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This thesis examines whether and in what ways ‘terrorism’ has featured in the UK’s 
interpretation of Article 1F, the ‘exclusion clause’ of the 1951 Refugee Convention, and how 
the provision is applied to suspected terrorists in the practice of decision makers. This 
research draws on a number of sources, including Freedom of Information requests, 
questionnaires and interviews conducted with immigration judges, the Home Office’s 
exclusion unit and legal practitioners. All reported UK cases concerning Article 1F were 
analysed, as were the Home Office’s asylum guidance documents, primary and secondary 
UK legislation and international legal sources pertaining to exclusion from refugee status. 
This research therefore provides an unprecedented and thorough analysis of whether and how 
terrorism is being employed in the interpretation and application of each of the individual 
limbs of Article 1F. Although there has been a clear governmental and political drive to 
ensure that refugee status is not granted to terrorists, this research reveals that the 
predominant practice of both courts and tribunals in the UK and the Home Office’s exclusion 
unit has not been to focus on whether an individual is a ‘terrorist’, but instead whether they 
have committed a serious crime within the meaning of Article 1F. Where the term ‘terrorism’ 
has been employed, courts and tribunals have looked to international rather than domestic 
definitions of the term in order to arrive at an ‘autonomous meaning’. While there has been 
an increase in the application of Article 1F in the UK over the last decade, in practice the use 
of the provision has remained exceptional and appears to be subject to a fair degree of rigour. 
Nevertheless, a number of recommendations are made by which the quality of decision 
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In 2001, shortly after the 9/11 terrorist attacks on United States, the United Nations (UN) 
Security Council called on Member States to ‘[e]nsure … that refugee status is not abused by 
the perpetrators, organizers or facilitators of terrorist acts’.
1
 This was not the first time the 
UN had called on States to exclude terrorists from refugee status, nor would it be the last.
2
 
The drive to deny the benefits of refugee status to suspected terrorists has led a number of 
states parties to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (the 1951 
Convention) to interpret Article 1F, its ‘exclusion clause’, so as to bring terrorism within the 
scope of the provision.
3
 However, although the UN Security Council has repeatedly called on 
Member States to exclude terrorists from refugee status, the Security Council did not define 
terrorism in these resolutions, nor did it refer to an existing definition of terrorism.
4
 Indeed, 
whilst the international community has repeatedly condemned terrorist acts, at present there 
is no universally agreed definition as to what in fact constitutes ‘terrorism’. The repeated 
resolutions of the UN Security Council calling on states to deny refugee status to terrorists 
therefore grant Member States a broad discretion to determine what ‘terrorism’ is and who a 
‘terrorist’ is. A number of commentators have expressed concern that this discretion leaves 
                                                          
1
 UN Security Council Resolution (UNSC Res) 1373 (28 September 2001) UN Doc S/RES/1373, para 3(g). 
2
 See also UNSC Res 1269 (19 October 1999) UN Doc S/RES/1269, para 4; UNSC Res 1624 (14 September 
2005) UN Doc S/RES/1624, preamble para 7; Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism 
(UNGA Dec 1994) (9 December 1994), annexed to UNGA Res 49/60 (17 February 1995) UN Doc 
A/Res/49/60, para 5(f); UNGA Declaration to Supplement the 1994 Declaration on Measures to Eliminate 
International Terrorism (UNGA Dec 1996) (17 December 1996), annexed to Res 51/210 (16 January 1997) UN 
Doc A/Res/51/210, preamble para 6, para 3; UNGA Res 56/160, (13 February 2002) UN Doc A/Res/56/160 
para 8; UNGA Res 59/195 (22 March 2005), UN Doc A/Res/59/195, para 10; UNGA Res 60/288 (20 
September 2006), UN Doc A/Res/60/288, para 7. 
3
 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (28 July 1951) 189 UNTS 137 (1951 Refugee Convention) 
Kidane W, ‘The Terrorism Bar to Asylum in Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States: 
Transporting Best Practices’ (2010) 33 Fordham International Law Journal 300-371; Mathew P, ‘Resolution 
1373 – A Call to Pre-empt Asylum Seekers?’ Jane McAdam (ed) Forced Migration, Human Rights and Security 
(Portland 2008) 19-61; Blake N, ‘Exclusion from Refugee Protection: Serious Non Political Crimes after 9/11’ 
(2003) 4 European Journal of Migration and Law 425-447; Zard M, ‘Exclusion, terrorism and the Refugee 
Convention’ (2002) 13 Forced Migration Review 32-34. 
4
 In its Technical Guide to Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1373 in 2009, the Counter-Terrorism 
Committee of the Security Council stated that “there is no universally agreed definition of terrorism. Therefore, 
each state will approach this issue [i.e. the criminalisation of terrorist offences] on the basis of its own domestic 
legal framework”. UNSC Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate ‘Technical Guide to 
Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1373’ (2009) S/2009/620, 44. 
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the 1951 Convention’s exclusion clause open to abuse by Member States seeking to exclude 
genuine asylum seekers from refugee status.
5
  
Over the past two decades there has indeed been an increased interest in the 
application of Article 1F globally, much of which appears to have stemmed from the UN 
resolutions outlined above.
6
 In its early years, Article 1F was used rarely and attracted little 
legal or academic attention. However, exclusion from refugee status under Article 1F is an 
area which is rapidly growing in importance in the United Kingdom (UK) and other states 
parties to the 1951 Convention.
7
 Despite the increased importance of Article 1F in UK 
asylum law, there is at present a lack of clear information on the application and 
interpretation of the provision in the UK. Unlike many other European States, the UK does 
not at present publish comprehensive data on exclusion from refugee status under Article 1F.
8
 
Furthermore, although an important and highly politicised area of law, the use and 
interpretation of Article 1F in the UK is a little researched topic.  
The purpose of this research is therefore to examine whether and in what ways 
‘terrorism’ has featured in the UK’s interpretation of Article 1F of the 1951 Convention, and 
how the provision has been applied in the practice of decision-makers in the UK. Although 
the term ‘terrorism’ does not appear in the text of Article 1F, terrorism has at least the 
                                                          
5
 Zanchettin M, Asylum and Refugee Protection After September 11: Towards Increasing Restrictionism? 
(Refugee Study Centre, 2003); Mathew P, ‘Resolution 1373’ (n 3) 19-61; Goodwin-Gill G, ‘Forced Migration: 
Refugees, Rights and Security’, in Jane McAdam (ed) Forced Migration Human Rights and Security (Portland 
2008) 1-17; Zard M, ‘Exclusion, terrorism and the Refugee Convention’ (n 3) 32-34; Saul B, ‘Protecting 
Refugees in the Global “War on Terror” (2008) University of Sydney, Legal Studies Research Paper No. 
08/130. 
6
 Gilbert G, ‘Exclusion under Article 1F since 2001: two steps backwards, one step forward’ (n 6). Turk V, 
‘Forced Migration and Security’ (2003) 15(1) International Journal of Refugee Law 115. Brouwer also notes 
that UNSC Res 1373 was presented as the main justification of proposals or measures taken at EU level in the 
fight against terrorism, including in relation to EU and national measures relating to exclusion from refugee 
status. Brouwer E, ‘Immigration, Asylum and Terrorism: A Changing Dynamic, Legal and Practical 
Developments in the EU in Response to the Terrorist Attacks of 11.09’ (2003) 4 European Journal of Migration 
and Law 411-414. See also Guild E, and Garlick M, ‘Refugee Protection, Counter-terrorism, and Exclusion in 
the European Union’ (2010) 29(4) Refugee Survey Quarterly 63-82.  
7
 Kapferer notes that while exclusion decisions remain a fairly small percentage of the overall number of asylum 
decisions, there has been a considerable increase in attention being paid to the issue of exclusion in asylum 
policy, jurisprudence and academic commentary in the last ten years. Sibylle Kapferer, ‘Revision of UNHCR’s 
Guidelines on Exclusion: Update’ (Nordic Asylum Seminar, Bergen June 2013) 3-4. Boccardi notes that during 
the first two decades following the adoption of the 1951 Convention Article 1F was very rarely invoked, and 
that its more frequent use is probably a direct result of the expansion of the purposes and principles of the UN 
through UN measures in the fields of human rights, drug trafficking and international crime.  Boccardi I, Europe 
and Refugees: Towards an EU Asylum Policy (Kluwer Law International, 2002) 15. 
8
 See, for example, the reports of the UNHCR and European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE), based in 
part on State information on the use of Article 1F. UNHCR ‘Asylum in the European Union: A Study of the 
Implementation of the Qualification Directive’ (November 2007): 
<www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/473050632.html> accessed 12 December 2013; European Council on Refugees 
and Exiles (ECRE) ‘The Impact of the EU Qualification Directive on International Protection’ (October 2008): 
<www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4908758d2.html> accessed 12 December 2013. 
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potential to feature largely in the interpretation and application of the provision. A terrorist 
act could be considered to amount to a war crime or crime against humanity under Article 
1F(a), a ‘serious non-political crime’ under Article 1F(b), or constitute ‘acts contrary to the 
purposes and principles of the United Nations’ under Article 1F(c). Those who participate in 
the activities of a terrorist organisation may also be considered responsible for the 
commission of such acts, and therefore fall within the scope of the provision.  
This research draws on a number of sources, including data provided by the Home 
Office in response to a number of Freedom of Information (FOI) requests made by the 
present researcher, interviews and questionnaires conducted with immigration judges sitting 
in tribunals throughout the UK, and interviews conducted with legal representatives and the 
Home Office’s exclusion unit. All reported UK cases concerning exclusion from refugee 
status under Article 1F were analysed, as were the Home Office’s asylum guidance 
documents, primary and secondary UK legislation and legislative instruments and 
international legal sources pertaining to exclusion from refugee status. This research therefore 
provides, in an unprecedented way, a thorough analysis of whether and how terrorism is 
being employed in the UK’s interpretation and application of each of the individual limbs of 
Article 1F. 
The specific questions addressed in this research are: 
 To what extent and in what ways does terrorism feature in the in the UK’s 
interpretation of each of the limbs of Article 1F? How have these interpretations 
changed and developed over time? 
 How often is Article 1F raised in the UK? On what grounds? Has there been a change 
in the frequency with which the provision has been raised in recent years? If so, why? 
 What is the process by which an individual is excluded from refugee status in the UK? 
How does this apply to those suspected of involvement in terrorist activity? 
This research began with the expectation that the past decade would have seen a dramatic 
increase in the number of instances in the UK where an individual was excluded from refugee 
status for their suspected role in terrorist activity. This expectation was based on a number of 
factors, including the prominent role played by the UK in the adoption of UN resolutions 
calling on Member States to exclude terrorists from refugee status, the introduction of 
primary legislation in the UK incorporating a broad definition of terrorism in the 
interpretation of Article 1F(c) and the concerns of a number of commentators that the absence 
of a universally accepted definition of terrorism could result in the abuse of Article 1F to 
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exclude genuine refugees from the protection of the 1951 Convention. However, this research 
has revealed that, although there has certainly been an increase in the application of Article 
1F in the UK, this increase has predominantly been in relation to those suspected of 
committing international crimes under Article 1F(a) (war crimes and crimes against 
humanity) rather than involvement in terrorist activities. Exclusion from refugee status under 
Articles 1F(b) and (c), in which terrorism has featured, has remained truly exceptional. 
Although there has been a clear (inter)governmental and political drive to ensure that 
refugee status is not granted to terrorists, the predominant practice of both courts and 
tribunals in the UK and the Home Office’s exclusion unit has been to examine whether a 
particular act meets the definition of one or more of the crimes or acts enumerated in Article 
1F, rather than rely on the characterisation of the act or individual as ‘terrorist’ in nature. 
Courts and tribunals in the UK have, on the whole, adopted a restrictive approach to the 
interpretation of the provision, an approach under which it has been stressed that Article 1F is 
not to be equated with a simple anti-terrorist measure. To this end, courts and tribunals have 
rejected domestic definitions of the crimes and acts listed in Article 1F, and rather looked to 
international legal sources to determine the ‘autonomous’ meaning of the provision as a 
matter of international law.  
The practice of both courts and tribunals in the UK and the Home Office in relation to 
Article 1F(a) has been to look to sources of international criminal law to determine whether 
the act in question amounts to a war crime or crimes against humanity. A consequence of this 
approach is that individuals who could very readily be depicted as ‘terrorists’ or members of 
a terrorist organisation are not described as such. The predominant focus on Article 1F(a) and 
international criminal sources within the Home Office appears to be largely a result of the 
close relationship of these specialised units with the governmental policy of ‘no safe haven 
for war criminals’. In common with the approach adopted in the interpretation of the crimes 
enumerated in Article 1F(a), courts and tribunals in the UK have recently begun to look 
towards international criminal sources in order to determine the standard of responsibility 
necessary for an individual to be excluded under Article 1F. In advocating an approach more 
closely aligned with international criminal law, the Supreme Court and Court of Appeal have 
disapproved the previous guidance on Article 1F responsibility which focused on the 
‘terrorist’ nature of an organisation, and rather stressed that there had to be serious reasons 
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for considering an individual had voluntarily contributed in a significant way to the 
commission of an Article 1F crime.
9
 
The limb of Article 1F that has been traditionally relied on to exclude terrorists from 
refugee status, Article 1F(b) (serious non-political crime), appears to now be very rarely 
applied in the UK. This may be a result of the geographical and temporal limitations inherent 
in the provision and the requirement that a specific crime be identified in the exclusion 
decision.
10
 The Court of Appeal appears to have furthermore recently moved away from the 
‘terrorist’ focus of Article 1F(b) established in the earlier cases, and stressed that merely 
labelling an offence ‘terrorist’ is not adequate to determine that the offence is ‘serious’ for the 
purpose of the provision. Rather, the Court was of the opinion that the individual facts of 
each case must be considered in order to establish whether the crime in question is 
sufficiently serious to warrant exclusion from refugee status.
11
 
The limb of Article 1F under which terrorism has featured most prominently in the 
UK is Article 1F(c), ‘acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations’. That 
terrorism has featured largely in the UK’s interpretation of this provision is unsurprising, as 
the UN in a number of resolutions has declared that ‘acts, methods and practices of terrorism 
are contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations’, recalling the wording of 
Article 1F(c) and explicitly including terrorism in this ground of exclusion.
12
 However, much 
like Article 1F(b), the application of Article 1F(c) in the UK appears to have remained truly 
exceptional. When examining the meaning of ‘terrorism’ for the purpose of this provision, 
courts and tribunals in the UK have generally chosen not to rely on the UK’s broad domestic 
definition of terrorism, but rather looked to international and regional definitions of the term. 
Recently, the Supreme Court rejected the UK’s domestic definition of terrorism entirely for 
the purpose of Article 1F(c), and instead stressed that, in order to fall within the scope of the 
provision, the terrorist activity in question must ‘attack the very basis of the international 
community’s coexistence’, being assessed with regard to its gravity and impact on 
international peace and security.
13
 Although courts and tribunals in the UK appear to have 
been increasingly strict in their interpretations of ‘terrorism’ in the context of Article 1F(c), a 
                                                          
9
 R JS (Sri Lanka), R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (Rev 1) [2010] 
UKSC 15, considered in Chapter 5. 
10
 Article 1F(b) is limited to acts committed outside the country of refuge prior to admission as a refugee. 
11
 AH (Algeria) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] EWCA Civ 395, considered in Chapter 3. 
12
 UNGA Dec 1994, para 2; UNGA Dec 1996, para 2; UNSC Res 1373, para 5; UNSC Res 1377, preamble para 
5; UNSC Res 1624, preamble para 8. 
13
 Al-Sirri v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] UKSC 54, as explored in Chapter 4. 
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recent development has seen the provision expanded to apply to attacks directed at UN-
mandated combatant forces.
14
 It is suggested that the Supreme Court may have been 
misguided in this respect and that the decision be revisited. 
While there has been an increase in the application of Article 1F in the UK over the 
last two decades, in practice the use of the provision has remained exceptional. The number 
of cases in which the Home Office has excluded individuals from refugee status for 
committing terrorist acts remains infrequent, and seems to have decreased in the last three 
years. In cases where terrorism is explicitly cited as a ground of exclusion it seems to be 
Article 1F(c) that is relied upon over and above the other limbs of Article 1F, and in a 
number of cases the Home Office has relied on this provision to revoke refugee status for acts 
committed in the UK or to exclude those who have participated in military activity that does 
not amount to an international crime under Article 1F(a). 
 A recurring theme raised by participants that took part in this research relates to the 
unfamiliarity of many Home Office interviewing officers, immigration judges and Home 
Office Presenting Officers with the issues raised by Article 1F cases. This thesis therefore 
concludes with a number of recommendations by which the exclusion process in the UK 
could be improved, to enable those involved to fully consider the complex legal and 
evidential issues involved, improve the quality of decision making and add a greater degree 
of fairness to the proceedings. 
  
Terminology 
This thesis is entitled ‘Exclusion from Refugee Status: Terrorism and the UK's Interpretation 
and Application of Article 1F of the 1951 Convention’. ‘Interpretation’ here is taken to mean 
the way Article 1F is construed in the UK, by courts and tribunals and the executive, while 
‘application’ refers to the practical use of Article 1F by the Home Office, courts and tribunals 
and legal representatives. 
The meaning of the term ‘terrorism’ is considered in Chapter 1 of this thesis. For the 
moment it is sufficient to note that ‘terrorism’ is an amorphous and ambiguous term. A 
multitude of definitions exist at present within international and domestic legal systems, none 
of which have achieved universal acceptance. The purpose of this research is not to provide a 





definition of terrorism, but to examine whether and in what ways ‘terrorism’ has featured in 
the UK’s interpretation and application of Article 1F.  
 The thesis examines the UK’s interpretation and application of Article 1F. The 
domestic legislation, immigration rules and legislative instruments referred to throughout this 
thesis apply to the UK in its entirety. Asylum applications in the UK fall within the remit of 
the Home Office, and were previously dealt with by the UK Border Agency (UKBA), a 
specialised border control agency of the Home Office. The Home Secretary Theresa May 
recently announced that she has decided to end the Executive Agency status of the UKBA 
and bring its functions back within the Home Office.
15
 However, for all intents and purposes 
this has not affected the exclusion guidance and procedure adopted by the UKBA, and so 
these will be referred to throughout this analysis. Particularly relevant for exclusion issues are 
the UKBA’s Asylum Process Guidance (APG) ‘Exclusion: Article 1F of the Refugee 
Convention’, which was most recently updated in May 2012.
16
 A number of the sources 
referred to throughout this research therefore refer to the UKBA, and the terms ‘Home 
Office’ and ‘Border Agency’ are sometimes used interchangeably. The remit of the Home 
Office (and the UKBA) also extends throughout the UK to include England, Wales, Scotland 
and Northern Ireland. 
 Similarly, the tribunal system for dealing with asylum appeals extends throughout the 
UK. Appeals against a negative immigration decision (which do not involve national security 
issues) are heard within a two-tier tribunal system which consists of a First-tier Tribunal and 
Upper Tribunal, each of which has an Immigration and Asylum Chamber.
17
 This new tribunal 
system replaced the single tier Asylum and Immigration Tribunal (AIT) in 2010. For ease of 
reference, both tribunal systems are referred to throughout this research as the ‘immigration 
tribunal’, except where differences between the two systems are materially relevant to the 
legal analysis. If the immigration decision was wholly or partly taken in reliance on 
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 Home Office, ‘Oral Statement’ (26 March 2013):  
<www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/sitecontent/newsarticles/2013/march/42-hom-sec> accessed 12 December 2013. 
16
 UKBA, Asylum Instruction ‘Exclusion: Article 1F of the Refugee Convention’ (Home Office Exclusion APG) 
(30 May 2012): 
<www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/sitecontent/documents/policyandlaw/asylumprocessguidance/consideringandde
cidingtheclaim/guidance/exclusion.pdf?view=Binary> accessed 12 December 2013. 
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 Created by the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007. 
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information which should not be made public in the interests of national security, appeal lies 
to the Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC) and not to the tribunal.
18
 
 Other domestic courts which are frequently referred to throughout this thesis are the 
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal. Again, the remit of the Supreme Court extends 
throughout the UK, as did its predecessor the House of Lords. However, references to the 
Court of Appeal refer only to the Court of Appeal of England and Wales. Unfortunately, no 
decisions of the Court of Appeal of Northern Ireland or the Scottish Court of Session 
(regional equivalents of the Court of Appeal of England and Wales) concerning Article 1F 
were found throughout the course of this research.
19
 References to the Court of Appeal 
throughout this thesis therefore refer to the Court of Appeal of England and Wales only. 
This research concerns the UK’s interpretation and application of Article 1F of the 
1951 Convention. This provision should not be confused with Articles 1D and 1E, which 
exclude from the protection of the 1951 Convention those who are receiving protection or 
assistance from other UN agencies, or those whose legal status is largely assimilated to that 
of a national of the host country, respectively.
20
 Article 1F must also not be confused with the 
exception to protection against refoulement contained in Article 33(2), or the exception to the 
prohibition on expulsion contained in Article 32 of the 1951 Convention.
21
 These provisions 
relate not to exclusion from refugee status, but rather the expulsion of a refugee based on host 
state security or public order concerns. Whilst there have been concerns that a number of 
                                                          
18
 The Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC) was set up by the Special Immigration Appeals 
Commission Act of 1997. The jurisdiction of SIAC is to hear immigration-related appeals where the Secretary 
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 Although a Scottish decision refusing leave to appeal to the Scottish Court of Session was D.K.N. v A 
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membership of a particular social group or political opinion.’ Paragraph 2 of article 33, however, provides that 
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States have conflated these provisions in domestic legislation and jurisprudence,
22
 this does 
not appear to have been the practice in the UK.
23
 Articles 32 and 33(2) of the 1951 
Convention are therefore only referred to incidentally in this thesis, where such reference is 
necessary to clarify the contours of Article 1F. 
 
Structure of the Thesis 
The present thesis comprises this introduction, seven chapters and a conclusion. Chapter 1 
gives an introduction to the topic of this thesis by exploring the meaning of terrorism in 
international law and how terrorist acts and actors may fall to be excluded from refugee status 
under Article 1F. The purpose and scope of this research is further outlined, as are the 
methodologies employed. This serves as a broader introduction to the examination of the 
UK’s interpretation and application of the provision throughout the thesis.  
 Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5 of this thesis comprise a primarily doctrinal analysis of the 
UK’s interpretation of terrorism in the context of Article 1F, while Chapters 6 and 7 draw 
largely on the empirical aspects of this research and analyse the application of the provision 
in practice. Chapter 2 examines the overall approach taken by UK courts and tribunals to the 
interpretation of Article 1F, which is assessed with regard to the rule of treaty interpretation 
contained in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and the interpretive techniques 
developed by courts and treaty bodies when interpreting treaties of a human rights or 
humanitarian character.  
 Chapters 3 and 4 analyse whether and in what ways terrorism features in the UK’s 
interpretation of the crimes and acts enumerated in Article 1F. Chapter 3 focuses on the UK’s 
interpretations of Article 1F(a) and (b) crimes and Chapter 4 considers how the UK has 
interpreted terrorism in the context of Article 1F(c)’s reference to ‘acts contrary to the 
purposes and principles of the United Nations’. In Chapter 5, the extent to which terrorism 
has featured in the UK’s interpretation of the level of responsibility required to give rise to 
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Article 1F exclusion is examined, with particular attention given to the issue of membership 
of a terrorist organisation. Reference is made throughout to international practice and 
guidance on the interpretation of these provisions and the principles of treaty interpretation 
explored in Chapter 2. 
 Chapters 6 and 7 of this thesis are drawn primarily from the empirical aspects of this 
study, including the results of case analyses, Home Office data and interviews and 
questionnaires conducted with the different stakeholder groups that participated in this 
research. Chapter 6 focuses on the application of Article 1F in the UK. The primary questions 
discussed are: When is Article 1F raised? Which limb of Article 1F is relied upon in 
exclusion decisions? How often is Article 1F raised and has this changed over time? Who is 
being excluded under Article 1F? Throughout this chapter particular attention is given to the 
application of the provision to suspected terrorists. Chapter 7 examines the exclusion process 
in the UK, in particular the process by which Article 1F decisions are made within the Home 
Office and the evidence relied upon to support such decisions; the treatment of evidence and 
legal issues on appeal before the immigration tribunal and the SIAC and; the practical and 
legal consequences of exclusion from refugee status in the UK 
Finally, the conclusion draws together the principal issues identified in previous 
chapters in order to evaluate and explain how terrorism features in the UK’s practice of 
















Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
The 1951 Convention was drafted in the aftermath of the Second World War, in an attempt to 
address the problems posed and faced by over 10 million people who had become refugees as 
a result of the events of the war.
24
 The Convention grants a broad host of rights and benefits 
to those that fall within the definition of ‘refugee’ contained in its Article 1A.
25
 That is, a 
person who is outside their country of origin, and unable or unwilling to return to that country 
due to a fear of individual persecution.
26
 However, Article 1F provides that that the 
Convention:  
‘shall not apply to any person with respect to whom there are serious reasons for 
considering that: 
(a) he has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity 
… 
(b) he has committed a serious non-political crime … 
(c) he has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United 
Nations’. 
An individual who falls within the scope of Article 1F is excluded from the scope of the 1951 
Convention per se, and all rights and privileges contained therein, notwithstanding a well-
founded fear of persecution.
27
  
The term terrorism does not appear in the text of Article 1F, nor was the issue raised 
during the debates surrounding the drafting of the provision. However, the exclusion of 
terrorists from refugee protection is a theme which appears in a number of international 
instruments which both preceded and were adopted subsequent to the 1951 Convention. Prior 
to the Second World War, international instruments relating to the legal status of refugees did 
not contain exclusion provisions as such, as these instruments defined refugees in terms of 
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 Boccardi notes that the five years that followed the end of the Second World War were of pivotal importance 
for the development of the current international refugee regime. Boccardi I, ‘Confronting a False Dilemma: EU 
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 The 1951 Convention provides refugees with key civil and socio-economic rights. See James Hathaway, The 
Rights of Refugees under International Law (CUP 2005). 
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 The temporal limitation of the refugee definition to ‘events occurring before 1 January 1951’ was removed by 
the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (31 January 1967) 606 UNTS 606 (the 1967 Protocol). 
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 This does not mean, however, that an excluded individual will cease to benefit from the rights and benefits 
contained in other international instruments, human rights treaties in particular. 
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discrete groups of persons considered in need of protection.
28
 It was only with the move 
toward a more individualistic refugee definition, which focused more on the circumstances of 
the individual, rather than group membership, that the concept of exclusion emerged. The 
Constitution of the International Refugee Organisation (IRO Constitution), excluded large 
numbers of individuals from the IRO’s mandate. These included: ‘war criminals, quislings 
and traitors’ and those who had, since the end of hostilities, participated in any organisation 




Despite the reference to those who had participated in terrorist organisations in the 
exclusion clauses of the IRO Constitution, terrorism was not an issue debated during the 
drafting of Article 1F nor the equivalent provision (Paragraph 7) contained in the Statute of 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR Statute).
30
 As both the 
UNHCR Statute and the 1951 Convention were drafted in the wake of the Second World 
War, considerable emphasis was rather placed on the need to exclude war criminals and 
associated persons from refugee protection. However, individuals who commit terrorist acts 
are explicitly excluded from the protection of a number of regional instruments adopted since 
the 1951 Convention came into force.  
The exclusion provision of the 1969 Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of 
Refugee Problems in Africa (OAU Refugee Convention) does not include a reference to 
terrorism.
31
 Terrorism is, however, explicitly mentioned in the exclusion provisions contained 
in the 1994 Arab Convention on Regulating Status of Refugees in the Arab Countries (Arab 
Refugee Convention),
32
 and the European Union’s (EU) Qualification Directives which form 
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 UN Constitution of the International Refugee Organisation, New York (15 December 1946) 18 UNTS 3, 
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 UNGA Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (14 December 1950) 
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considering that he has committed a crime covered by the provisions of treaties of extradition or a crime 
mentioned in article VI of the London Charter of the International Military Tribunal or by the provisions of 
article 14, paragraph 2, of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.’ 
31
 Organization of African Unity (OAU) Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in 
Africa (10 September 1969) 1001 UNTS 45 (OAU Refugee Convention). 
32
 League of Arab States 'Arab Convention on Regulating Status of Refugees in the Arab Countries’ (1994) (not 
yet ratified) (Arab Refugee Convention).  
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part of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS).
33
 Article 2(1) of the Arab 
Convention provides that the provisions of the Convention shall not apply to any person who 
‘[h]as been convicted of having committed a war crime, a crime against humanity or a 
terrorist crime as defined in the international conventions and covenants.’
34
 The Arab 
Convention has not, however, been ratified, and it is unlikely it will come into force. 
Terrorism also appears in the exclusion provisions of the EU’s Qualification Directives.
35
 In 
relation to Article 1F(c)’s reference to ‘acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the 
United Nations, the preambles to the Qualification Directives provide: 
‘Acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations are set out in the 
Preamble and Articles 1 and 2 of the Charter of the United Nations and are, amongst 
others, embodied in the United Nations Resolutions relating to measures combating 
terrorism, which declare that ‘acts, methods and practices of terrorism are contrary to 
the purposes and principles of the United Nations’ and that ‘knowingly financing, 




The EU Directives therefore refer directly to UN resolutions which refer to ‘acts, methods 
and practices of terrorism’ falling within the scope of Article 1F(c) of the 1951 Convention.
37
 
 These resolutions are those that have been adopted by the UN General Assembly and 
Security Council over the last two decades, beginning with the General Assembly’s 
Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism (the 1994 Declaration) and 
Declaration to Supplement the 1994 Declaration (the 1996 Declaration). These declarations 
contain several paragraphs that concern refugees and asylum seekers. Member States affirm 
that ‘acts, methods and practices of terrorism are contrary to the purposes and principles of 
the United Nations’ and also that ‘knowingly financing, planning and inciting terrorist acts 
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 Council Directive 2004/83/EC on the minimum standards for the qualification and status of third country 
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 2004 Qualification Directive, art 12; 2011 Qualification Directive, art 12. 
36
 2004 Qualification Directive, recital 22; 2011 Qualification Directive, recital 31. 
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 See Boccardi for consideration of how Article 1F was included in previous EU measures, including the 1996 
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Policy (n 7) 107-110. 
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are also contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations’. States are also called 
on to ‘take appropriate … before granting refugee status, for the purpose of ensuring that the 
asylum-seeker has not participated in terrorist acts’.
38
 These provisions in the 1996 
Declaration appear to have begun as a result of a UK proposal.
39
 
 The reference to asylum seekers and refugees in resolutions on terrorism first 
appeared in the UN Security Council in Resolution 1269 of 1999. This resolution ‘Calls upon 
all States to … take appropriate measures … before granting refugee status, for the purpose 
of ensuring that the asylum seeker has not participated in terrorist acts’.
40
 Two Security 
Council resolutions concerning terrorism which included reference to asylum seekers and 
refugees also followed the 9/11 attacks on the United States in 2001. Resolutions 1373 and 
1377 again call on States to ‘take appropriate measures … before granting refugee status, for 
the purpose of ensuring that the asylum seeker has not participated in terrorist acts’, and 
further to ‘[e]nsure, in conformity with international law, that refugee status is not abused by 
the perpetrators, organizers or facilitators of terrorist acts’.
41
 Both resolutions firmly declare 
that ‘acts, methods, and practices of terrorism are contrary to the purposes and principles of 
the United Nations and that knowingly financing, planning and inciting terrorist acts are also 
contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations’.
42
 The Security Council again 
reaffirmed that ‘acts, methods, and practices of terrorism are contrary to the purposes and 
principles of the United Nations’ in Resolution 1624 of 2005.
43
 Again, Resolution 1624 
appears to be the result of a UK initiative.
44
  
In line with the increased international attention focused on the threat posed by 
international terrorism, there has been a clear inter-governmental desire on the part of States 
to ensure terrorists are excluded from refugee status. However, the Security Council did not 
define terrorism in these resolutions, nor did it refer to an existing definition of terrorism.
45
 
Indeed, whilst the international community has repeatedly condemned terrorist acts, at 
present there is no universally agreed definition as to what in fact constitutes ‘terrorism’. 
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1. What is terrorism? 
Despite the great amount of legal and political attention within the UN that has focused on 
the threat posed by international terrorism, terrorism as a concept has proved one the 
international community has struggled to define. At present, there is no universally agreed 
definition of ‘terrorism’.  
Recently, attempts were made to include terrorism as one of the core international 
crimes within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. However, these attempts 
failed, as states were unable to agree on a definition of the crime.
46
 There have also been 
attempts to draft a Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism, but negotiations 
have fallen into deadlock, again because a definition of ‘terrorism’ cannot be agreed upon.
47
 
The primary problem that states encounter when attempting to agree upon a definition of 
terrorism concerns the question of whether an exception should be made for the activities of 
national liberation movements. Hence the old saying ‘one person’s terrorist is another’s 
freedom fighter’. Was Nelson Mandela a terrorist or a freedom fighter? Is violence 
unjustified per se, or can exceptions sometimes be made, for example, for those fighting 
against repressive regimes?  
Due to the difficulty agreeing upon a universal definition of ‘terrorism’, the 
international community has thus far preferred to adopt international conventions concerning 
certain categories of acts that are considered to be so heinous that they permit no exception 
for national liberation movements.
48
 There are at present a host of international counter-




Nevertheless, some authors have argued that a definition of the crime of international 
terrorism has evolved as a matter of customary international law. Basing his analysis on the 
adoption of national laws, judgements of national courts, UN General Assembly resolutions 
and the ratification of international counter-terrorism conventions, Cassese argues that a 
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 UNGA ‘Final Act of Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court’ 
(17 July 1998) UN Doc A/CONF.183/10 Resolution E. A definition of terrorism was also not included 
following the Review Conference in Kampala in 2010. 
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 Ben Saul, Defining Terrorism in International Law (Oxford University Press 2006) 184 et seq. 
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 Anthony Aust, Handbook of International Law (2
nd
 ed, CUP 2010) 265. 
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 For example, Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (16 December 1970) 860 UNTS 
105; International Convention against the Taking of Hostages (17 December 1979) 1316 UNTS 205; 
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consensus has emerged on the objective and subjective elements of a crime of international 
terrorism in times of peace, which includes three core elements: 
(i) acts normally criminalised under national penal systems; 
(ii) which are intended to provoke a state of terror in the population or coerce a state 
or international organisation to take (or abstain from) some sort of action;  
(iii) are politically or ideologically motivated.
50
 
Terrorism is therefore an umbrella term that can potentially cover a wide range of acts, 
provided Cassese’s three cumulative conditions are met. These acts will generally already be 
crimes under domestic and/or international law. The classification of these crimes as 
‘terrorist’ hinges on their underlying motivation, i.e. that the act be politically or ideologically 
motivated and intended to provoke a state of terror in the public or coerce a government or 
international organisation.  
 The Special Tribunal for Lebanon recently declared that a customary crime of 
terrorism in times of peace has crystallised at international law.
51
 This definition of terrorism 
comprises three elements:  
(a) The perpetration of a criminal act (such as murder, kidnapping, hostage-taking, 
arson, and so on), or threatening such an act;  
(b) The intent to spread fear among the population (which would generally entail the 
creation of a public danger) or directly or indirectly coerce a national or international 
authority to take some action, or to refrain from taking it; and 
(c) When the act involves a transnational element.   
This definition of terrorism essentially replicates Cassese’s earlier formulations, with the 
added criteria that the act must involve some transnational element.
52
 Again, the definition 
permits a considerable range of acts that may constitute ‘terrorism’, and such acts will 
generally already be crimes under domestic or international law. However, the validity of 
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recognising a crime of terrorism under customary international law has been doubted.
53
 It 
furthermore remains to be seen whether the Tribunal’s definition is employed by national 
courts, since the decision is not binding on courts other than the Special Tribunal.
54
  
 Whilst many definitions of terrorism exist, no one definition has achieved universal 
acceptance. The closest that the UN Security Council has come to defining the term was in 
Resolution 1566 of 2004, in which the Council offered a non-binding definition of the term, 
allowing States to adopt their own definitions.
55
 The absence of a universally accepted 
definition of terrorism means that it is left to individual States, or regional organisations, to 
determine the range of acts (or crimes) that may be described as ‘terrorist’, and whether an 
exception is permitted for national liberation movements.  
‘Terrorism’ is therefore an amorphous and ambiguous term. A multitude of 
definitions exist at present within international and domestic legal systems, none of which 
have achieved universal acceptance. The purpose of this research is not to provide a 
definition of terrorism; this topic has been examined extensively elsewhere.
56
 Rather, this 
research examines whether and in what ways ‘terrorism’ has featured in the UK’s 
interpretation and application of Article 1F. As will be considered below, although the term 
‘terrorism’ does not appear in the text of Article 1F itself, those who commit terrorist acts 
may fall to be excluded from refugee status under the provision, as the acts in question may 
fall within the definitions of the crimes enumerated therein. Similarly, those who participate 
in the activities of a terrorist organisation may be considered responsible for the commission 
of such acts and therefore fall within the scope of the provision. 
 
2. Article 1F and terrorism 
Although the term ‘terrorism’ does not appear in the text of Article 1F, terrorism has at least 
the potential to feature largely in the interpretation of the provision. Many individuals 
suspected of committing terrorists acts will not qualify as refugees under Article 1A of the 
1951 Convention at all, since they may not be fleeing persecution but legitimate prosecution 
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in a third state.
57
 Those that are fleeing persecution may nevertheless be excluded from 
refugee status under Article 1F. A terrorist act could be considered to amount to a war crime 
or crime against humanity under Article 1F(a). Provided they take place in the context of an 
armed conflict, the concept of ‘war crime’ includes many acts that would be considered 
terrorist in nature, such as intentionally directing attacks against civilians and civilian objects, 
using indiscriminate means of warfare, and taking hostages.
58
 Massive attacks on a civilian 
population may also constitute a ‘crime against humanity’ under Article 1F(a). Attacks on a 
civilian population committed by a terrorist organisation, in the context of a widespread and 
systematic attack against it, may therefore fall within the definition of crimes against 
humanity as a matter of international law.
59
  
 Terrorist acts that do not meet the gravity of a war crime or crime against humanity 
may nevertheless fall within the scope of Article IF(b) of the 1951 Convention, which 
excludes those that have committed ‘a serious non-political crime’
60
 from refugee status. 
Although Article 1F(b) refers to serious non-political crimes, terrorist acts may fall within the 
scope of this provision despite being committed with political objectives when the act in 
question is disproportionate to the alleged objective.
61
 Many terrorist acts will also be 
considered sufficiently ‘serious’ to fall within the scope of the provision. 
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 The final ground of exclusion under Article 1F is for those who are ‘guilty of acts 
contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations’. As highlighted above, a 
number of UN resolutions call on states to exclude terrorists from refugee status and state that 
‘acts methods and practices of terrorism are contrary to the purposes and principles of the 
United Nations’, specifically recalling the wording of Article 1F(c) of the 1951 Convention, 
and including terrorism within this ground of exclusion.
62
 Terrorism has therefore explicitly 
been held to fall within the scope of Article 1F(c).
63
 Those who participate in the activities of 
a terrorist organisation may also be considered responsible for the commission of such acts, 
and therefore fall within the scope of the Article 1F. 
Individuals who are suspected of committing terrorist acts may therefore be excluded 
from refugee status under Articles 1F(a), (b) and/or (c) of the 1951 Convention. However, in 
the absence of a universally agreed definition of terrorism, considerable discretion is left to 
Member States to determine what ‘terrorism’ is and who a ‘terrorist’ is. A number of 
commentators have expressed concern that this discretion leaves the 1951 Convention’s 




There has clearly been a strong political drive within the UK to ensure that terrorists 
are excluded from refugee status. As noted above, a number of the UN resolutions relating to 
terrorism and refugees began life as UK proposals. In addition, in 2006 the UK’s Immigration 
Asylum and Nationality Act came into force, s 54 of which provides that “[i]n the 
construction and application of Article 1(F)(c) of the Refugee Convention the reference to 
acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations shall be taken as including 
... (a) acts of committing, preparing or instigating terrorism ... and (b) acts of encouraging or 
inducing others to commit, prepare or instigate terrorism”. The meaning of ‘terrorism’ here is 
that given by the UK’s broad domestic definition contained in the Terrorism Act 2000. Since 
the 1951 Convention has not been formally incorporated into the UK’s domestic legal 
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system, Article 1F represents one of the very few provisions of the 1951 Convention that are 
the subject of primary legislation in the UK. The increasing importance of Article 1F in the 
UK is furthermore highlighted by the fact that in the past few years the UK Supreme Court 
and the Court of Appeal have handed down an unprecedented number of decisions 
concerning the interpretation of the provision.
65
  
Despite the increased importance of Article 1F in UK asylum law, there is at present a 
lack of clear information on the application and interpretation of the provision in the UK. 
Unlike many other European States, the UK does not at present publish comprehensive data 
on exclusion from refugee status under Article 1F.
66
 Furthermore, although an important and 
highly politicised area of law, the use and interpretation of Article 1F in the UK is a little 
researched topic. While there is a body of literature which focuses on terrorism and the 
interpretation of Article 1F of the 1951 Convention, this literature primarily examines the 
international UN measures outlined above.
67
 Where the UK’s domestic practice has been 
considered, this has principally been subsumed within comparative analyses with Canada, 
Australia, the United States and other European countries.
68
 The wide scope of this research 
has restricted the depth of this examination and resulted in a rather limited analysis of the 
issue. Literature which has specifically considered the UK’s domestic practice has been 
limited to examination of case law and not taken into account the UK’s legislative 
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 and all this research fails to situate the UK’s practice within the wider 
international legal context, with the result that there appears to be lack of sustained legal 
appraisal of the UK’s practice in interpreting and applying Article 1F.  
The purpose of this research is therefore to provide, in an unprecedented way, 
knowledge and understanding of the ways in which terrorism is being employed in the UK’s 
interpretation and application of each of the individual limbs of Article 1F. The importance of 
this topic, and limited amount at present known about the use of Article 1F in the UK, was 
recognised by the Senior President’s Office of the UK’s immigration tribunal, which granted 
the present researcher permission to conduct research on Article 1F with immigration judges 
throughout the UK. Rigorous legal appraisal of the UK’s interpretation and application of 
Article 1F is sorely lacking at present, and it is therefore hoped that this research will provide 
a valuable and unique contribution to the academic literature in the field. The methodologies 
employed in this research are considered below. 
 
3. Methodology 
A number of methodologies are employed in this thesis. The primary methodology adopted in 
this research is doctrinal. A rigorous legal appraisal is made of the UK’s interpretation of 
terrorism in the context of each of the individual limbs of Article 1F. The interpretation of 
Article 1F in the UK is determined from a myriad of sources, these include primary and 
secondary legislation and legislative instruments, the jurisprudence of courts and tribunals 
and Home Office guidance documents. However, quantitative and qualitative methodologies 
are also employed to examine the practical use and application of Article 1F in the UK. This 
research draws on data provided by the Home Office, the results of an analysis of UK cases 
concerning exclusion from refugee status and interviews and questionnaires conducted with 
three stakeholder groups: immigration judges, legal representatives and UK Border Agency 
staff. The methodologies employed in this research are considered in further detail in the 
following sections.  
3.1 Quantitative research 
3.1.1. Home Office data 
Data concerning exclusion from refugee status in the UK under Article 1F was obtained from 
the Home Office in response to a number of Freedom of Information (FOI) requests made by 
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the present researcher. This data relates to initial decisions made by the UKBA, a specialised 
border control agency of the Home Office, in response to applications for asylum.
70
 This data 
details the number of individuals excluded from refugee status under Article 1F of the 1951 




There are, however, a number of limitations to the data provided by the Home Office:  
 Due to changes in the UKBA Case Information Database, the UKBA are unable to 
provide data prior to the last quarter of 2007.
72
 
 The data provided relates only to initial decisions by the UKBA. They therefore do 
not include: 
o Instances where Article 1F is raised at a later stage, i.e. after asylum has been 
granted or upon appeal
73
 




 The data outlines the refusals based on paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of Article 1F 
separately. This does not therefore indicate where the paragraphs were relied upon in 
conjunction, or indeed, where no particular paragraph of Article 1F was specified in 
the refusal.  
Due to the nature of the UKBA Case Information Database, further data on the use of Article 
1F in the UK was not available from the Home Office. Data was also not available for the 
number of individuals excluded from humanitarian protection,
75
 or granted protection but 
removed under Article 33(2) of the 1951 Convention.
76
 The reliability of the Home Office 
Data is discussed further in Chapter 6. 
3..1.2. Case analysis 
As part of this research, a quantitative analysis was also made of UK cases at tribunal and 
court level concerning exclusion from refugee status under Article 1F.  
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These cases were compiled from searches of legal databases such as Westlaw, BAILII 
and LexisNexis, and the Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Reported 
Determinations Database, in an attempt to capture all reported decisions concerning Article 
1F.
77
 The databases were searched for key terms such as ‘Article 1F’, ‘Article 1(F)’, 
‘exclusion’ and ‘Article 12(2)’. The method used in selecting cases for analysis involved a 
comprehensive survey, rather than selection of the most interesting or provocative cases. 
Decisions on leave to appeal or leave to seek judicial review were excluded from the sample 
of cases selected for analysis, as were cases in which Article 1F was briefly mentioned but 
considered irrelevant to the outcome of the case.
78
  
In total 30 cases were analysed as part of this research. One of these was a conjoined 
case, and it was decided to consider this as two separate cases, bringing the total to 31.
79
 The 
sample included cases heard before the Supreme Court, the House of Lords, the Court of 
Appeal, the Upper Tribunal (Asylum and Immigration Chamber) and its predecessor the 
Immigration and Asylum Tribunal (IAT) and the Special Immigration Appeals Commission 
(SIAC).  
These cases were analysed and coded thematically, in order to draw out key 
information including: the court/tribunal before which the case was heard; the limb of Article 
1F raised; the nationality of the asylum applicant; any organisation the asylum applicant was 
suspected of being associated with; when and by which body Article 1F was raised and; 
whether the issue of terrorism was considered.  
3.2. Qualitative research 
In order to triangulate and expand upon the data provided by the Home Office and the case 
analysis outlined above, a qualitative research study was undertaken that focused on the 
experiences of three stakeholder groups: 
 Immigration judges 
 Legal representatives with experience in Article 1F cases 
 Border Agency staff with experience in Article 1F cases 
                                                          
77
 Unfortunately the IAT/AIT Tribunal Archive Database was searchable by date only and therefore not suitable 
for identifying Article 1F cases.  
78
 For example, in a number of cases the asylum applicant was not considered credible and therefore found not 
in need of protection, but the tribunal made comments to the effect that if they had been found credible, they 
would fall to be excluded under Article 1F in any case. PM and others (Kabul - Hizb-i-Islami) [2007] UKAIT 
00089; MA (Palestinian Arabs - Occupied Territories - Risk) [2007] UKAIT 00017. 
79
 Some of these cases are duplicated as they concern a case which rose through the higher courts. 
46 
 
No attempt was made to involve asylum applicants in this research. The information that 
asylum applicants could provide on the legal aspects of Article 1F is limited, and it was felt 
that the benefits of including this information in the present research were outweighed by the 
potential ethical considerations involved in including a vulnerable group of persons in this 
research project.  
3.2.1. Immigration judges 
This stakeholder group was selected as immigration judges are uniquely placed to be able to 
provide an overview of the use of Article 1F in tribunals in the UK. Permission for judicial 
participation in this research project was granted by the Access to Justice Analytical Services 
(AJAS) team and the Presidents of the Upper Tribunal and the First-tier Tribunal of the 
Immigration & Asylum Chamber. Permission for judicial participation in this research project 
was conditional on the judiciary not being drawn into areas of political controversy. The 
purpose of interviews and questionnaires was therefore limited to understanding the 
perceptions of judicial participants regarding the frequency with which Article 1F is raised in 
tribunals in the UK; the grounds on which it is raised; and the relative success or failure of 
the provision before the tribunal, rather than to distil the personal views of the judiciary on 
the interpretation of Article 1F or the provisions application to those suspected of 
involvement with terrorism. 
3.2.2. Questionnaires 
The primary method of data collection involving judicial participants was questionnaires. 
This method of data collection was chosen in order to include the largest possible number of 
participants, and also to enable direct comparison and analysis of the responses given. 
The sample of immigration judges was based on a convenience sampling technique, 
with the sole criteria of selection being individuals wishing to take part in the research 
project. Introductory letters and questionnaires prepared by the present researcher were 
electronically distributed to all full-time and part-time immigration judges sitting in both the 
First Tier and Upper Tribunal of the Immigration and Asylum Chambers in England, 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland by the President’s Office of the Immigration & Asylum 
Chamber in February 2013 (568 judges in total). The introductory letters distributed to 
potential participants outlined the nature and purpose of the research project, and participants 
then had the option of choosing whether or not they wished to take part in the research 
project by completing the questionnaire. The questionnaires were four sides of A4 paper in 
length, and it was estimated that each would take around 20 minutes to complete. A mixture 
47 
 
of question types was used, including open, yes/no, rank and closed questions. In addition, 
space for comments was left throughout the questionnaire in order for respondents to 
elaborate on or add further comments to the answers provided, or to address anything else 
they wished to comment on but did not have space to elsewhere (please see copy of 
questionnaire in Appendix B). These questionnaires were approved for distribution by the 
AJAS team and the Presidents of the Upper Tribunal and the First-tier Tribunal of the 
Immigration & Asylum Chamber. In total 36 completed questionnaires were returned to the 
researcher in March 2013. The results of questionnaires were analysed using SPSS, a 
statistical software package that enables statistical analysis and charting. 
35 of the 36 judicial participants that responded to questionnaires indicated how long 
they had been sitting as immigration judges.
80
 The number of years judicial participants had 
been sitting as immigration judges in the UK is shown in Figure 1. The range of years was 
between 5 and 23. The mean number of years was 12.3, the mode and median numbers of 
years sitting were both 12 years. 
 
Figure 1: The number of years judicial participants had been sitting as immigration judges in the UK 
 
The judicial participants that responded to questionnaires included experience at the First Tier 
and Upper Tier of the Asylum and Immigration Chambers (including the tribunals’ previous 
incantations) and the Special Immigration Appeals Commission. 
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Years sitting as immigration judge in the UK 
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 21 judicial participants gave details of the specific tribunals they had experience 
sitting at. The majority of participants had experience sitting at more than one immigration 
tribunal. Experience included tribunals in England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. 










These questionnaires proved extremely valuable to this research project. The results revealed 
that a much lower number of Article 1F cases appear before tribunals in the UK than was 
expected. Judicial participants therefore had problems responding to some of the questions 
contained in the questionnaires, which were designed with a higher frequency of Article 1F 
cases in mind. Were this study to be conducted again, a number of the questions should be re-
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designed to take into account the low frequency of Article 1F cases in the UK, and therefore 
the limited amount of experience of many immigration judges with this type of case. 
3.2.3. Interviews 
Permission was also granted by the AJAS team and the Presidents of the Upper Tribunal and 
the First-tier Tribunal of the Immigration & Asylum Chamber for interviews to be conducted 
with a number of immigration judges. Again, the sampling of immigration judges was based 
on a convenience sampling technique, with the sole criteria of individuals wishing to take 
part in the research project. At the end of the questionnaires distributed to judicial 
participants a short paragraph invited participants to take part in an interview if they wished, 
and participants then had the option of choosing whether or not they would like to take part in 
the research project by being interviewed. Interviews were organised by the administrative 
staff of the President’s Office, and took place between April and July 2013 at the tribunals at 
which the judicial participants sat. In total five interviews were conducted with judicial 
participants.
82
 Interviewees included judges with experience sitting at the First-tier and Upper 
Tribunal of the Asylum and Immigration Chamber, the High Court and the Special 
Immigration Appeals Commission. 
Interviews took on average between 30 minutes and 1 hour, and were recorded 
electronically and later transcribed by the present researcher. The interviews were semi-
structured around the questions formulated for the questionnaires in order to triangulate data 
obtained from the questionnaires, expand on some of the themes identified, and assess 
whether the findings captured in the questionnaires were reflective of and encapsulated the 
same ideas and trends. 
3.2.4. Legal representatives  
Interviews were also conducted with a number of legal representatives. The sample of legal 
representatives selected for participation in this research was limited to those with experience 
in Article 1F cases. This stakeholder group was selected because legal representatives that 
have direct experience of Article 1F cases in the UK have knowledge and understanding of 
how these cases are processed and argued before courts and tribunals in the UK. The sample 
included legal representatives that had acted both on behalf of asylum applicants and the 
Home Office in Article 1F cases. It was felt this more inclusive sample would result in a 
more balanced overview of the asylum process in the UK. The sample of legal 
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representatives with experience in Article 1F cases that took part in this research was to some 
extent self-selecting, and limited to those wishing to take part in the research project. 
 Invitations to take part in this research project were emailed directly to individual 
legal firms and posted on migration law mailing lists. These invitations outlined the nature 
and purpose of the research project, and participants then had the option of choosing whether 
or not they wished to take part in the research by being interviewed. However, this method of 
invitation did not prove very successful, and only one legal representative responded and 
agreed to be interviewed as a result. 
 A more focused sample method was then adopted. Barristers and solicitors firms that 
had acted in Article 1F cases were identified via the heading information provided in the 
published records of Article 1F cases that had taken place in the UK. In total 51 letters were 
then sent to individual barristers and 15 letters sent to legal firms that had acted in Article 1F 
cases. The letters sent to individual barristers outlined the nature and purpose of the research 
project, noted the experience of the individual in Article 1F case(s) and invited the barrister to 
take part in the research project by being interviewed. In total eight barristers were 
interviewed and one more barrister responded in writing to written questions provided by the 
present researcher. Three of the barristers that took part in this research had acted as counsel 
for the Home Office, and six had acted as counsel for asylum applicant(s), some also on 
behalf of interveners such as UNHCR and Justice.  
The letters sent to legal firms were addressed to the firm rather than a specific 
individual, and outlined the nature and purpose of the research project, noted the firm’s 
involvement with Article 1F cases(s) and invited a legal representative with Article 1F 
experience to be interviewed as part of the research project. Unfortunately, no solicitors were 
interviewed as a result of this sampling method. 
 Interviews with barristers were conducted at a time and location of their convenience. 
The majority of interviews were conducted at the participants’ chambers, and two were 
conducted in coffee shops nearby. The solicitor that took part in this research was 
interviewed via telephone. The length of interviews ranged from half an hour to one hour, 
and were electronically recorded and later transcribed by the present researcher. In two 
instances problems with the recording device meant that the interview was not fully recorded. 
In these cases summary transcripts of these parts of the interview were based on hand-written 
notes taken by the present researcher during the interview. 
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Interviews were semi-structured around a number of questions prepared by the 
present researcher. This structure was chosen in order enable comparisons to be drawn 
between the responses of different legal representatives. However, where it was apparent that 
a legal representative had knowledge or experience of a particular area, the structure of the 
interview was kept flexible enough to allow a greater amount of time to be devoted to that 
topic. 
3.2.5. Border agency staff 
One member of the UK Border Agency’s Special Cases Unit was also interviewed as part of 
this research. 
Permission was initially sought from the UKBA for interviews to be conducted with 
staff that had experience with Article 1F cases, or for a Border Agency representative to 
respond to written questions on Article 1F provided by the present researcher. However, 
these requests were denied on the basis of operational sensitivities.
83
 
Contact was later established, via a personal referral, with a member of the Border 
Agency’s Special Cases Unit (SCU) who had an interest in the research project. The SCU 
team deal with the majority of Article 1F cases within the Border Agency, and this staff 
member was therefore uniquely placed to provide insight into how Article 1F cases are 
handled within the Home Office. This interviewee had ten years of experience working for 
both the War Crimes Unit and the Special Cases Unit within the Home Office, and had 
personally handled and overseen scores of Article 1F cases. The SCU team member was 
provided with an information sheet outlining the nature and purpose of the research project 
and invited to take part in the research by being interviewed. Permission to take part in the 
research was approved by the SCU team member’s superiors, and an interview took place in 
June 2013. The interview was conducted in a coffee shop at a convenient location for the 
participant, and lasted one and a half hours. The interview was semi-structured around a 
number of questions prepared by the present researcher, primarily drawing on the results of 
interviews and questionnaires conducted with immigration judges and legal representatives. 
The interview was recorded electronically and later transcribed by the present researcher.  
3.2.6. Ethical approval and anonymity 
The ethical considerations of the proposed research were fully considered and approved by 
the Queen Mary Research Ethics Committee (Ref: QMREC2011/71). Furthermore, the 
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ethical considerations for judicial participants was fully considered and approved by the 
Access to Justice Analytical Services (AJAS) team and the Presidents of the Upper Tribunal 
and the First-tier Tribunal of the Immigration & Asylum Chamber and participation of the 
Special Cases Directorate team member was approved by the Home Office. 
Judicial participants who completed questionnaires were given anonymised numerical 
participant numbers (i.e. Judge 23). Participants who took part in interviews were assigned 
alphabetised participant labels (e.g. Judge C, Barrister E) in order to distinguish these from 
the comments and responses provided in the questionnaires. The Special Cases Unit team 
member who took part in this research was accorded the anonymised label SCU 1. 
3.3. Conclusions 
A number of methodologies were therefore employed in this research. The qualitative and 
quantitative methodologies employed in this research all involve relatively small sample 
sizes. The sample sizes involved reflect the exceptional use of Article 1F in the UK, and 
therefore the small number of people involved in the exclusion process, whether in relation to 
the numbers excluded from refugee status in the Home Office statistics, the cases analysed as 
part of this research or the participants that took part via questionnaires and interviews. 
Viewed together, however, these sources provide a unique and compelling overview of the 








Chapter Two: Interpreting Article 1F 
 
Although the term ‘terrorism’ does not appear in the text of Article 1F, and the issue was not 
raised during the debates surrounding the drafting of the provision, those for whom there are 
‘serious reasons for considering’ have committed or been complicit in the commission of 
terrorist acts may indeed fall to be excluded from refugee status under Article 1F where these 
acts constitute war crimes, crimes against humanity, serious non-political crimes and/or acts 
contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.
84
 That acts of terrorism may 
potentially fall under any of the limbs of Article 1F is recognised in the UK Home Office’s 
APG: 
‘Acts of terrorism are widely considered contrary to the purposes and principles of the 
United Nations, and may potentially fall within Article 1F(c). But they may also fall 
within Article 1F(b) because acts of terrorism are not necessarily political crimes, or 
even within Article 1F(a).’
85
 
However, it is equally clear that not every act classified as terrorism will necessarily fall 
within the scope of the provision, as not every terrorist act will automatically meet the 
definitions of the crimes or acts enumerated therein.
86
 For example, under Article 1F(a) an act 
of terrorism may only be considered a war crime where it is committed in the context of an 
armed conflict. To fall within the scope of Article 1F(b), a terrorist act must be considered to 
be a ‘serious’ crime. Courts and tribunals in the UK have stressed that adjudicators should 
‘avoid equating Art 1F with a simple anti-terrorism provision.’ Rather, it is necessary to 
‘make findings about the serious crime or act committed by the claimant and then explain 
how that fits within a particular sub-category (or particular sub-categories) of Art 1F - 1F(a), 
IF (b) or 1F(c).’
87
 Whether and in what way(s) terrorist acts may fall within the scope of 
Article 1F therefore depends on the interpretation given to the provision.  
Unlike many international treaties of a human rights or humanitarian character, the 
1951 Convention does not have a designated treaty body that is mandated to provide 
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authoritative interpretation of its provisions. Whilst the UNHCR has a supervisory role in 
overseeing the implementation and application of the Convention, this mandate does not 
extend to providing authoritative rulings or opinions on the meaning of particular treaty 
terms.
88
 The absence of an international refugee court to act as final arbitrator on issues of 
interpretation means that there is no uniform international practice or single interpretation of 
the treaty.
89
 Interpretation of the 1951 Convention has therefore developed in a piecemeal, ad 
hoc manner, through the domestic jurisprudence of Member States, advice and guidance 
provided by the UNHCR and its Executive Committee, and the opinions of academics and 
experts.   
An examination of the UK’s approach to interpreting Article 1F, and the 1951 
Convention as a whole, is therefore of vital importance for understanding whether and how 
terrorism features in the UK’s interpretation of the provision. The purpose of this chapter is 
therefore to examine the approach adopted in the interpretation of Article 1F in the UK, 
which will be critically assessed with regard to the rules and principles of treaty interpretation 
that exist in public international law. However, before the UK’s interpretation of Article 1F is 
considered in detail a preliminary note must be made regarding the approaches to 
interpretation mandated by the rules on treaty interpretation contained in the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, and the interpretive techniques developed by courts and 
treaty bodies when interpreting treaties of a human rights or humanitarian character. 
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1. The Vienna rule and the interpretation of human rights treaties 
When interpreting the 1951 Convention, and Article 1F in particular, courts and tribunals in 
the UK have made reference to the rules of treaty interpretation contained in the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, and also appear to have been influenced to a large extent 
by the approaches to treaty interpretation developed particularly in the jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and other human rights treaty bodies. The 
following sections will therefore provide a brief examination of the aspects of these 
approaches to treaty interpretation that are pertinent to understanding the approach adopted 
by courts and tribunals in the UK to the interpretation of Article 1F. 
1.1. The Vienna rule on treaty interpretation 
As the provision forms part of an international treaty, Article 1F must be interpreted in 
accordance with the rules and principles of treaty interpretation that exist as a matter of 
public international law. Any authoritative interpretation of the provision must therefore 
begin with the rules on treaty interpretation laid down in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties (the Vienna rule).
90
 The Vienna rule (contained in Articles 31-33 of the 1969 
Vienna Convention) is generally considered to constitute a rule of customary international 
law,
91
 and therefore applies to the interpretation of all treaties concluded between States.
92
 
These provisions were largely a result of the International Law Commission’s (ILC) draft 
rules on treaty interpretation.
93
 The commentary provided by the ILC to supplement its draft 
rules on treaty interpretation is therefore very instructive and will be referred to throughout 
this section. 
 Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention, entitled the ‘General Rule of Interpretation’, 
provides that ‘[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
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meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and 
purpose’, whilst paragraph (2) goes on to define the meaning of context for the purposes of 
the provision. Paragraphs (3) and (4) of Article 31 require an interpreter to take into account 
subsequent agreements between, and the subsequent practice of, state parties to the treaty 
regarding the treaty’s interpretation; relevant rules of international law; and any special 
meanings given to terms in the treaty. Article 32 goes on to define when recourse may be had 
to supplementary materials, such as the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances 
of its conclusion, and Article 33 concerns the interpretation of treaties authenticated in 
different languages. It must be noted that the Vienna rule of interpretation is not a rigid rule, 
but rather embodies techniques of interpretation that are a starting point for a treaty 
interpreter, and invariably offers more than one possible result.
94
 
In formulating its draft articles, the ILC did not favour one doctrinal approach to 
treaty interpretation to the exclusion of others. The Vienna rule contains aspects of the 
‘textual’, ‘effective’ and ‘teleological’ approaches to treaty interpretation. However, the ILC 
did emphasise ‘the primacy of the text as the basis of interpretation’.
95
 As the Commission 
explained: 
‘... the text must be presumed to be an authentic expression of the intention of the 
parties ... in consequence, the starting point of interpretation is the elucidation of the 
meaning of the text, not an investigation ab initio into the intention of the parties.’
96
 
This approach gives effect to the first of Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice’s six principle of treaty 
interpretation, the ‘Principle of actuality (or textuality)’, which provides that ‘[t]reaties are to 
be interpreted primarily as they stand, and on the basis of their actual texts.’
97
 The basic 
premise is that treaty obligations are embodied in the text of the treaty itself, and therefore 
this is the starting point for analysis. Under the Vienna rule, preparatory works and the 
circumstances surrounding the conclusion of the treaty are relegated to a lesser status than the 
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text of the treaty itself.
98
 Article 31(1) of the Vienna rule therefore directs an interpreter to the 
‘ordinary meaning’ of the terms of the treaty.
99
 Discerning the ordinary meaning of a treaty 
provision is not, however, intended to be an exercise in linguistics or dictionary definitions, 
but is intimately linked with the requirement that the text be interpreted in good faith in light 
of its context and object and purpose.
100
  
The requirement that a treaty provision be interpreted in good faith, in light of its 
context and object and purpose allows a more generous interpretation of treaty obligations 
than a purely textual approach,
101
 and is bound up with the notion of ‘effectiveness’.
102
 That 
is, ‘the instrument as a whole and each of its provisions must be taken to have been intended 
to achieve some end, and that an interpretation that would make the text ineffective to 
achieve that object is ... incorrect.’
103
 Thus, the principle of effectiveness requires the 
provisions of a treaty to be interpreted in a manner which ensures their coherence and value. 
However, it is clear that a purposive approach to treaty interpretation should not depart from 
the terms of the text of the treaty itself. As explained by the ILC: 
‘Properly limited and applied, the maxim [effectiveness] does not call for an 
"extensive" or "liberal" interpretation in the sense of an interpretation going beyond 
what is expressed or necessarily to be implied in the terms of the treaty.’
104
 
The ILC has therefore cautioned that courts should not ‘revise treaties or ... read into them 
what they do not, expressly or by implication, contain ... [as] ... an interpretation which ran 
counter to the clear meaning of the terms would not be to interpret but to revise the treaty’.
105
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The Vienna rule therefore reveals a distinct focus on the text of the treaty itself, although this 
textual approach is tempered somewhat by the requirement that the treaty be interpreted in a 
manner which makes its obligations effective.  
The Vienna rule also requires that an interpreter look outside the text of a treaty. In 
particular, Article 31(3) states that, together with context, an interpreter must take into 
account: 
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the 
treaty or the application of its provisions; 
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the 
agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation; 
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the 
parties 
The ILC made clear in its commentary that ‘these three elements [of Article 31(3)] are all of 
an obligatory character and by their very nature could not be considered to be norms of 
interpretation in any way inferior to those which precede them.’
106
 In particular, the ILC has 
advised that subsequent agreements and practice regarding the interpretation of a treaty 
constitute as significant an aspect of the Vienna rule as the text of the treaty itself, as it 
‘constitutes objective evidence of the understanding of the parties as to the meaning of the 
treaty.’
107
 As state parties are in principle ‘masters’ of a treaty, subsequent agreement and/or 
practice can significantly alter the interpretation given to the text.
108
 Subsequent agreements 
and practice of state parties may take a variety of forms;
109
 it is crucial that the agreement or 
practice establishes ‘the agreement of the parties’. However, in the context of multilateral 
treaties such as the 1951 Convention it is often difficult to establish the concordant practice 
of state parties necessary to constitute ‘the agreement of the parties’. That is ‘that they have 
done essentially the same thing expressed in pursuance of the treaty, or, if the conduct is 
unilateral, that it reveals the agreement of the other party or parties.’
110
 Indeed, the precise 
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The Vienna rule further requires that an interpreter take into account ‘relevant rules of 
international law’ when interpreting a treaty. This aspect of the Vienna rule, contained in 
Article 31(3)(c), can be said to be based on the premise that no treaty exists in a legal 
vacuum, but instead has to be interpreted within the wider background of international law.
112
 
As explained by the ILC in its recent Fragmentation Report, this provision ‘gives expression 
to the principle of “systemic integration” according to which, whatever their subject matter, 
treaties are a creation of the international legal system and their operation is predicated on 
that fact.’
113
 Customary international law and general principles of law may be of particular 
relevance to the interpretation of a treaty where:  
(a) The treaty rule is unclear or open-textured;  
(b) The terms used in the treaty have a recognised meaning in customary international 
law or under general principles of law;  
(c) The treaty is silent on the applicable law and it is necessary for the interpreter, to 
look for rules developed in another part of international law to resolve the point.
114
 
Much dispute has surrounded the question of whether this reference to ‘relevant rules of 
international law’ applies to international law as it stood at the time of the treaty’s adoption, 
or at the time of its interpretation or application.
115
 Determining which temporal legal regime 
is applicable may be dictated by the terms of the treaty itself. As explained by the ILC in its 
Fragmentation Report, ‘[a] treaty may convey whether in applying article 31 (3) (c) the 
interpreter should refer only to rules of international law in force at the time of the conclusion 
of the treaty or may also take into account subsequent changes in the law.’ However, to this 
statement the ILC added: ‘[m]oreover, the meaning of a treaty provision may also be affected 
by subsequent developments, especially where there are subsequent developments in 
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customary law and general principles of law.’
116
 Thus even when a treaty does not 
specifically provide that subsequent developments in international law should be taken into 
account in the treaty’s interpretation these factors may remain relevant, particularly if the 
concepts used in a treaty are open or evolving in nature.  
The relevance of current international law to the interpretation of treaty terms has 
been repeatedly emphasised by the International Court of Justice (ICJ).
117
 In its Advisory 
Opinion on Namibia, the court noted that the interpretation of instruments: 
‘cannot remain unaffected by the subsequent developments of law, through the 
Charter of the United Nations and by way of customary law. Moreover, an 
international instrument has to be interpreted and applied within the framework of the 
entire legal system prevailing at the time of its interpretation.’
118
 
Similarly, the Institute of International law, in its 1975 Resolution on Intertemporal Problems 
in Public International Law, stated that ‘[a]ny interpretation of a treaty must take into account 




This dynamic approach to treaty interpretation is very much still a developing concept 
and the legal features of the approach are not yet fully defined.
120
 The ILC suggests that the 
concepts used in a treaty may be considered open or evolving particularly where: (a) the 
concept is one which implies taking into account subsequent technical, economic or legal 
developments; (b) the concept sets up an obligation for further progressive development for 
the parties; or (c) the concept has a very general nature or is expressed in such general terms 
that it must take into account changing circumstances.
121
 The approach has indeed been 
adopted and developed particularly by bodies interpreting treaties which do not regulate fine 
detail, but set out broad, general principles that are intended to apply in a wide range of 
circumstances and over a long period of time, such as human rights treaties, as is the subject 
of the following section. It must be stressed, however, that there is not one but many theories 
of dynamic interpretation, which are still very much in development. The dynamic approach 
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to treaty interpretation has proved itself controversial, particularly in Europe, as it has been 
viewed by some as resulting in unwarranted expansions of state obligations which were not 
agreed to or envisaged during the adoption of the original treaty text. Nevertheless, the 
approach has proven very popular with a number of international and national courts and 
tribunals, and appears to have influenced the approach taken to the interpretation of the 1951 
Convention in the UK. 
 In sum, therefore, the Vienna rule mandates a primarily textual approach to treaty 
interpretation, although this is tempered somewhat by the requirement that a treaty be 
interpreted in context and in light of its object and purpose, so as to make its obligations 
effective. The Vienna rule also requires an interpreter to take into account the subsequent 
practice and agreement of state parties to a treaty, and rules of international law that are 
relevant to its interpretation. A dynamic approach to treaty interpretation may also be adopted 
in some cases, although the parameters of this approach are not yet clearly defined.  
1.2. The interpretation of human rights treaties  
The approach of human rights tribunals to the interpretation of human rights treaties has 
frequently been to assert the applicability of the Vienna rule to the treaties under 
consideration. However, it has been noted that, at the same time, these bodies have ‘adopted 
positions concerning interpretation that are hard to reconcile with the provisions’, developing 




 Perhaps the most important feature that is used to distinguish human rights treaties 
from other international treaties is the non-reciprocal character of the human rights 
obligations contained therein. The ‘special nature’ of human rights treaties has been 
repeatedly emphasised by international human rights treaty bodies. As explained by the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights:  
‘Modern human rights treaties in general, and the American Convention in particular, 
are not multilateral treaties of the traditional type concluded to accomplish the 
reciprocal exchange of rights for the mutual benefit of the contracting States. Their 
objective and purpose is the protection of the basic rights of individual human beings 
irrespective of their nationality, both against the State of their nationality and all other 
contracting States. In concluding these human rights treaties, the States can be 
deemed to submit themselves to a legal order within which they, for the common 
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good, assume various obligations, not in relation to other States, but towards all 
individuals within their jurisdiction.’
123
 
The UN Human Rights Committee has also emphasised that the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) is not a web of inter-state obligations, but designed to 
safeguard individual human beings.
124
 The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in 
particular has  repeatedly stressed the European Convention’s ‘special character as a human 
rights treaty’ and as an ‘instrument of European public order’.
125
 The Court has noted that:  
‘[u]nlike international treaties of the classic kind, the [European] Convention 
comprises more than mere reciprocal engagements between contracting States. It 
creates, over and above a network of mutual, bilateral undertakings, objective 




The special nature of human rights treaties has also been recognised by other courts and 
tribunals, including the ICJ.
127
 
However, Alain Pellet, during his work as Special Rapporteur on the ILC’s ‘Guide to 
State Practice on Reservations to Treaties’, rejected the claim of distinctiveness in relation to 
human rights treaties, or treaties of a ‘normative character’ as a whole. Rather, Pellet took the 
view that no treaty contains only provisions of a normative unilateral character, as all treaties, 
including those governing the protection of human rights, also contain provisions of a 
reciprocal, contractual nature.’
128
 Despite this view, however, the special status of human 
rights treaties has continued to be re-asserted by international human rights treaty bodies and 
tribunals, and the approach adopted by these bodies has had a dramatic effect on the 
interpretation of the treaties in question. 
The approach of human rights tribunals to treaty interpretation has been to make 
substantial use of the concept of ‘effectiveness’, tied to the notion of the ‘object and purpose’ 
of the treaties in question.
129
 It has been suggested that this aspect of interpretation is 
particularly significant for human rights treaties, ‘since the status of specific human rights 
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norms in general international law may be of importance in the process of interpreting their 
content, scope and effect as they are enshrined in a given convention.’
130
 These bodies have 
therefore developed approaches to treaty interpretation which may be considered to in some 
ways expand upon, and in some ways depart from, the Vienna rule. These include the 
development of a ‘pro homine’ approach to interpretation, which emphasises that the source 
of human rights is not merely the texts of the Conventions themselves, but the very nature of 
man.
131
 Another approach is the doctrine of ‘evolutive’ interpretation, which requires an 
interpreter to take into account changing conditions in law and society when determining the 
scope of the obligations contained in a treaty. 
Whilst evolutive interpretation is a developing concept whose contours are as yet 
quite unclear,
132
 some observations may be made regarding the initial premise of the doctrine. 
The evolutive approach to treaty interpretation has been grounded in Art 31(1) of the Vienna 
rule, on interpreting a treaty in light of its object and purpose, and Art 31(3)(c), on 
interpretation in light of changing applicable rules of international law. A treaty or treaty 
provision may be determined to have an ‘evolutive’ character, which requires an interpreter 
to take into account changing conditions in state and society when determining the scope of 
the obligations contained in a treaty. In the ICJ’s words, evolutive obligations ‘must be 
understood to have the meaning they bear on each occasion on which the Treaty is to be 
applied, and not necessarily their original meaning’.
133
 Indeed, it has been suggested that 
human rights treaties intend an effective and not only theoretical protection of the individual, 
and this aim can only be reached if an interpretation takes account of changing conditions in 
State and society.
134
 Whilst this approach to treaty interpretation is still a developing concept, 
it has been suggested that the practice of evolutive interpretation may be ‘tentatively’ 
categorised into two discreet forms: evolutive interpretation based on terminology, and 
evolutive interpretation in light of object and purpose.
135
 The former approach is grounded in 
the nature of the text itself.
136
 The latter mode of evolutive interpretation takes the object and 
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purpose as its starting point, and asks whether it is necessary to give the treaty an evolutive 
reading in order to make the agreement effective in terms of its object and purpose.
137
  
Both these approaches to treaty interpretation have been adopted and expanded upon 
by human rights treaty bodies and tribunals. The ECtHR for instance has repeatedly stated 
that the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) is a ‘living instrument which ... 
must be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions’.
138
 The Human Rights Committee 
has also expressly stated that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights should 
be interpreted ‘as a living instrument’ and further that the rights protected under the Covenant 
‘should be applied in context and in the light of present-day conditions’.
139
 The Committee 
on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) and Committee against Torture (CAT) 
have made similar statements, and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has followed 
the ECtHR’s reasoning in adjudging the Charter of the Organization of American States as 
‘evolutive’ on the basis of its similar object and purpose.
140
 The doctrine of evolutive or 
dynamic treaty interpretation is not unique to the interpretation of human rights treaties, and 
has been endorsed and developed outside the context, particularly by the ICJ.
141
 However, the 
concept is one which has primarily developed through the jurisprudence of these bodies 
based on the special statuses of the treaties in question. This approach to treaty interpretation 
appears to have had a marked affect on the approach of courts and tribunals in the UK to the 
interpretation of the 1951 Convention, and Article 1F in particular, as will be considered 
further below. 
 
2. The interpretation of Article 1F in the UK 
Article 1F of the 1951 Convention is not formally incorporated into UK law by way of 
statute. However, s 2 of the 1993 Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act prohibits the 
Immigration Rules from endorsing any practice that would be incompatible with rights under 
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 Immigration Rule 328 also confirms the applicability of the 1951 
Convention to decisions on asylum, stating ‘all asylum applications will be determined by the 
Secretary of State in accordance with the Geneva Convention’. Positive comments as to the 
effect of the 1951 Convention have been made by the judiciary,
143
 and the House of Lords 
has confirmed that the Convention is for all effects and purposes incorporated into domestic 
law.
144
 Article 1F is also incorporated into UK law by the 2006 Qualification Regulations, 
Regulation 7 of which provides: 




When interpreting the 1951 Convention, courts and tribunals in the UK appear to have been 
influenced to a large extent by the approaches to treaty interpretation adopted by human 
rights tribunals and treaty bodies. The UK judiciary has repeatedly stressed that the terms of 
the 1951 Convention are to be given an ‘autonomous meaning’, distinct from the domestic 
legal culture of any state parties to the 1951 Convention, and have repeatedly affirmed the 
‘humanitarian character’ of the 1951 Convention and its special status as a ‘living 
instrument’. When interpreting the 1951 Convention, and Article 1F in particular, courts and 
tribunals in the UK have therefore adopted a dynamic and purposive approach to its 
interpretation, drawing on legal developments in many areas of international law to give 
meaning to the terms of the Convention, an approach reminiscent to that taken by the ECtHR 
and other human rights treaty bodies.
146
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2.1. The search for an autonomous meaning 
Courts and tribunals in the UK have repeatedly stressed that the terms of the 1951 
Convention are to be given an ‘autonomous meaning’. As famously stated by Lord Steyn in 
ex parte Adan: 
‘In principle therefore there can only be one true interpretation of a treaty ... In 
practice it is left to national courts, faced with a material disagreement on an issue of 
interpretation, to resolve it. But in doing so it must search, untrammelled by nations of 
its national legal culture, for the true autonomous and international meaning of the 
treaty. And there can only be one true meaning.’
147
 
Lord Steyn here drew attention to the independent meaning of a provision of the 1951 
Convention, derivable from international legal sources ‘without taking colour from 
distinctive features of the legal system of any individual contracting state’. This seems to 
echo the approach to treaty interpretation adopted by human rights treaty bodies. For 
example, the European and Inter-American Courts of Human Rights have insisted that the 
terms of the European and Inter-American Conventions have their own meaning, an 
‘autonomous interpretation’, regardless of national legislation concerning their 
interpretation.
148
 This has indeed been the approach adopted by courts and tribunals in the 
UK to the interpretation of Article 1F, which have repeatedly stressed that ‘there can be only 
one true interpretation of Article 1F … an autonomous meaning to be found in international 
rather than domestic law.’
149
 
 Following this approach, the UK judiciary have repeatedly rejected attempts by the 
UK legislature to impose statutory interpretations on the terms of Article 1F, as will be 
considered throughout the course of the following chapters. The UK Supreme Court in Al-
Sirri recently side-stepped the UK’s statutory definition of ‘terrorism’ for the purpose of 
Article 1F(c), rather defining the term by looking to guidance from international sources. In 
doing so, the Supreme Court noted that Member States to the 1951 Convention are not free to 
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adopt their own definitions of Article 1F(c), for ‘it is clear that the phrase “acts contrary to 
the purposes and principles of the United Nations” must have an autonomous meaning’.
150
 
Similarly, the Court of Appeal in AH (Algeria) recently rejected the UK’s statutory definition 
of ‘particularly serious crime’ in the context of Article 1F(b), noting: 
‘Being an international convention, it must be given an autonomous meaning. They 
are ordinary words and should be given their ordinary universal meaning.’
151
 
The Court was rather of the opinion that the determination of what constituted a ‘serious’ 
crime for the purpose of Article 1F(b) must be founded upon a ‘common starting point’.
152
  
In seeking to establish the ‘autonomous meaning’ of the terms of the 1951 
Convention, courts and tribunals in the UK have made frequent reference to the rule of treaty 
interpretation contained in the  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (the Vienna rule). 
The applicability of this rule of treaty interpretation to the 1951 Convention was recognised 
by Lord Steyn in case ex parte Adan, noted above, in which he referred to ‘an independent 
meaning derivable from the sources mentioned in Articles 31 and 32 [of the Vienna 
Convention]’,
153
 and has been referred to in a number of cases concerning the interpretation 
of the 1951 Convention.
154
  
The Vienna rule has also been referred to by the immigration tribunal in a number of 
cases specifically concerning the interpretation of Article 1F.
155
 However, reference to the 
Vienna Convention has been notably absent from a number of these decisions, particularly 
those of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeal.
156
 Indeed, the approach adopted by courts 
and tribunals in the UK to the interpretation of Article 1F, and the 1951 Convention as a 
whole, appears to have been influenced largely by the concept of ‘evolutive’ interpretation 
based on the 1951 Convention’s special status as a ‘living instrument’, as will be considered 
in the following section. 
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2.2. Dynamic interpretation 
Courts and tribunals in the UK have adopted a purposive approach to the interpretation of the 
1951 Convention, and Article 1F in particular. This approach has been based largely on the 
object and purpose of the treaty, an aspect which forms part of the ‘General Rule of 
Interpretation’ under the Vienna rule. The object and purpose of the 1951 Convention, as 
stated in its preamble, is to ‘assure refugees the widest possible exercise of ... fundamental 
rights and freedoms’.
157
 The 1951 Convention’s primary purpose is therefore not the 
regulation of inter-state rights and obligations, but the protection of individual human beings. 
This has led courts and tribunals in the UK to draw attention to the humanitarian aims of the 
Convention, and as such the need to approach the Convention as a ‘living instrument’ bearing 
in mind the protective purpose of the Convention, in a similar manner to the approach taken 
by many human rights courts. The adoption of a purpose approach to the interpretation of the 
1951 Convention has meant that courts and tribunals in the UK have tended to adopt a 
dynamic approach to the interpretation of Article 1F. 
 It will be recalled that in formulating the Vienna rule the ILC mandated a primarily 
textual approach to interpretation, albeit mitigated somewhat by the requirement that the 
terms of a treaty be interpreted in good faith in light of its object and purpose. The UK House 
of Lords has accordingly stressed that ‘the starting point of the construction exercise must be 
the text of the Refugee Convention itself, because it expresses what the parties to it have 
agreed’.
158
 However, it appears that courts in the UK have, overall, adopted a more flexible 
approach to the interpretation of the 1951 Convention rather than a purely textual one. As 
noted by Lord Lloyd in Adan, ‘A broad approach is what is needed, rather than a narrow 
linguistic approach.’
159
 Indeed, it seems that the approach to the interpretation of the 1951 
Convention adopted by courts in the UK has been influenced largely by the approach taken 
by human rights treaty bodies. Thus courts in the UK have repeatedly stressed the 1951 
Convention’s special character as a treaty of humanitarian nature, a ‘living instrument’, and 
thus the need to adopt a purposive and evolutive approach to interpreting its provisions: 
 ‘the best guide is to be found in the evolutionary approach that ought to be taken to 
international humanitarian agreements. It has long been recognised that human rights 
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treaties have a special character… Their object is to protect the rights and freedoms of 
individual human beings generally or falling within a particular description… ‘
160
 
That the 1951 Convention is a ‘living instrument’ means that ‘while its meaning does not 
change over time its application will’.
161
 The 1951 Convention has thus been recognised by 
courts in the UK to have a dynamic, ‘evolutive’ character, as a result of its special status as a 
treaty of humanitarian nature. 
The 1951 Convention’s special status as a living instrument has influenced the 
interpretation of Article 1F. In the seminal Gurung decision of the immigration tribunal, 
Judge Storey noted that: 
‘in respect of the Exclusion Clauses it is particularly salient to recall the well-settled 
principle that the Refugee Convention is a living instrument whose interpretation 
requires a dynamic approach which bears in mind the objects and purposes set out in 




This sentiment has been echoed throughout the higher courts, which have adopted a 
purposive and dynamic approach to the interpretation of Article 1F. This dynamic approach 
to interpretation has manifested itself in two ways: firstly, by taking into account the 
subsequent practices and agreements of states parties to the 1951 Convention, and secondly, 
by referring to contemporary rules of international law.  
2.2.1. Subsequent agreement and practice 
As noted above, under the Vienna rule an interpreter is required to take into account the 
subsequent agreement and practice of states parties to a treaty when interpreting its terms. 
This aspect of the Vienna rule has proved particularly difficult in the context of multilateral 
treaties, such as the 1951 Convention. One particularly useful ‘shortcut’ that has been 
employed in the context of the 1951 Convention is resort to the UNHCR’s Handbook on 
Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status.
163
 The Handbook records the 
practice of state parties to the 1951 Convention, and also takes into account exchanges of 
views between the UNHCR and the authorities of state parties. As such, the Handbook has 
been considered by some commentators to provide ‘coordinated evidence of the practice and 
an institutional input’ of member states’.
164
 It has also been suggested that many of the 
Conclusions on International Protection issued by the UNHCR’s Executive Committee 
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should also be taken into account as evidence of ‘agreement between the parties’, as these are 
generally adopted in dialogue with state parties to the Convention.
165
 In the context of Article 
1F, this would include the UNHCR’s Guidelines on International Protection and the 
accompanying Background Note on the Application of the Exclusion.
166
 
The UNHCR Handbook has been well received in a number of UK cases concerning 
interpretation of the 1951 Convention. As noted by Lord Steyn:  
‘While the Handbook is not by any means itself a source of law, many signatory states 
have accepted the guidance which on their behalf the UNHCR was asked to provide, 
and in those circumstances it constitutes in our judgement, good evidence of what has 
come to be international practice within Art.31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention.’
167
  
However, its reception in cases concerning the interpretation of Article 1F have been mixed. 
In the early case T v Secretary of State, the House of Lords endorsed the use of the UNHCR 
Handbook as ‘a useful recourse on doubtful questions’.
168
 However in a particularly scathing 
passage the immigration tribunal in AA Palestine stated: 
‘The UNHCR Handbook … is not necessarily a guide to state practice, because it may 
not relate to state practice in any particular paragraph but more to UNHCR's 
exhortations. Its exhortations may also reflect the humanitarian perspective, wider 
than the Refugee Convention, which UNHCR sometimes adopts. Interpretation or 




The UNHCR’s Guidelines have similarly received mixed reviews from courts and tribunals 
in the UK. In KK, the immigration tribunal noted that, although the views of the views of the 
UNHCR must be accorded ‘the very greatest respect. Those views are not, however, binding 
on us and they do not necessarily reflect the correct interpretation of the Convention’.
170
 The 
Supreme Court in Al-Sirri, however, recently reiterated that the guidance provided by the 
UNHCR, although not binding, ‘should be accorded considerable weight’ in light of the 
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obligation, under Article 35 of the 1951 Convention, to supervise the application of the 
provisions of the Convention.
171
 Indeed, in this case the Supreme Court chose to follow the 
UNHCR’s Guidance on the interpretation of the term ‘acts contrary to the purposes and 
principles of the United Nations’ which appears in Article 1F(c) of the 1951 Convention.  
 The EU 2004 Qualification Directive, to which the UK is party, may also be seen as 
evidence of the subsequent practice of a number states parties to the 1951 Convention in 
interpreting the terms of the Convention. As noted in the Directive’s preamble, its provisions 
are aimed at guiding Member States in the application of the 1951 Convention which is the 
‘cornerstone of the international legal regime for the protection of refugees’.
172
 The 
Qualification Directive may also be considered to constitute ‘relevant rules of international 
law’ under the Vienna rule, as will be considered in section 2.2.2. below.  
 When interpreting Article 1F, courts and tribunals in the UK have also drawn heavily 
on the jurisprudence of other states parties to the 1951 Convention. Case law emanating from 
Canada has been particularly influential in this respect, whilst jurisprudence of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (CJEU) interpreting Article 12(2) of the European 
Qualification Directive has also been relied upon.
173
 In turn, jurisprudence emanating from 
the UK has been very influential on other jurisdictions. In particular, the UK Supreme 




 Another manner in which courts and tribunals have taken a dynamic approach to the 
interpretation of Article 1F has been referring to other sources of international law, as 
considered in the next section. 
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2.2.2. Relevant rules of international law 
When interpreting the 1951 Convention, courts and tribunals in the UK have made frequent 
reference to international rules and principles external to the 1951 Convention itself.
175
 In 
doing so, these bodies have frequently made reference to the 1951 Convention’s status as a 
‘living instrument’ which must be interpreted dynamically in order that the protective object 
and purpose of the Convention remain effective. As such, courts and tribunals in the UK have 
made reference to many contemporary international legal standards, in an approach 
reminiscent to that adopted by human rights treaty bodies. 
 For example, when interpreting the 1951 Convention, courts in the UK have made 
frequent use of contemporary human rights standards. In ex parte Yogathas the House of 
Lords determined the scope of the obligation of non-refoulement, contained in Article 33 of 
the 1951 Convention through reference to the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, concluding that 
the obligation contained in the 1951 Convention was broadly similar to that contained in 
Article 3 ECHR.
176
 Courts have also used international human rights standards to imply terms 
into the 1951 Convention. Although the text of the Convention itself does not prohibit 
persecution on the basis of gender or sex, in K’s Case Baroness Hale argued that: 
‘State parties to the Refugee Convention, at least if they are also parties to the 
International Convention on Civil and Political Rights and to the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, are obliged to interpret 
and apply the Refugee Convention compatibly with the commitment to gender 
equality in those two instruments.’
177
 
Baroness Hale therefore held that gender was, by implication, included in the prohibited 
grounds of persecution contained in the 1951 Convention. The House of Lords has similarly 
recognised the status of the 1951 Convention as a living instrument, ‘in the sense that while 
its meaning does not change over time its application will’.
178
 In ex parte Shah, Lord Hope 
explained that it was important to take an ‘evolutionary approach’ to interpreting the meaning 
of ‘particular social group’ in the Refugee Convention, because this ‘enables account to be 
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taken of changed in society and discriminatory circumstances which may not have been 
obvious to the delegates when the Convention was being framed’.
179
 
 When interpreting Article 1F, courts and tribunals in the UK have also frequently 
relied upon sources external to the 1951 Convention. Each of the three limbs of Article 1F 
contains concepts which cannot be interpreted without reference to international rules and 
principles external to the 1951 Convention itself.
180
 For example, Article 1F(a) refers to a 
crime against peace, war crime or crime against humanity ‘as defined in the international 
instruments drawn up to make provision in respect of such crimes’.
181
 Article 1F(c) 
furthermore excludes individuals who are guilty of ‘acts contrary to the purposes and 
principles of the United Nations’. This phrase again cannot be interpreted without recourse to 
external legal rules and standards, and leads the interpreter directly to the terms of the Charter 
of the United Nations and practice of the UN General Assembly and Security Council.
182
 
Article 1F(b)’s reference to ‘non-political crimes’ is unclear, and in practice has been 
interpreted with reference to the political offence exception in extradition law.
183
 Courts and 
tribunals in the UK have of course also made reference to the EU Qualification Directive, and 
associated jurisprudence of the CJEU.
184
 
The Qualification Directive is given domestic legal force in the UK by the European 
Communities Act of 1972,
185
 and was implemented by the Refugee or Person in Need of 
International Protection (Qualification) Regulation 2006 and Part 11 of the Immigration 
Rules,
186
 both of which came into effect on 9
th
 October 2006. Regulation 7 of the 
Qualification Regulations provides ‘[a] person is not a refugee, if he falls within the scope of 
Article 1D, 1E or 1F of the Geneva Convention.’ Courts and tribunals in the UK have 
referred extensively to the Directive and associated jurisprudence of the CJEU in cases 
concerning Article 1F. The Directive has been held by courts and tribunals in the UK to 
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condition and qualify domestic legislation concerning Article 1F.
187
 Similarly, judgements of 
the CJEU concerning Article 12(2) of the Qualification Directive have been recognised as 
binding on courts and tribunals in the UK, and therefore held to take prominence over 
guidance provided by the UK Supreme Court.  
 When referring to these external sources of law, courts and tribunals have made 
reference to the need to adopt a dynamic approach to the interpretation of Article 1F.
188
  Thus 
in relation to Article 1F(a), the Supreme Court noted it was common ground that ‘the 
international instruments referred to in the article are those existing when disqualification is 
being considered, not merely those extant at the date of the Convention’.
189
 In line with the 
dynamic approach that has been taken to the interpretation of Article 1F, courts and tribunals 
do not appear to have resorted to the travaux preparatoires, finding them unhelpful. 
2.3. The principle of restrictive interpretation 
The adoption of a purposive approach to the interpretation of Article 1F has also led courts 
and tribunals in the UK to advocate a restrictive approach to the interpretation of the 
provision, based on its object and purpose.  
 The rationale underlying Article 1F is twofold: to exclude those considered to be 
‘undeserving’ of refugee protection and to ensure such persons do not misuse the institution 
of asylum to evade legitimate prosecution.
190
 Article 1F therefore serves the important 
function of preserving the institution of asylum by excluding those considered to be 
undeserving of such protection. However, courts and tribunals in the UK have repeatedly 
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affirmed that, because of the serious consequences of excluding a person who has a well-
founded fear of persecution from the protection of the 1951 Convention, the provision 
‘should be interpreted restrictively and applied with caution.’
191
 The Home Office’s APG 
similarly provides that Article 1F ‘is not a punitive measure and should always be applied 
responsibly, bearing in mind the humanitarian character of the Convention and the serious 
possible consequences of exclusion for the individual’.
192
 The principle of restrictive 
interpretation entails that in the case of any ambiguity, the narrower, stricter sense which 
favours non-exclusion is to be preferred. This restrictive approach to the interpretation of 
Article 1F is widely argued to be in line with, if not mandated by, the protective function of 
the 1951 Convention.
193
 The UNHCR in particular advises that ‘Considering the serious 
consequences of exclusion for the person concerned … the interpretation of these exclusion 
clauses must be restrictive.’
194
 
 Another aspect of the restrictive approach to interpreting Article 1F which has been 
recently stressed by courts and tribunals in the UK is the requirement of individual 
consideration of each case to which the provision may apply. The Supreme Court has 
recently stressed the requirement of individualised assessment in Article 1F cases, and held 
that it is not justifiable to base a decision to exclude an individual under Article 1F solely due 
to a person's membership of a group classified as a ‘terrorist organisation’.
195
 The Court of 
Appeal has similarly rejected attempts by the Secretary of State to impose generalised 
classifications of Article 1F crimes based on the length of sentence imposed, or likely to be 
imposed, upon conviction.
196
 Again, this approach appears to be in line with academic 
commentary on the interpretation of Article 1F, in which it has been argued that any 
generalised approach to the application of Article 1F risks excluding bona fide refugees from 
the protection of the 1951 Convention,
197
 an approach which would run counter to both the 
object and purpose of the 1951 Convention and the individual nature of refugee status 
determination under the Convention. 
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Whilst terrorism is not explicitly referred to in the text of Article 1F, those for whom there 
are ‘serious reasons for considering’ have committed or been complicit in the commission of 
a terrorist act may nevertheless be excluded from refugee status under the provision. 
However, this depends on the interpretation given to the crimes and acts enumerated therein. 
For this reason, an examination of the approaches taken by courts and tribunals in the UK to 
the interpretation of Article 1F is of vital importance for understanding whether and how 
terrorist acts might be considered to fall within the scope of the provision. 
Whilst the practice of courts and tribunals in the UK has not been wholly consistent or 
clear, it appears that when interpreting the 1951 Convention and Article 1F these bodies have 
drawn heavily on the ’evolutive’ approach to treaty interpretation developed in the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR. Courts and tribunals in the UK have therefore frequently 
referred to the 1951 Convention’s humanitarian aims and its status as a ‘living instrument’.  
As such, courts and tribunals have adopted a dynamic approach to the interpretation of the 
provision, drawing on contemporary sources of international law external to the text of the 
treaty itself, and making reference to the UNHCR’s guidance and the practice of other state 
parties to the 1951 Convention. The focus on the protective object and purpose of the 1951 
Convention has also led courts and tribunals in the UK to adopt a restrictive approach to the 
interpretation of Article 1F, one which merits individual assessment of each case to which the 
provision may apply and mandates against expansive interpretations of the crimes 
enumerated therein. The approach taken by the UK judiciary to the interpretation of Article 
1F appears to be in line with academic commentary and the UNHCR’s guidance on the 
interpretation of the provision, and has furthermore influenced the jurisprudence of other 









Chapter Three: Terrorism as a crime against 
peace, a war crime, a crime against humanity 
or a serious non-political crime 
 
Under the first two limbs of Article 1F, an individual may be excluded from refugee status 
where there are ‘serious reasons for considering’ they have committed a crime against peace, 
a war crime or a crime against humanity (Article 1F(a)) or a serious non-political crime 
(Article 1F(b)). The purpose of this chapter is to examine whether and in what ways terrorism 
has featured in the UK’s interpretations of these crimes, and is accordingly divided into two 
parts, with each of these limbs of Article 1F considered separately. The ways in which 
terrorism has featured in the UK’s interpretation of ‘acts contrary to the purposes and 
principles of the United Nations’ under Article 1F(c) will be considered in the following 
chapter, while responsibility for the commission of a crime within the meaning of Article 1F 
will be considered in Chapter 5. The purpose of this chapter and of Chapter 4 is to examine 
the UK’s interpretation of the crimes and acts listed in Article 1F, before attention is later 
turned to the issue of responsibility. 
Part 1 of this chapter examines the UK’s approach to interpreting the crimes listed in 
Article 1F(a), and the ways in which terrorism has (and has not) featured in the interpretation 
of ‘crime against peace’, ‘war crime’ and ‘crime against humanity’, while Part 2 considers 
how terrorism has featured in the UK’s interpretation of ‘serious non-political crime’ under 
Article 1F(b).
198
 Terrorism has the potential to feature largely in the interpretation of both 
these provisions, as a terrorist act may qualify as a war crime or crime against humanity 
under Article 1F(a) or a serious non-political crime under Article 1F(b). However, terrorism 
has not featured significantly in the UK’s interpretation of Article 1F(a). The jurisprudence of 
courts and tribunals in the UK has rather focused primarily on the interpretations given to the 
crimes listed in Article 1F(a) as a matter of international law, as defined in the statutes and 
jurisprudence of international criminal courts and tribunals. The individuals that have been 
considered for exclusion under this provision have not generally been defined as ‘terrorists’, 
nor have international or domestic definitions of terrorism been employed in the 
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interpretations of the crimes listed in the provision. However, terrorism has featured largely 
in the UK’s interpretation of Article 1F(b). Courts and tribunals have, on a number of 
occasions, excluded individuals under this provision for committing crimes defined as 
terrorist in nature. The Home Office’s APG similarly notes that terrorist-related offences are 
likely to fall under this provision. However, the Court of Appeal has recently made clear that 
simply labelling an act ‘terrorist’ is not sufficient to raise it to the level of gravity required to 
constitute a ‘serious’ crime for the purpose of Article 1F(b). Rather, regard must be had to the 
individual facts of each case in order to determine that a particular terrorist offence 
constitutes a ‘serious’ crime, the definition of which must be based on a ‘common starting 
point’. 
1. Terrorism as a crime against peace, a war crime or a crime against 
humanity 
Article 1F(a) of the 1951 Convention provides:  
‘The provisions of this Convention shall not apply to any person with respect to 
whom there are serious reasons for considering that … he has committed a crime 
against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity, as defined in the 
international instruments drawn up to make provision in respect of such crimes’. 
An individual will therefore be excluded from refugee status under Article 1F(a) where there 
are serious reasons for considering they are responsible for the commission of a crime against 
peace, war crime or a crime against humanity.  
A number of international instruments may be considered pre-runners of Article 
1F(a). The 1948 Constitution of the International Refugee Organisation (IRO) excluded ‘war 
criminals, quislings and traitors’ from the organisations mandate. Reference was also made to 
those who had assisted enemy forces in the persecution of civilian populations or operations 
against the United Nations, and those who had, since the end of hostilities, participated in any 
organisation hostile to the government of a member of the United Nations, or had participated 
in any terrorist organisation.
199
 
Despite reference to terrorist organisations in the Constitution of the IRO, terrorism 
did not feature in early formulations of Article 1F(a), nor was the issue of terrorism raised 
during the debates surrounding the drafting of the provision. It must be remembered that the 
1951 Convention was drafted in the wake of the Second World War. During the drafting of 
Article 1F, considerable emphasis was therefore placed on the need to exclude war criminals 
and associated persons from refugee protection. These debates did not centre on the issue of 
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terrorism, but rather the most appropriate international instruments that should be referred to 
in the provision’s definition of crime against peace, war crime and crime against humanity.
200
 
The issue was referred to in the Working Group of the Conference, which recommended the 
phrasing now found in Article 1F(a): ‘he has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, 
or a crime against humanity, as defined in the international instruments drawn up to make 
provision in respect of such crimes.’
201
  
 Terrorism did not therefore feature in the drafting of Article 1F(a). The provision was 
shaped largely by the 1951 Convention’s status as a post-World War II instrument, and the 
ensuing concern that those who had committed atrocities during the war should not benefit 
from refugee protection. Reference to terrorism was, however, included in Article 1F(a)’s 
equivalent provision in the Arab Refugee Convention, which refers to any person who ‘[h]as 
been convicted of having committed a war crime, a crime against humanity or a terrorist 
crime as defined in the international conventions and covenants.’
202
 This reference to terrorist 
crimes was not included in the formulations of Article 1F(a) in the EU Qualification 
Directive or the OAU Refugee Convention however, which retain Article 1F(a)’s reference to 
crime against peace, war crime or crime against humanity ‘as defined in international 
instruments drawn up to make provision in respect of such crimes’.
203
  
The international instruments to which Article 1F(a) refers could include a number of 
possible sources. Earlier formulations of Article 1F made explicit reference to Article VI of 
the London Charter, which defines the crimes that fell within the jurisdiction of the 
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg: ‘crimes against peace’, ‘war crimes’ and 
‘crimes against humanity’.
204
  During the Conference of Plenipotentiaries, reference was also 
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made to the Geneva Conventions I to IV, and the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.
205
 These instruments may therefore be relevant to the 
interpretation of the crimes enumerated in Article 1F(a). The most recent formulation of 
Article 1F(a) crimes appears in the 1998 Statute of the International Criminal Court (the 
Rome Statute).
206
 Other recent definitions of these crimes appear in the statutes and 
jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the International 
Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
207
 and the 1977 Additional Protocols I and 
II to the 1949 Geneva Conventions.
208
 These sources may be relevant to a dynamic 
interpretation of the provision.
209
 
Although terrorism is not specifically mentioned in the text of Article 1F(a), and the 
issue was not raised during the drafting of the provision, terrorism has the potential to feature 
largely in the interpretation of the provision since terrorist acts may qualify as a war crime or 
crime against humanity. However, terrorism has not featured significantly in the UK’s 
interpretation of Article 1F(a) crimes. The jurisprudence of courts and tribunals in the UK has 
rather focused primarily on the interpretations given to the crimes listed in Article 1F(a) as a 
matter of international law, as defined in the statutes and jurisprudence of international 
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criminal courts and tribunals. The Home Office’s Asylum Process Guidance (APG) on 
exclusion similarly refers to international criminal instruments for the purpose of defining the 
crimes that fall within the scope of Article 1F(a). The individuals that have been considered 
for exclusion under this provision have not generally been defined as ‘terrorists’, nor have 
international or domestic definitions of terrorism been employed in the interpretations of the 
crimes listed in the provision. Although explicit reference to the Vienna rule has not been 
frequently made, courts and tribunals in the UK have tended to approach the definitions of 
Article 1F(a) crimes by reference to international legal instruments and the jurisprudence of 
international criminal courts and tribunals in order to arrive at the ‘autonomous’ meaning of 
the provision.  
 Courts and tribunals in the UK have furthermore adopted a dynamic approach to the 
interpretation of the crimes listed in Article 1F(a). In the seminal case R (JS (Sri Lanka)), 
Lord Brown, in his leading judgement for the UK Supreme Court, stated ‘the international 
instruments referred to in the article are those existing when disqualification is being 
considered, not merely those extant at the date of the Convention’.
210
 In particular, Lord 
Brown stated that the Rome Statute ‘should now be the starting point for considering whether 
an applicant is disqualified from asylum by virtue of article 1F(a) … ratified as it now is by 
more than a hundred States and standing as now surely it does as the most comprehensive and 
authoritative statement of international thinking on the principles that govern liability for the 
most serious international crimes.’
211
 This reasoning has been followed in later decisions of 
the Court of Appeal and the immigration tribunals, which have consistently maintained the 
importance of the Rome Statute as the ‘starting point’ for the interpretation of the crimes that 
fall within the scope of Article 1F(a).
212
 Jurisprudence in the UK has also referred to the 
International Criminal Court’s (ICC) Elements of Crimes, the Statutes and jurisprudence of 
the ICTY and ICTR, and the London Charter. The Home Office’s APG on exclusion 
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similarly concedes that ‘[t]here is no one single set of definitions of what constitutes a war 
crime, crimes against humanity or genocide for the purposes of the Convention’, but directs 
caseworkers to the detailed definitions provided in the Rome Statute of the ICC.
213
 The 
definitions of Article 1F(a) crimes provided in the Home Office’s APG are further drawn 
from the London Charter and the Statutes of the ICTY and ICTR. The UK’s approach to 
interpreting each of the crimes listed in Article 1F(a) will now be considered in turn. 
1.1. Terrorism as a crime against peace 
The first international crime listed in Article 1F(a) is ‘crime against peace’. Crime against 
peace was defined in Article VI(a) of the London Charter as:  
‘planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in 
violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a 
common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing.’
214
 
This definition played a part in defining the ‘crime of aggression’ as a crime against peace in 
the UN General Assembly’s 1974 Resolution on the Definition of Aggression (the General 
Assembly Definition) and the Rome Statute of the ICC.
215
 
There have been very few asylum cases in which crime against peace has emerged as 
a ground of exclusion in the jurisprudence of states parties to the 1951 Convention.
216
 Indeed, 
in international criminal law the concept has attracted much less international attention than 
the other crimes listed in Article 1F(a); unlike war crimes and crimes against humanity, a 
definition of the ‘crime of aggression’ as a crime against peace was not included in the 
Statutes of the ICTR and ICTY, and was only defined in the Rome Statute following a review 
conference in 2010.
217
 It has therefore been suggested that it is ‘most unlikely that this ground 
for exclusion will ever play a significant practical role’ in refugee exclusion cases.
218
 
The present author suggests that non-state terrorist actors cannot be excluded from 
refugee status for committing a crime against peace, since crime against peace, as defined in 
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international criminal law, is limited to State action. Both the Rome Statute and General 
Assembly Definition define an ‘act of aggression’ as ‘the use of armed force by a State 
against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in 
any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations.’
219
 These definitions 
suggest that individual responsibility for a crime against peace is limited to leaders of a State, 
or high ranking State officials.
220
 This conclusion is reinforced by the terms of the London 
Charter, which refer to ‘a war of aggression’ in the context of ‘a war in violation of 
international treaties, agreements or assurances’. It would therefore appear that only 
individuals occupying a position of power within a state and therefore capable of breaching 




It has been suggested, however, that in the context of Article 1F(a) a definition of a 
crime against peace might also include ‘leaders of rebel groups in non-international armed 
conflicts which seek secession, but few if any others.’
222
 The UNHCR also advises that ‘a 
crime against peace can only be committed by individuals in a high position of authority 
representing a State or State-like entity.’
223
 This approach could potentially include the acts of 
non-state terrorist rebel groups within the scope of the provision. However, the assertion that 
a crime against peace for the purpose of Article 1F(a) may include the actions of non-state 
actors does not appear to accord with the Rome Statute and General Assembly Definition, nor 
that of the London Charter. It is therefore suggested that acts of aggression by non-state 
terrorist groups, whether internal or international in character, do not fall within the scope of 
a crime against peace for the purpose of Article 1F(a). 
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There have been few exclusion cases involving crime against peace in the UK, but the 
approach taken by the immigration tribunal has been to confine ‘wars of aggression’ to 
waging wars across international boundaries, and not extend the concept to participation in 
internal attacks conducted by rebel groups.
224
 The determination that rebel groups and low-
ranking members of a State’s armed forces do not fall within the terms of crime against peace 
appears to be consistent with the interpretation of the crime in international legal instruments. 
In particular, this approach excludes terrorist groups from the scope of crime against peace 
for the purpose of Article 1F(a). 
1.2. Terrorism as a war crime 
War crimes are grave breaches of the laws or customs of war, which give rise to individual 
criminal responsibility. The London Charter included in this definition: 
‘murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labour … ill-treatment of prisoners of 
war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or private property, 




International law has since expanded upon and developed the definitions of acts that qualify 
as war crimes, not least through the Geneva Conventions I to IV and Additional Protocol I, 
the Statues and jurisprudence of the ICTR and the ICTY and the Rome Statute of the ICC.
226
  
Terrorism has the potential to feature largely in this category of Article 1F(a) crimes. 
Provided they take place in the context of an armed conflict, war crimes may include many 
acts that would be considered terrorist in nature, such as intentionally directing attacks 
against civilians and civilian objects, using indiscriminate means of warfare, and taking 
hostages.
227
 Importantly, it has now been recognised that war crimes can be perpetrated 
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during both international and non-international conflicts, and by non-state actors taking an 
active part in the hostilities.
228
 In the ICTY Appeals Chamber case of Galic it was held that 
‘acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the 
civilian population’ is a war crime as part of customary international law, a finding which has 
been confirmed by the Special Court for Sierra Leone.
229
  Therefore, the actions of non-state 
terrorist organisations engaged in an armed conflict may be caught by this provision.
230
  
In the UK, however, terrorism has not featured greatly in decisions to exclude 
individuals from refugee status for committing war crimes. Rather, the focus of courts and 
tribunals in the UK has centred on whether the acts committed constitute war crimes as 
defined in the relevant international instruments. For example, in one case the initial asylum 
adjudicator had decided that the applicant’s voluntary membership of a terrorist group in Sri 
Lanka meant that it was reasonably likely that he had committed a crime against peace, a war 
crime or a crime against humanity under the terms of Article 1F(a), and so was excluded 
from refugee status.
231
 On appeal, the tribunal rightly held that activities carried out by the 
applicant in the course of combat, which did not constitute war crimes within the terms of 
international instruments such as the London Charter, could not bring him within the scope of 
Article 1F(a).
232
 In this case, the asylum applicant was a Sri Lankan national who had fought 
for the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) against Sri Lankan government forces. 
Although the LTTE could readily have been described as a terrorist organisation by the 
tribunal (and was indeed described as such by the initial adjudicator), terrorism was not 
referred to by the tribunal in their decision. Rather, the tribunal analysed whether the 
activities of the applicant could be considered to amount to war crimes, as defined by 
international legal instruments. 
Similarly, the JS (Sri Lanka) case concerned a Sri Lankan national, who had been a 
member of the Intelligence Division of the LTTE for a number of years. The Court of Appeal 
however did not refer to the LTTE or its members as ‘terrorist’. Rather, Toulson LJ, in his 
leading judgement, noted that the principal sources of reference for the definition of the 
crimes referred to in Article 1F(a) must be the international instruments drawn up to make 
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provision in respect of them, and the jurisprudence of international criminal tribunals which 
had had to interpret and apply them.
233
 The Supreme Court agreed with the reasoning of the 
Court of Appeal in this respect.
234
 In his leading judgement, Lord Brown concluded that, 
based on the evidence provided by the Secretary of State, the LTTE in general, and the 
Intelligence Division in particular, were guilty of widespread acts and atrocities that 
constituted war crimes within the meaning of Article 8 of the Rome Statute, including suicide 
bombings, attacks upon civilians, assassinations, kidnappings and the forcible recruitment of 
children.
235
 Although these activities could clearly have been described as terrorist in nature, 
the Supreme Court chose not to do so. 
1.3. Terrorism as a crime against humanity 
Crimes against humanity involve the fundamentally inhumane treatment of a population in 
the context of a widespread or systematic attack against it.
236
 Article VI of the London 
Charter defined crimes against humanity as: 
‘murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed 
against any civilian population, before or during the war, or persecutions on political, 
racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the 
country where perpetrated.’ 
The definition of crimes against humanity has been further developed in the Statutes of the 




Again, terrorism has the potential to feature largely in this category of Article 1F(a) 
crimes. The very definition of a crime against humanity is that it is an attack ‘committed 
against any civilian population’,
238
 and many of the acts that may form part of this attack may 
be considered terrorist in nature. For example: murder; torture; persecution against a group or 
collectivity and enforced disappearance. In order to rise to the level of a crime against 
humanity, the Rome Statute provides that the act(s) must be committed ‘as part of a 
widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population … pursuant or in 
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furtherance of a State or organizational policy’.
239
 This is commonly known as the ‘chapeau 
requirement’. Given that under this definition crimes against humanity can be committed as 
part of an ‘organizational policy’, they could include not only actions directed by States, but 
also non-state groups. The application of crimes against humanity to non-state actors, in 
particular terrorist organisations, has been confirmed.
240
 Furthermore, although Article 5 of 
the ICTY Statute refers to crimes against humanity ‘committed in armed conflict’, it is now 
generally accepted that crimes against humanity can occur during peacetime. This view is 
confirmed by the ICTR Statute, Rome Statute and the jurisprudence of the ICTY,
241
 and has 
been recognised by the UK immigration tribunal.
242
 As a consequence, terrorist attacks such 
as the 9/11 attacks on the United States in 2001 may be subsumed under the provision.
243
 
In the UK, the term ‘terrorism’ has not featured in decisions to exclude individuals 
from refugee status for committing crimes against humanity under Article 1F(a). Much like 
the approach taken to the interpretation of war crimes, the approach taken by Courts and 
tribunals to the interpretation of crimes against humanity has focused on the definitions 
provided in international legal instruments. Although reference to ‘terror’ has been made in 
the jurisprudence, this has been in the context of definition of crimes against humanity 
contained in international instruments. For example, where the expelling of persons from 
their homes, accompanied by ‘terror’ and the burning of their homes was held to be a crime 
against humanity within the scope of Article 7(1)(k) of the Rome Statute.
244
  
Although crimes against humanity may be committed by non-State groups, in 
particular terrorist organisations, case law on crimes against humanity in the UK has 
predominantly concerned State or State-sponsored action. This has included the Zimbabwe 
police’s acts against political opponents of the ZANU PF party;
245
 the Zimbabwe youth 
militia’s attacks on white farmers and their workers;
246
 the activities of the Basji, a volunteer 
paramilitary force in Iran;
247
 and the activities of the Afghani intelligence service.
248
 It 
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therefore remains to be seen whether terrorism will feature in the jurisprudence of courts and 
tribunals in the UK in the case of non-State organisations. 
1.4. Conclusions on article 1F(a) crimes 
Terrorism has not therefore featured in the UK’s interpretation of war crime or crime against 
humanity in the context of Article 1F(a). This is somewhat surprising, given that terrorism 
has the potential to feature largely in the interpretation of the provision. Rather, domestic 
jurisprudence in the UK has focused on the definitions of Article 1F(a) crimes contained in 
the Statutes and jurisprudence of international criminal courts and tribunals.
249
  
 There are a number of reasons why terrorism may not feature in the UK’s 
interpretation of war crimes and crimes against humanity under Article 1F(a), which are 
explored further in Chapter 6. The development of Article 1F screening in the Home Office 
has meant that the specialised units which deal with potential Article 1F cases are primarily 
expert in international criminal law, and as such are likely to adhere to the interpretations of 
these crimes as a matter of international criminal law rather than employ the ‘terrorism’ label. 
Similarly, it has been suggested by judicial participants interviewed as part of this research 
that judges are more comfortable dealing with the definitions of international crimes as they 




 The practice of UK courts and tribunals in adhering to the definitions of Article 1F(a) 
by reference to international criminal instruments, rather than generalised labels of categories 
of persons or acts, appears to accord with the ordinary meaning of the phrase ‘as defined in 
the international instruments drawn up to make provision in respect of such crimes’, in line 
with Article 31(1) of the Vienna rule. The ordinary meaning of this phrase, in the context of 
the 1951 Convention’s status as an international legal instrument, indicates that crimes 
against peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity must be interpreted with reference to 
international instruments that define such crimes.
251
 Thus, purely domestic interpretations of 
the crimes may not be appropriate as these words may be considered to have ‘special 
meanings’ within the terms of Article 31(4) of the Vienna rule, and as such should not be 
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interpreted without consideration of the international legal instruments and jurisprudence that 
define them.  
 When approaching the international instruments which define the crimes listed in 
Article 1F(a), courts and tribunals in the UK have tended to adopt a dynamic approach, 
clearly considering the terms ‘war crime’, ‘crime against humanity’ and ‘crime against peace’ 
to be ‘evolutive’ in nature. Indeed, the concepts of ‘war crime’, ‘crime against humanity’ and 
‘crime against peace’ are ones which have evolved and developed in international criminal 
law since the adoption of the 1951 Convention.
252
 It has therefore been suggested that to fail 
to take into account more recent interpretations of these terms would be to thwart the object 
and purpose of the provision as well as ‘gradually render the instrument devoid of any 
substance’.
253
 This dynamic approach to the interpretation of Article 1F(a) crimes is 
reflective of the UK’s approach taken to the interpretation of Article 1F, and the 1951 
Convention as a whole, as considered in Chapter 2. 
 However, it is suggested by the present author that courts and tribunals in the UK 
should perhaps be more cautious when referring to contemporary definitions of Article 1F(a) 
crimes. Whilst Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna rule clearly indicates that an interpreter should 
take into account ‘relevant rules of international law’ when interpreting a treaty, this 
provision is limited to rules ‘applicable in the relations between the parties to the treaty’. 
Reference to more modern enumerations of the crimes listed in Article 1F(a) may therefore 
be inappropriate unless it is clear that the provisions truly are applicable to all parties to the 
1951 Convention, having crystallised as customary international law.
254
 A notable trend in 
UK practice is a strong reliance on the provisions of the Rome Statute. This over-reliance 
must be cautioned against, since the Rome Statute is in some senses narrower, and in some 
wider, than the customary international law definitions of the crimes listed in Article 1F(a).
255
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It is therefore suggested that courts and tribunals in the UK strive to interpret Article 1F(a) in 
line with established rules of customary international law, in keeping with the rule of 
interpretation contained in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
 
2. Terrorism as a serious non-political crime 
Article 1F(b) excludes from refugee status an individual for whom there are ‘serious reasons 
for considering … has committed a serious non-political crime outside the country of refuge 
prior to his admission to that country as a refugee’.  
 Whilst a number of international instruments may be considered pre-runners to 
Article 1F(b), these provisions did not refer to terrorism, but rather to common criminals and 
criminals extraditable by treaty. Several resolutions of the United Nations Relief and 
Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) excluded those who had committed serious 
common crimes from the organisation’s assistance.
256
 The Constitution of the International 
Refugee Organisation (IRO Constitution) also excluded from its mandate ordinary criminals 
extraditable by treaty.
257
 Similarly, Proverb 7 of the Statute of the UNHCR Statute provides 
the competencies of the UNHCR shall not extend to a person: 
‘In respect of whom there are serious reasons for considering that he has committed a 
crime covered by the provisions of treaties of extradition or … by the provisions of 
article 14, paragraph 2, of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.’ 
Article 14(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) states that the right to 
seek and enjoy asylum may not be invoked ‘in the case of prosecutions genuinely arising 
from non-political crimes …’
258
 The UNHCR’s mandate therefore does not extend to persons 
for whom there are ‘serious reasons for considering’ they have committed a crime covered by 
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 Terrorism also did not feature in the debates surrounding the drafting of Article 1F(b). 
Initially, those who had committed common crimes were not excluded from the scope of the 
Convention at all.
260
 The reference to ‘common criminals’ in the exclusion provision was 
included as a result of a French proposal, and retained primarily at the insistence of the 
French representative.
261
 However, due to the concerns of some states that the provision 
could be used to exclude individuals after admission to a receiving country, and for possibly 
trivial offences, it was agreed that only serious crimes committed before entry were at issue. 
During the course of the discussions, the issue of extradition was also raised, and the possible 
conflict between State’s obligations under extradition treaties and the provisions of the 
Convention.
262
 However, ultimately the drafters declined introducing a formal connection 
with the law of extradition. The final text of Article 1F(b) adopted at the Conference reads as 
follows: 
‘(b) he has committed a serious non-political crime outside the country of refuge prior 
to his admission to that country as a refugee’
263
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Terrorism did not therefore feature in the final text of Article 1F(b), nor was the issue raised 
during the debates surrounding the drafting of the provision, which rather focused on whether 
it was necessary to exclude common criminals from the scope of the Convention and possible 
conflicts with states obligations under treaties of extradition. Terrorism also doesn’t feature in 
the formulations of Article 1F(b) contained in the OAU Refugee Convention, the Arab 
Refugee Convention or the EU Qualification Directives, in which the provision is replicated 
almost exactly.
264
 The EU Directives specify, however, that the phrase ‘outside the country of 
refuge prior to his or her admission as a refugee means the time of issuing a residence permit 
based on the granting of refugee status’.
265
 The Directives also specify that ‘particularly cruel 
actions, even if committed with an allegedly political objective, may be classified as serious 
non-political crimes’.
266
 As will be considered below, this latter addition may be seen as 
giving effect to the approach taken to the interpretation of non-political crime by the 




Terrorism has the potential to feature largely in the interpretation of Article 1F(b) 
since terrorist offences are capable of constituting ‘non-political’ crimes where they are 
considered to be disproportionate to their alleged political objective, and many terrorist 
crimes will also be considered ‘serious’ within the meaning of the provision. Indeed, 
terrorism has featured to a large extent in the UK’s interpretation of Article 1F(b). Courts and 
tribunals have, on a number of occasions, excluded individuals under this provision for 
committing crimes defined as terrorist in nature. The Home Office’s APG similarly notes that 
terrorist-related offences are likely to fall under this provision. However, while under the 
UK’s approach to interpreting Article 1F(b), terrorist acts may clearly constitute ‘non-
political’ crimes for the purpose of the provision, close examination of the jurisprudence of 
courts in the UK reveals that not every act so defined will automatically be considered 
disproportionate to its political motivation. Similarly, the Court of Appeal has recently made 
clear that simply labelling an act ‘terrorist’ is not sufficient to raise it to the level of gravity 
required to constitute a ‘serious’ crime for the purpose of Article 1F(b). Rather, regard must 
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be had to the individual facts of each case in order to determine that a particular terrorist 
offence constitutes a ‘serious’ crime, the definition of which must be based on a ‘common 
starting point’. The UK’s interpretation of terrorism as both a ‘non-political’ crime and a 
‘serious’ crime under Article 1F(b) is considered in turn below.   
2.1. Terrorism as a non-political crime 
The UK’s practice on interpreting the term ‘non-political’ crime in Article 1F(b) has 
traditionally been to rely on the rules and principles of extradition law, particularly the scope 
of the political offence exception to extradition, to inform the interpretation of the phrase.
268
 
In the seminal case T v Secretary of State for the Home Department, the House of Lords drew 
on principles from a number of extradition cases in order to give meaning to the phrase ‘non-
political crime’ in Article 1F(b). Although Lord Mustill noted ‘There are significant 
differences between the two doctrines [of asylum and extradition law]’, he stated:  
‘the reference to the "serious non-political crime" in the [1951 Convention] must 
surely be an echo of the political exception which had been a feature of extradition 
treaties for nearly a century, and one may hope that decisions on the political 




In this case, their Lordships held that for a crime to be political in nature there had to be 
shown a direct relationship between the ideas of the perpetrator and those of the victim, such 
as a crime aimed at a government or military target. In such a case, the crime would be 
considered political and therefore not fall within the scope of Article 1F(b). Their Lordships 
believed that a crime could be considered non-political in nature, despite being committed 
with political objectives, when no clear link exists between the crime and its alleged political 
objective, or when the act in question is disproportionate to the alleged objective. This was 
particularly the case where the crime was aimed at a civilian target or was likely to involve 
the indiscriminate killing or injuring of members of the public.
270
 In this case, their Lordships 
were of the opinion that a terrorist offence which involved the indiscriminate killing of 
innocent civilians (in this case a bomb attack on an airport) was far removed from any 
political objective, and therefore could only be described as a non-political crime for the 
purpose of Article 1F(b). 
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 In coming to this conclusion, the House of Lords drew on the UNHCR Handbook. 
This position has now been set out in the Home Office’s APG,
271
 and maintained by the 
UNHCR and other States Parties to the 1951 Convention.
272
 According to the UNHCR 
Guidelines, ‘[a] serious crime should be considered non-political when other motives (such as 
personal reasons or gain) are the predominant feature of the specific crime committed.’ Non-
political motives should be considered predominant where no clear link exists between the 
crime and its alleged political objective, or when the act in question is disproportionate to the 
alleged objective.
273
 In particular, the UNHCR advises that ‘[e]gregious acts of violence, 
such as those commonly considered to be of a ‘terrorist’ nature, will almost certainly [be 
considered] wholly disproportionate to any political objective.’
274
 This doctrine has also now 
been set out in the UK’s Qualification Regulations of 2006, which provides that in the 
construction and application of Article 1F(b), ‘the reference to serious non-political crime 
includes a particularly cruel action, even if it is committed with an allegedly political 
objective’,
275
  replicating the language of Article 12(2)(b) of the EU Qualification Directive. 
The Home Office’s APG explains ‘Article 1F(b) may therefore include terrorist crimes’ as 




Indeed, their Lordships in T stressed that terrorist offences amounted to ‘serious non-
political crimes’ for the purpose of Article 1F(b). Lord Mustill, in his leading judgement, 
noted that ‘terrorism is an evil in its own right, distinct from endemic violence, and calling 
for special measures of containment’.
277
 Delineating acts of terrorism as political crimes was 
also the correct approach because the law of asylum ‘must be applied at speed’. In contrast to 
the subjective criteria such as remoteness, causation, atrociousness and proportionality 
generally employed in extradition cases, the term ‘terrorism’ was considered capable of 
‘capable of definition and objective application’.
278
 He drew on the definition of terrorism 
contained in the 1937 League of Nations Convention, which defined ‘terrorism’ as: 
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‘criminal acts directed against a state and intended or calculated to create a state of 




Whilst this Convention never came into force, the House of Lords was happy that it was 
‘serviceable’. 
Following the House of Lords judgement in T, it appears that terrorist offences should 
be considered non-political in nature for the purpose of Article 1F(b). However, closer 
examination of the judgment reveals that their Lordships appeared to employ a specific 
understanding of terrorism, as indiscriminate violence directed at innocent members of the 
public: 
‘The terrorist does not strike at his opponents; those whom he kills are not the tyrants 
whom he opposes, but people to whom he is indifferent. They are the raw materials of 
a strategy, not the objectives of it. The terrorist is not even concerned to inspire terror 
in the victims, for to him they are cyphers … the depersonalised and abstract violence 
which kills 20, or three, or none, it matters not how many or whom, so long as the 
broad effect is achieved.’
280
 
Indeed, Lord Mustill continued: ‘once it is made clear that terrorism is not simply a label for 




The House of Lord’s determination that terrorist acts amount to serious non-political 
crimes therefore appears to be limited to their interpretation of ‘terrorism’ as indiscriminate 
acts of violence directed at innocent civilians, as opposed to politically motivated violent 
conduct per se. As explained in the Home Office’s APG: 
‘Consistent with the reasoning in T v SSHD, the commission of crimes such as 
murder, rape and serious assault, or other violent acts which result in indiscriminate 
harm or death to the public, will usually fail to establish a sufficient link to the 
achievement to a political objective and should be considered to be “non-political” 
crimes for the purposes of Article 1F(b).’
282
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The CJEU, in the B & D case, also appeared to interpret non-political crime under Article 
1F(b) in this manner. The Court in this case referred to ‘terrorist acts, which are characterised 
by their violence towards civilian populations.’
283
 
However, the scope of terrorist-related offences, as defined in the UK, is in many 
cases much broader than this definition. For example, a terrorist act of violence may be 
directed not against the public, but against a specific political target. A violent attack against 
a government representative will clearly fall within the scope of the UK’s domestic definition 
of terrorism,
284
 however it is not clear that this will necessarily constitute a non-political 
crime for the purpose of Article 1F(b). As noted in the Home Office’s APG: 
‘A link may however be established to a political crime if such methods [violent acts] 
are used against specific targets that are political in nature (e.g. government 
representatives etc) and are committed for political motives.’
285
 
Furthermore, a number of terrorist-related offences do not involve the commission of an act 
of violence at all. For example, in the UK it is a criminal offence simply to be a member of a 
proscribed terrorist organisation.
286
 This is clearly a terrorist-related offence, and yet does not 
involve violence of any type. This was recognised in a case which came before the Special 
Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC), in which an Algerian national had been sentenced 
to life imprisonment in his absence for belonging to a terrorist organisation. This was 
considered by the adjudicator to constitute an ‘inherently political offence’ in the absence of 
any linked and more specifically criminal behaviour.
287
 
Under the UK’s approach, terrorist offences are therefore capable of constituting 
‘non-political crimes’ for the purpose of Article 1F(b), despite being committed with political 
motivation, where they involve attacks on civilians or violence which is disproportionate to 
the alleged political objective. However, not every terrorist-related offence will amount to a 
non-political crime under this test, as has been recognised in both the jurisprudence of courts 
and tribunals in the UK and in the Home Office’s guidance documents. 
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2.2. Terrorism as a serious crime 
In order to fall within the scope of Article 1F(b) the crime must not only be non-political in 
nature but also be sufficiently ‘serious’.  Indeed, during the drafting of Article 1F(b) the UK 
representative was concerned that the provision should not be used to exclude those who had 
committed minor offences from the protection of the Convention.  
The term ‘serious crime’ is not defined in the 1951 Convention itself. The UNHCR 
suggests that the term ‘serious’ is limited to ‘a capital crime or a very grave punishable 
act.’
288
 However, this has been described by the UK tribunal as ‘an unwarranted gloss’ on the 
term ‘serious’.
289
 It has further been suggested that examples of serious crimes include 
murder, rape, arson and armed robbery, but do not extend to minor crimes such as petty 
theft,
290
 and that certain offences may be deemed serious if accompanied by the use of deadly 
weapons, involve serious injury to persons or there is evidence of serious habitual criminal 
conduct and other similar factors.
291
 These examples of serious crime are all covered by the 
Border Agency’s APG on exclusion, which further provide that ‘crimes, though not 
accompanied by violence, such as large-scale fraud, may also be regarded as “serious” for the 
purposes of Article 1F(b).’
292
 
In determining what amounts to a ‘serious crime’ for the purpose of Article 1F(b) in 
the UK, recourse has also been made by the Home Office to s.72 of the UK Nationality, 
Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (the 2002 Act), which provides a statutory definition of 
‘particularly serious crime’ for the purpose of the exception to refoulement under Article 
33(2) of the 1951 Convention. This provision provides that a ‘particularly serious crime’ is 
one which either attracted a custodial sentence of two years or more or, where the offence is 
committed outside of the UK, could have attracted a custodial sentence of two years or more 
had the offence been committed in the UK. Thus in AH (Algeria) the Secretary of State 
argued that the 1951 Convention left the issue of what constituted a ‘serious crime’ to be 
determined by the domestic courts of signatory states. The Secretary of State therefore 
submitted that they were entitled to rely upon the presumption in s.72: that a person convicted 
of an offence and sentenced to at least two years imprisonment had committed a ‘particularly 
                                                          
288
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serious crime’, which therefore fell within the scope of Article 1F(b) as a ‘serious crime’. 
This position is also maintained in the Home Office’s APG which further provides that:  
‘given that the Article 1F(b) requirement states exclusion will be merited following a 
“serious” crime, as opposed to “particularly serious”, it may be appropriate to regard a 
crime for which a custodial sentence of 12 months or more upon conviction might be 
expected (if that crime had been tried in the United Kingdom) as a “serious crime”.
293
 
Under this approach, a crime will be considered sufficiently ‘serious’ for the purpose of 
Article 1F(b) if it would attract a custodial sentence of one year were it committed in the UK. 
However, in AH (Algeria) the Court of Appeal gave short shrift to the Home Office’s 
approach to the determination of ‘serious’ for the purpose of Article 1F(b). Sullivan LJ, in his 
leading judgement, stated that he did not accept that each signatory state was free to adopt its 
own definition of what constitutes a ‘serious crime’ for the purpose of the provision.
294
 In his 
opinion, whilst the Convention left to domestic courts the decision of whether a non-political 
crime was ‘serious’ in any particular case, ‘that determination must be founded upon a 
common starting point as to the level of seriousness that must be demonstrated if a person is 
to be excluded from the protection of the Convention’.
295
 Ward LJ agreed:  
‘Being an international convention, it must be given an autonomous meaning. They 
are ordinary words and should be given their ordinary universal meaning.’
296
  
The Lord Justices stressed that it was not helpful to determine the level of seriousness of an 
offence by the precise sentence of imprisonment imposed upon an asylum applicant. 
Although sentence was a material factor, ‘it is not the benchmark’.
297
 Rather, Ward LJ stated 
that the term ‘serious’ had to be given its ordinary meaning. In the context of Article 1F(b), 
this meaning was given the ‘appropriate colour’ in that the crime committed must be serious 
enough to justify the withholding of protection an asylum applicant would otherwise enjoy as 
a person fleeing persecution.
298
 In sum, Ward LJ stated: 
‘In deciding whether the crime is serious enough to justify his loss of protection, the 
Tribunal must take all facts and matters into account, with regard to the nature of the 
crime, the part played by the accused in its commission, any mitigating or aggravating 
features and the eventual penalty imposed.’
299
 
Whilst Sullivan LJ could accept that an offence which carried a maximum sentence of 10 
years imprisonment was capable of constituting a serious non-political crime within the scope 
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of Article 1F(b), in this case the fact that the asylum applicant had been sentenced to two 
years imprisonment ‘placed it at the lower end of seriousness of this kind of offence’. The 
Court of Appeal in this case therefore  stressed the need to examine cases individually in 
order to determine if the crime(s) in question are sufficiently serious for the purpose of 
Article 1F(b), regard being had to all the surrounding circumstances.  
Approaches of presumptive exclusion based on generalised classifications of Article 
1F crimes or length of sentence have indeed been heavily criticised.
300
 Rather, it would 
appear that the restrictive approach that it is advised be adopted in the interpretation of 
Article 1F points to the need to consider the act committed by the asylum applicant 
individually.
301
 Similarly, the principle that the provisions of the 1951 Convention be 
interpreted so as to have an autonomous meaning points to the need to base Article 1F(b)’s 
concept of serious crime on international, rather than domestic standards.
302
 As such, the 
Court of Appeal appears to have been correct in rejecting the Secretary of State’s reliance on 
the 2002 Act, and rather stressing the need to examine cases individually in light of all the 
circumstances surrounding the crime for which there are serious reasons for considering the 
asylum applicant has committed. 
 Attention was also given in the AH (Algeria) case to whether terrorist offences 
amounted to ‘serious crimes’ for the purpose of Article 1F(b). Indeed, it is likely that many 
terrorist offences will be considered to be ‘serious crimes’, particularly where they involve 
acts such as murder, bombing and hostage taking. Thus in one case the UK tribunal noted:  
‘It would be difficult for the Claimant to argue that his activities in training to be an 
Islamic Jihad armed militant, smuggling guns, undertaking missions and preparing for 
a suicide mission did not constitute serious crimes under the formal, if ineffective, 
legal system or systems in Gaza.’
303
 
The tribunal drew attention to the fact that the asylum applicant ‘was a would-be suicide 
bomber; even if his target had been a checkpoint, which is a place where many civilians 
gather and queue.’
304
 In this case the asylum applicant’s terrorist activity meant he fell within 
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the scope of Article 1F(b). The House of Lords in T were also clearly of the opinion that 
terrorist offences amounted to ‘serious non-political crimes’ for the purpose of Article 1F(b). 
However, as there are a range of offences that may be considered terrorist in character, it is 
apparent that not every act considered to be terrorist or terrorist-related in nature will meet 
Article 1F(b)’s requirement of ‘serious crime’, as was the case in AH (Algeria), considered 
below. 
 In AH (Algeria), the Court of Appeal had to determine whether the asylum applicant’s 
conviction in France amounted to a ‘serious crime’ for the purpose of Article 1F(b). He had 
been convicted in France for the terrorist-related offence of being a member of an association 
formed with a view to the preparation of acts of terrorism, and making fraudulent 
representations, in the form of a passport and identity card, with the intention of seriously 
disrupting public order by intimidation or terror. The Court of Appeal in this case held that it 
was not possible, on the basis of the very limited findings of the French Court, to conclude 
that this offence crossed the threshold of seriousness for the purpose of Article 1F(b). It was 
not clear what ‘material acts’ were relied upon by the French Appeal Court in the case, 
further than the offence of falsifying a French passport and national identity card, which it 
was considered the asylum applicant would use in relation to the terrorist activities of the 
group.
305
 In particular, Sullivan LJ noted: 
‘While terrorism is a grave international threat, merely labelling an offence a terrorist 
offence is not sufficient, of itself, to establish that the offence is a serious offence for 
the purpose of Article 1F(b).’   
Whilst his Lordship noted that ‘as an instrument of state policy, "nipping terrorism in the 
bud" is eminently sensible’, he pointed out that: 
‘if the criminal law framed in aid of the policy foils the aspiring terrorist's intentions 
well before he has undertaken any, or any significant, preparatory acts, then the 
consequence for the purpose of Article 1F may well be that the offence of which he is 
convicted, at the outer boundary of criminality, will not be an offence which is so 
serious as to exclude him from protection under the Convention.’
306
  
Sullivan LJ thus emphasised the need for an act of sufficient seriousness to have been 
committed by an asylum applicant in order to bring him or her within the terms of Article 1F. 
Merely labelling an offence ‘terrorist’ was considered not adequate to establish that the 
offence is ‘serious’ for the purpose of Article 1F(b).  
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In contrast with the approach adopted by the House of Lords in T, the Court of Appeal 
in this case did not attempt to define terrorism for the purpose of Article 1F(b), nor stress that 
terrorist acts should fall to be excluded under the provision. Rather, the Court of Appeal 
directed its legal analysis away from the ‘terrorism’ label, and toward answering the question 
of whether there were serious reasons for considering the individual had committed a serious 
crime. The Court in this case seems to have recognised the broad sweep of some domestic 
anti-terrorist legislation (in this case French), and therefore cautioned against relying on the 
delineation of a crime as ‘terrorist’ when determining it is ‘serious’ for the purpose of Article 
1F(b).  
Whilst account should be taken of the fact that the UN Security Council has called 
upon Member States to qualify terrorist acts as ‘serious criminal offences’,
307
 the principle 
that the provisions of the 1951 Convention be interpreted so as to have an autonomous 
meaning points to the need to base Article 1F(b)’s concept of serious crime on international, 
rather than domestic standards. Therefore, domestic definitions of terrorism or terrorist 
offences may not be appropriate standards of which to base an Article 1F decision. Rather, it 
appears consideration should rather be given to whether the offence would be considered a 
serious crime by the majority of states parties to the 1951 Convention. Examples of terrorist 
offences which would appear to meet this standard include those prohibited by international 
anti-terrorism convention, such as hostage taking, hijacking, and the use of explosives.
308
 
However, it would appear that in all cases the surrounding circumstances of the crime should 
be considered, to allow any relevant mitigating or aggravating circumstances be taken into 




2.3. Conclusions on article 1F(b) crimes 
The UK’s interpretation of the term ‘non-political’ crime in Article 1F(b) has traditionally 
been based on the rules and principles of extradition law, particularly the scope of the 
political offence exception to extradition. However, in T v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department the House of Lords stressed that the evil of terrorism calls for special measures 
of containment, and therefore held that terrorist crimes fall within the scope of Article 1F(b) 
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as serious non-political crimes. Their Lordships drew on the definition of terrorism contained 
in the 1937 League of Nations Convention. However, closer examination of the judgment 
reveals that the House of Lords appeared to employ a specific understanding of terrorism in 
this case: indiscriminate violence directed at innocent members of the public. Not every 
terrorist-related offence will amount to a non-political crime under this test, as has been 
recognised in both the jurisprudence of courts and tribunals in the UK and in the Home 
Office’s guidance documents. 
In contrast with the approach adopted by the House of Lords in T, the Court of Appeal 
in AH (Algeria) did not attempt to define terrorism for the purpose of Article 1F(b), nor stress 
that terrorist acts should fall to be excluded under the provision. Rather, the Court of Appeal 
directed its legal analysis away from the ‘terrorism’ label, and toward answering the question 
of whether there were serious reasons for considering the individual had committed a serious 
crime. Merely labelling an offence ‘terrorist’ was not considered adequate to establish that 
the offence is ‘serious’ for the purpose of Article 1F(b). The Court in this case seems to have 
recognised the broad sweep of some domestic anti-terrorist legislation, and therefore 
preferred an approach which focused on individual examination of each case in order to 
determine if the crime in question is sufficiently serious to bring it within the scope of Article 
1F(b), regard being had to all the surrounding circumstances. 
 
3. Conclusions 
Although explicit reference to the Vienna rule has not been frequently made, courts and 
tribunals in the UK have tended to adopt a restrictive approach to the interpretation of the 
crimes enumerated in Articles 1F(a) and (b), an approach which tends away from expansive 
interpretations of these crimes and stresses the need for individual consideration of the facts 
of each case. To this end, generalised classifications and purely domestic interpretations of 
the crimes enumerated in these provisions have been rejected, resort rather being had to 
international instruments in order to arrive at the ‘autonomous’ meaning of the crimes as a 
matter of international law. 
 Terrorism has not featured to any significant extent in the UK’s interpretations of the 
crimes that fall within the scope of Article 1F(a), resort rather being had to the statues and 
jurisprudence of international criminal courts and tribunals. In the context of Article 1F(b), 
whilst terrorism was a clear feature of the House of Lords decision in T, the Court of Appeal 
104 
 
has recently emphasised that merely labelling an offence ‘terrorist’ is not adequate to 
establish that the offence is ‘serious’ for the purpose of Article 1F(b). The Court of Appeal 
rather stressed that the individual facts of each case must be considered in order to determine 
if the crime in question is sufficiently serious to warrant exclusion from refugee status under 
this provision. Indeed, a closer reading of the House of Lords judgment in T reveals that their 
Lordships had in mind a specific form of terrorism in this case - acts of indiscriminate 
violence directed towards innocent civilians – rather than any form of terrorism per se. That 
not every terrorist-related offence will amount to a non-political crime under this test appears 
to have been recognised in both the jurisprudence of courts and tribunals in the UK and in the 
Home Office’s guidance documents, and is indeed the approach that appears to have been 




Chapter Four: Terrorism as acts contrary 
to the purposes and principles of the 
United Nations 
 
Article 1F(c) of the 1951 Convention excludes from refugee status an individual for whom 
there are ‘serious reasons for considering … has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes 
and principles of the United Nations’. Several resolutions of the United Nations Relief and 
Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) might be considered forerunners of Article 1F(c). 
For example, UNRRA Resolution 71 excluded from the organisation’s assistance: 
‘displaced persons who may be detained in the custody of the military or civilian 
authorities of any of the United Nations on charges of having collaborated with the 
enemy or having committed other crimes against the interests or nationals of the 
United Nations.’
310
   
The Constitution of the International Refugee Organisation (IRO Constitution) also excluded 
from its mandate those who had assisted enemy forces in the persecution of civilian 
populations or operations against the United Nations, and those who had, since the end of 
hostilities, participated in any organisation hostile to the government of a member of the 
United Nations, or had participated in any terrorist organisation.
311
  
Despite reference to terrorist organisations in the IRO Constitution, terrorism did not 
feature in early formulations of Article 1F(c), nor the debates surrounding the drafting of the 
provision. The drafting debates rather focused on the imprecise nature of the phrase ‘acts 
contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations’, and the type of acts that might 
fall within the scope of the provision.
312
 The debates surrounding the drafting of the provision 
suggest that Article 1F(c) was understood as applying to violations of human rights that fell 
short of crimes against humanity, war crimes, genocide and the subversion or overthrow of 
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democratic regimes, committed by persons occupying government posts, such as heads of 
State, ministers and high officials.
313
  
Terrorism is also not mentioned in the exclusion provisions of the OAU Refugee 
Convention, which replicate the wording of Article 1F(c) and includes an additional reference 
to a person who has been ‘guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the 
Organization of African Unity’.
314
 Terrorism is, however, explicitly cited in the EU 
Qualification Directives. The Directives exclude those ‘guilty of acts contrary to the purposes 
and principles of the United Nations as set out in the Preamble and Articles 1 and 2 of the 
Charter of the United Nations.’
315
 Furthermore, the Preambles to the Directives provide: 
‘Acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations are set out in the 
Preamble and Articles 1 and 2 of the Charter of the United Nations and are, amongst 
others, embodied in the United Nations Resolutions relating to measures combating 
terrorism, which declare that ‘acts, methods and practices of terrorism are contrary to 
the purposes and principles of the United Nations’ and that ‘knowingly financing, 




The EU Directives thus refer directly to the Charter of the United Nations and UN resolutions 
relating to measures combating terrorism when interpreting the phrase ‘acts contrary to the 
purposes and principles of the United Nations’.  
 The purposes and principles of the UN, as set out in the Preamble and Articles 1 and 2 
of the Charter of the United Nations (UN Charter), include such purposes as maintaining 
international peace and security, developing friendly relations among nations and promoting 
and encouraging respect for human rights, and principles such as the sovereign equality of all 
states, fulfilling obligations under the Charter in good faith and settling disputes by peaceful 
means. These are broad general statements and as such it has been suggested that in certain 
areas the practical content of the declared purposes and principles must be determined in light 
of more general developments in international law,
317
 including, for example, multilateral 
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conventions adopted under the auspices of the UN General Assembly and UN Security 
Council resolutions.
318
 This dynamic approach to the interpretation of the purposes and 
principles of the UN is indeed mandated by the EU Qualification Directives, which refer to 
UN resolutions which declare that ‘acts, methods and practices of terrorism are contrary to 
the purposes and principles of the United Nations’ outlined in Chapter 1.
319
 This has indeed 
been the approach adopted by courts and tribunals in the UK when considering the scope of 
the provision. 
 Terrorism has featured largely in the UK’s interpretation of Article 1F(c). Drawing on 
the UN resolutions highlighted above, the courts and tribunals in the UK have recognised that 
acts of terrorism are capable of falling within the scope of Article 1F(c). The Home Office’s 
APG similarly provides: 
‘Acts of terrorism are widely considered contrary to the purposes and principles of the 
United Nations, as set out in the United Nations Security Council Resolutions relating 
to measures combating terrorism (United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1373 
and 1377 which declare that the “acts, methods and practices of terrorism are contrary 
to the purposes and principles of the United Nations” and that “knowingly financing, 




This has now been set out in statute in the UK’s Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 
2006, which provides that the construction of Article 1F(c) includes acts of committing, 
preparing or instigating terrorism.
321
  
 However, it seems that courts and tribunals in the UK have been more cautious with 
regard to adopting a definition of terrorism for the purpose of Article 1F(c). Although the 
UK’s Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act directs one to the UK’s domestic definition 
of terrorism for this purpose, the practice of courts and tribunals in the UK has not been to 
adhere rigidly to this definition, but rather to draw on the definitions of terrorism contained in 
international sources to give content to the meaning of terrorism in the context of the 
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provision. Indeed, the Supreme Court recently rejected the UK’s domestic definition of 
terrorism completely, rather preferring to rely on the UNHCR’s guidance when interpreting 
the phrase ‘acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.’ While 
jurisprudence on Article 1F(c) in the UK has long been dominated by the definition and 
scope of ‘terrorism’ as acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations, a 
recent approach to the interpretation of the phrase considers whether it also covers military 
action which does not amount to terrorism but can nevertheless be considered to constitute 
‘acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations’ for the purpose of Article 
1F(c). 
 Part 1 of this chapter examines the practice of the immigration tribunal and the SIAC 
in the early cases involving Article 1F(c), before the adoption of domestic legislation in the 
UK concerning the interpretation of the provision. Part 2 considers the UK’s domestic 
definition of terrorism, the coming into force of the EU Qualification Directive and how the 
intersection of these different legal regimes was approached in a number of cases before the 
Court of Appeal, while Part 3 considers a recent decision of the Supreme Court in which it 
provides long-awaited guidance on the definition of ‘terrorism’ for the purpose of Article 
1F(c). The chapter concludes in Part 4 with a critical examination of the Supreme Court’s 
approach to addressing the important question of whether military action against armed 
forces acting under UN mandate is contrary to the purposes and principles of the United 




1. The early cases 
For over a decade the immigration tribunal and the SIAC have recognised that acts of 
terrorism are capable of falling within the scope of Article 1F(c).
323
 In the early cases, before 
the adoption of the UK’s 2006 Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act which sets out in 
statute that acts of terrorism fall within the scope of the provision, the immigration tribunal 
and the SIAC drew on a number of the UN resolutions outlined above in support of this 
proposition.
324
 These bodies therefore took a dynamic approach to the interpretation of the 
                                                          
322
 This chapter is drawn in part from Singer S, ‘Exclusion from Refugee Status: asylum seekers and terrorism in 
the UK’ (2012) 1 Centre for Criminal Justice and Human Rights Working Papers Series 2-16 
323
 Mukhtiar Singh v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2000] (unreported, SC 4/99) [68]; Gurung 
(Exclusion, Risk, Maoists) (n 87) 100. 
324
 C v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] UKSIAC 7/2002 [31]; AA (Exclusion clause) 
Palestine (n 169) [54]; KK (n 149) [21]-[29].  
109 
 
phrase ‘acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations’, an approach 
based in part on 1951 Convention’s status as a ‘living instrument’.  
The meaning of the phrase ‘acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United 
Nations’ was considered in detail by the immigration tribunal in the KK case in 2004. The 
tribunal here noted that, although Articles 1 and 2 of the UN Charter are the ‘starting point’ 
for determining the meaning of the phrase, it did not consider itself limited to the wording of 
these Charter provisions but also considered UN General Assembly and Security Council 
resolutions to be highly relevant to the interpretation of the provision. The tribunal drew 
attention to the rule of treaty interpretation contained in the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, and considered Security Council resolutions to be evidence of subsequent practice 
of states parties within the meaning of Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna rule,
325
 and General 
Assembly resolutions, while not having the legislative force of Security Council resolutions, 
as evidence of subsequent agreement of states parties within the meaning of Article 31(3)(a) 
of the Vienna rule.
326
 The tribunal noted:  
‘To fail to give full effect to these Acts is not merely to ignore the Vienna 
Convention: it is to prevent the Charter of the United Nations being regarded as a 
living instrument, capable of being adapted by interpretation and use, by agreement 
and endorsement, to the circumstances of changing ages.’
327
 
This approach was followed in a number of decisions of the tribunal and the SIAC.
328
 These 
UN Security Council and General Assembly resolutions were therefore relied upon heavily in 
the UK’s interpretation of Article 1F(c), to support the view that acts of terrorism fall within 
the scope of the provision. In support of this approach, attention was also drawn to the 
seminal decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Pushpanathan.
329
 In this case, the 
Canadian Court held that acts could be considered contrary to the purposes and principles of 
the United Nations for the purpose of Article 1F(c) in cases where:  
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(a) "there was a consensus in international law that particular acts constitute 
sufficiently serious and sustained violations of fundamental human rights as to 
amount to persecution" and  




The tribunal reasoned that as acts of terrorism had been explicitly recognised as contrary to 
the purposes and principles of the United Nations in these Security Council and General 
Assembly resolutions, terrorism was certainly capable of falling within the scope of Article 
1F(c) under section (b) of the Pushpanathan approach.
331
  
However, in these early cases both the tribunal and the SIAC repeatedly stressed that 
merely characterising certain acts as ‘terrorist’ is ‘neither necessary nor sufficient’ for the act 
to constitute acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the UN for the purpose of Article 
1F(c).
332
 Rather, it was necessary to examine the meaning of the phrase ‘acts contrary to the 
purposes and principles of the United Nations’, and determine whether the acts in question 
were capable of falling within the scope of the provision: 
‘evidently the phrase [acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United 
Nations] is capable of bearing a meaning not limited to acts of terrorism. For the same 
reason, acts which some might call terrorist might not fall within the United Nations' 
understanding of the word, but might nevertheless, for some other reason, fall within 
the class of acts that are contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations. 
But what we wish to make clear is that the entire process of analysis is properly 
independent of any use of the word "terrorism" in other contexts.’
333
 
The tribunal in KK maintained that it was ‘searching for an international autonomous 
meaning of the relevant provisions of the Refugee Convention’, and therefore purely 
domestic interpretations of terrorism, such as those contained in English statutes, were 
inappropriate.
334
 Similarly, the tribunal considered its task was to determine what the UN 




The tribunal and the SIAC, however, declined from making any firm findings as to 
what the UN meant by terrorism in its resolutions, or formulating a working definition of 
terrorism for the purpose of Article 1F(c). Rather, the provision was repeatedly held to apply 
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to ‘acts which are the subject of intense disapproval by the governing body of the entire 
international community’.
336
 The tribunal in KK explained: 
‘An individual who has committed such an act cannot claim that his categorisation as 
criminal depends upon the attitudes of the very regime from whom he has sought to 
escape, because the international condemnation shows that his acts would have been 




In these early cases, Article 1F(c) was held to apply to a Turkish activist who had been 
convicted of arson and conspiracy to commit arson in relation to his part in petrol bomb 
attacks on a Turkish bank and travel agency in London. The fact that a DKHP flag had been 
placed at the scene of both incidents was considered to show the purpose of the attacks ‘was 
to provoke a state of terror amongst those engaged in lawful Turkish businesses in the United 
Kingdom and thus to indicate that the fight against the Turkish Government was being 
pursued by violent means even here’.
338
 The tribunal noted that these factors ‘bring into these 
offences of arson both an international and a terrorist element’, and therefore fell within the 
scope of Article 1F(c).
339
 The provision was also applied to an active supporter of Egyptian 
Islamic Jihad (EIJ), a proscribed terrorist organisation in the UK, for his role in trying to 
recruit serving Egyptian Army officers for the EIJ and in planning operations on behalf of the 
EIJ, both in Egypt and abroad.
340
 Again, the key factors here appeared to be the international 
dimension to the individual’s activities and the political motivation underlying them.  
 In deciding these early cases, courts and tribunals in the UK also firmly established 
that Article 1F(c) is not limited to those deploying state powers, but can also extend to private 
individuals. As the purposes and principles of the UN to which Article 1F(c) refers are 
intended to govern the conduct of Member States in relation to one other, Article 1F(c) was 
traditionally interpreted as capable of applying only to an ‘individual in a position of power 
in a member State and instrumental to his State’s infringing these principles.’
341
 Thus, during 
the drafting of the provision, the delegate for France explained ‘[t]he provision was not aimed 
at the man-on-the-street, but at persons occupying government posts, such as heads of State, 
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ministers and high officials.’
342
 It has indeed been suggested that State officials are most 
likely to be capable of violating the purposes and principles of the United Nations by 
interfering with other States in violation of international law or depriving third persons of 
their human rights as protected under international law.
343
 However, it cannot be disregarded 
that private groups or single private persons are today also subject to obligations arising 
under public international law.
344
 Indeed, in the seminal Pushpanathan case the Supreme 
Court of Canada held that Article 1F(c) could, in some instances, extend to private actors. 
The Court noted that ‘[a]lthough it may be more difficult for a non-state actor to perpetrate 
human rights violations on a scale amounting to persecution without the state thereby 
implicitly adopting those acts, the possibility should not be excluded a priori.’
345
 The UK 
tribunal has followed this approach, holding that private individuals are indeed capable of 
falling with the scope of Article 1F(c),
346
 an approach which has been confirmed in later 
cases by the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court
347




The Security Council and General Assembly have indeed declared that ‘acts methods 
and practices of terrorism’ are contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations 
without limiting this determination to acts committed by State officials. This may be seen as 
implying that private individuals are also capable of acting against these purposes and 
principles.
349
 Indeed, the Security Council has gone as far as to state its ‘unequivocal 
condemnation of all acts, methods and practice of terrorism, wherever and by whomever 
committed’.
350
 It has, however, been suggested that if Article 1F(c) is applied to non-state 
actors, it should be restricted to ‘persons in high office in government or a rebel movement 
that controls territory within the State or in a group perpetrating international terrorism that 
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threatens international peace and security.’
351
 It is submitted by the present author that, as the 
purposes and principles of the United Nations are inherently international in nature, the 
provision be limited to senior State officials or high ranking members of an organisation that 
are capable of implementing policies and large scale actions that threaten international peace 
and security. In particular, Article 1F(c) should not be applied to low ranking members or 
foot soldiers in a State-controlled or rebel organisation, particularly as exclusion of these 
individuals from refugee status could more appropriately be considered under Articles 1F(a) 
or (b) or, if committed in the host State, under the domestic criminal legal system of that 
country. 
 Another issue that the tribunal and the SIAC had to grapple with in the early cases 
was the question of whether there are any geographical or temporal limitations to the scope of 
Article 1F(c). Unlike Article 1F(b), which provides the excludable act must have been 
committed outside the country of refuge prior to his admission to that country as a refugee’, 
Article 1F(c) does not explicitly provide for any temporal or geographical limitations to the 
range of acts that may fall within the scope of the provision. Nevertheless, in a number of UK 
cases it was argued that Article 1F(c) similarly applies only to acts committed outside the 
country of refuge prior to the asylum applicant’s admission to that country as a refugee. 
However, this argument was firmly rejected by the tribunal: 
Article 1F(c) does not contain the words "outside the country of refuge prior to his 
admission to that country as a refugee", which are found in Article 1F(b). There is no 
reason at all to suppose that that difference is accidental. Acts which merit the 
condemnation of the whole international community must lead to exclusion from the 
benefits of the Refugee Convention whenever they occur.
352
 
This view was later approved in a number of cases which appeared before the SIAC, and 
ultimately by the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords.
353
 The Home Secretary 
accordingly relied on Article 1F(c) in a number of cases to revoke refugee status from those 
previously granted protection in the UK.
354
  
This appears to be the correct interpretation of the provision. The ordinary meaning of 
the text of Article 1F(c) does not indicate any temporal or geographical limitations to the acts 
that may fall within its scope. Although Article 1F(b) includes such limitations, these are not 
included in the text of either Articles 1F(a) or (c), which should also be interpreted to apply to 
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acts committed without such requirements. However, given the vague nature of Article 1F(c), 
and the relatively limited jurisprudence concerning its application, it has been argued by 
commentators that its application ‘needs to take place with restraint and should be limited to 
residual cases in which Art. 1F(a) and (b) fail to apply’.
355
 The lack of temporal or 
geographical limitations to the range of acts that may fall within the scope of Article 1F(c) do 
not mean that the provision should simply be used to cover any crime which would fall 
within the scope of Article 1F(b) but for the geographical and temporal limitations inherent in 
the provision, as not every serious non-political crime will meet the gravity required to 
constitute ‘acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations’ for the purpose 
of Article 1F(c). Such crimes could be better addressed by Article 33(2) of the 1951 
Convention, which in any case appears a more specific provision for this set of 
circumstances, or the domestic criminal legal system of the host State.
356
 
 In these early cases, the immigration tribunal and the SIAC therefore began to define 
the scope and reach of Article 1F(c). These bodies adopted a dynamic approach to the 
interpretation of the provision, and relied on UN resolutions which declare that ‘acts methods 
and practices of terrorism are contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations’ 
in determining that acts of terrorism were capable of falling within the scope of the provision. 
Whilst it may initially have been doubted whether these resolutions truly represented the 
consensus of the international community sufficient to establish subsequent practice or 
agreement regarding the interpretation of the 1951 Convention,
357
 it seems that the number 
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Meeting' (4 October 1996) UN Doc A/C.6/51/SR.11, 7-8. Gilbert also noted that ‘it is questionable whether the 
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and strength of resolutions adopted establish uncontrovertibly that terrorism may constitute 




The tribunal and the SIAC in these cases, however, stressed that the purpose of such 
an examination was not to rely on interpretations of terrorism which exist in international 
instruments, nor domestic statutes defining the term, but rather to determine what the UN 
meant by terrorism in these resolutions. However, both these bodies declined making any 
firm findings as to what the UN meant by terrorism in its resolutions, or formulating a 
working definition of terrorism for the purpose of Article 1F(c). Rather, the provision was 
held to apply to ‘acts which are the subject of intense disapproval by the governing body of 
the entire international community’. The approach of the tribunal and the SIAC in these early 
cases therefore seems to have been to rely on a decision-maker to recognise acts of terrorism 
which attract the condemnation of the international community, rather than refer definitions 
of terrorism which exist in international or domestic instruments. As considered below, this is 
in direct contrast with the approaches later taken to the interpretation of the provision. 
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2. The UK’s domestic definition of terrorism, the EU Qualification Directive 
and the Court of Appeal 
Following the 7/7 terrorist attacks on London in 2005, the UK included two provisions 
concerning Article 1F in the 2006 Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act. One of these, 
section 54, provides that:  
‘[i]n the construction and application of Article 1(F)(c) of the Refugee Convention the 
reference to acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations shall be 
taken as including ... (a) acts of committing, preparing or instigating terrorism ... and 




The government relied heavily on a number of UN Security Council resolutions to justify 
including such a provision in this piece of legislation.
360
 However, in contrast to the approach 
which had been previously adopted by the tribunal and the SIAC, which focused on the 
meaning of terrorism in the UN resolutions under examination, this provision provides that 
’terrorism’ for the purpose of the construction of Article 1F(c) has the meaning given by the 
UK’s domestic definition of terrorism.
361
  
The UK’s domestic definition of terrorism, contained in the Terrorism Act 2000, is 
extremely wide. Section 1 of the 2000 Act encompasses certain acts and threats done in order 
to advance a political, religious or ideological cause, if done in order to influence the 
government or an international governmental organisation, or to intimidate the public or 
section of the public.
362
 The acts or threats that may fall within this definition include not 
only serious violence against a person and endangering another person’s life, but also acts 
that involve serious damage to property, whether or not this involves a risk of harm to 
anyone.
363
 Therefore, political protest that involves demolishing a State official’s car, or 
throwing a brick through the window of a State building, even where it was clear that neither 
car nor building were occupied, may fall within this definition of terrorism.
364
 For these 
purposes ‘the government’ and ‘the public’ are not limited to the UK, but extend to action 
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against any government, anywhere in the world.
365
 The broad scope of this legislation was 
made clear in two criminal cases concerning the definition of terrorism contained in the 2000 
Act which recently came before the Court of Appeal. 
 In the first of these cases, it was argued by the appellant that actions targeted at 
removing an unelected and unrepresentative government, in this case the Gaddafi regime in 
Libya, did not fall within the terms of the 2000 Act, as an unrepresentative government could 
not be considered a ‘government’ within the meaning of the Act.
366
 The Court of Appeal, 
however, rejected this argument, noting that, given the broad terms of the 2000 Act, all 
governments were within its scope; there was no exemption from criminal liability for 
terrorist activities which were motivated or said to be morally justified by the alleged nobility 
of the terrorist cause.
367
 As noted by the Court: 
‘What is striking about the language of s1, read as a whole, is its breadth. It does not 
specify that the ambit of its protection is limited to countries abroad with governments 
of any particular type or possessed of what we, with our fortunate traditions, would 
regard as the desirable characteristics of representative government. . . . Terrorism is 
terrorism, whatever the motives of the perpetrators.’
368
 
The Court of Appeal also recently rejected the argument that the UK’s definition of terrorism 
did not extend to military action by non-State groups in a non-international armed conflict, 
despite the fact that such action was directed at the State’s armed forces rather than 
civilians.
369
 The Court noted that: 
‘The definition [contained in the Terrorism Act 2000] is comprehensive in its scope; 
on its face, acts by insurgents against the armed forces of a state anywhere in the 
world which seek to influence a government and are made for political purposes are 
terrorism. There is no exemption for those engaged in an armed insurrection and an 
armed struggle against a government.’
370
 
Although the Court considered that international law might develop a rule which excludes 
some types of insurgents attacking the armed forces of government from the definition of 
terrorism, the necessary widespread and general state practice or the necessary opinio juris to 
that effect had not yet been established. Noting that the UK’s definition of terrorism is 
extremely wide, the Court concluded that there is ‘nothing in international law which either 
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compels or persuades us to read down the clear terms of the 2000 Act to exempt such persons 
from the definition in the Act.’
371
 The UK’s domestic definition of terrorism is therefore 
extremely broad. It appears to cover all politically motivated action against a government or 
international organisation, permitting no exceptions for those engaged in military action 
during internal armed conflicts, nor the activities of those seeking to overthrow repressive 
regimes, whether during an armed conflict or during peacetime.   
 In the asylum context, however, the interpretation given to terrorism for the purpose 
of Article 1F(c) by courts and tribunals in the UK has not been as comprehensive in its scope. 
Notably, military activity directed against a State’s armed forces has been excluded from the 
definition of terrorism for the purpose of Article 1F(c), and courts have developed the 
requirement that terrorist activity must have an international dimension to constitute ‘acts 
contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations’ for the purpose of the 
provision. In attempting to define ‘terrorism’ for the purpose of Article 1F(c), the Court of 
Appeal has relied on the UK’s domestic definition contained in the 2000 Act and a number of 
other international sources. The intersection of a number of different areas of law here has 
resulted in a rather confusing stream of decisions from the Court of Appeal. Much of this 
disparity has stemmed from the coming into force of the EU Qualification Directive. 
In 2006, the same year as the UK’s Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act, the EU 
Qualification Directive came into force, which is incorporated into UK law by the 2006 
Qualification Regulations. As noted above, the Qualification Directive defines the phrase 
‘acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations’ by reference to the 
preamble and Articles 1 and 2 of the UN Charter and UN resolutions which declare that ‘acts, 
methods and practices of terrorism are contrary to the purposes and principles of the United 
Nations’. The Court of Appeal in a number of cases has held that the Qualification Directive 
conditions and qualifies the application of the Terrorism Act 2000 to Article 1F proceedings, 
as, even at its most generous, the formulation of ‘acts contrary to the purposes and principles 
of the UN’ contained in the Directive is not as wide as section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2000.
372
 
As such, ‘the meaning of terrorism contained in the 2000 Act has where necessary to be read 
down in an art. 1F case so as to keep its meaning within the scope of art 12(2)(c) of the 
Directive’.
373
 Adopting this approach, the Court of Appeal in Al-Sirri noted that, ‘terrorism 
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here means the use for political ends of fear induced by violence’.
374
 The Court did not 
consider this materially different from the second limb of Security Council Resolution 1566 
of 2004: 
‘acts … committed with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public 
or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a 
government or an international organisation to do or abstain from doing any act’
375
 
The Court of Appeal in this case therefore referred to a definition of terrorism contained in a 
UN resolution to inform the interpretation of terrorism for the purpose of Article 1F(c). 
The Court of Appeal in KJ (Sri Lanka), however, didn’t appear to rely on any sources, 
domestic or international, when it noted that military action directed against government 
forces did not constitute acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.
376
 
The Court of Appeal in this case considered it common ground that the deliberate killing or 
injuring of civilians in pursuit of political objects were acts of terrorism within the meaning 
of Article 1F(c).
377
 However, participation in military action directed against government 
forces, which did not involve the murder or attempted murder of civilians, did not fall within 
the scope of the provision. Although it was noted by the SIAC in one case that this aspect of 
the KJ (Sri Lanka) judgment was made per incuriam,
378
 the distinction between military 
action directed against government forces and attacks on civilians has been maintained in 
later Court of Appeal decisions.
379
 Thus it has been held that KJ (Sri Lanka) is authority for 
the view that military action directed against the armed forces of a government, even if 
conducted by a proscribed terrorist organisation, does not as such constitute terrorism or acts 
contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.
380
 The Court of Appeal in DD 
(Afghanistan) noted that ‘it is difficult to hold that every act of violence in a civil war, the 
aim of which will usually be to overthrow a legitimate government, is an act of terrorism 
within the 2000 Act.’
381
 The Court in this case therefore appears to have seen its task as 
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interpreting the UK’s domestic definition of terrorism contained in the Terrorism Act of 
2000. In contrast with the later Court of Appeal decision in the criminal context, noted above, 
the court in this case did not consider the UK’s domestic definition of terrorism to be as 
wide-reaching in its scope as to encompass all military action against government forces. 
However, the Court of Appeal has also stressed that the KJ (Sri Lanka) exception 
does not extend to violence of any kind against governments, such as violence against 
government officials. In SS (Libya), a military attack which left 165 Libyan officials dead and 
159 injured was considered to be action very difficult to categorise as anything other than 
terrorism, and as such fell within the scope of Article 1F(c).
382
 The Court of Appeal here 
approved the definition of terrorism in the European Council’s Common Position of 2001 as 
authoritative guidance for the meaning of terrorism within the context of Article 12(2)(c) of 
the Qualification Directive.
383
 The essence of this definition was: 
‘the use or threat of action designed to influence a government or to intimidate a 
population by serious acts of violence and some acts of economic disruption.’
384
 
The Court in Al-Sirri appeared to consider the EU Directive’s reference to the UN Charter 
and UN resolutions referred it to a definition of terrorism contained in Security Council 
Resolution 1566. In contrast, the Court of Appeal in SS (Libya) instead referred to the 
definition contained in an EU instrument as guidance on the interpretation of terrorism within 
the meaning of the Directive. The Court of Appeal in KJ (Sri Lanka), in contrast, appeared to 
be seeking to interpret the UK’s domestic definition contained in the Terrorism Act 2000. 
The Court of Appeal in these cases therefore drew on a number of different instruments to 
inform the meaning of terrorism for the purpose of Article 1F(c), resulting in a rather 
fragmented and confusing stream of jurisprudence. 
 Another issue to which some attention has been given throughout this jurisprudence is 
whether an international dimension is needed in order to bring a terrorist act within the scope 
of Article 1F(c). In Al-Sirri, the Court of Appeal stated it saw force in the argument that 
terrorism had to have an international dimension in order to fall within the scope of the EU 
Qualification Directive. However, in the instant case this international dimension was 
supplied as it ‘involved the use of a safe haven in one state to destabilise the government of 
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another by the use of violence.’
385
 In a later decision, however, the Court saw nothing for a 
requirement of an ‘international dimension’ to the terrorist act, as the court in Al-Sirri had not 
had to express a definitive view for the purpose of that case.
386
 The Al-Sirri requirement of an 
international dimension was, however, followed by the tribunal in a case involving a former 
police officer in Zimbabwe,
387
 and was indeed affirmed by the Supreme Court when Al-Sirri 
was heard on appeal.  
The Court of Appeal in these cases drew on a number of different instruments to 
inform the meaning of terrorism for the purpose of Article 1F(c). While the underlying bases 
of these different definitions of terrorism appear similar – acts intended to provoke a state of 
terror in the population or coerce a state or international organisation to take (or abstain from) 
some sort of action – the range of acts that may fall within these definitions differ to a large 
extent. Thus, as noted above, the UK’s domestic definition of terrorism encompasses not only 
serious violence against a person and endangering another person’s life, but also acts that 
involve serious damage to property, whether or not this involves a risk of harm to anyone. In 
contrast, UN Security Council Resolution 1566 of 2004 suggests that terrorism should be 
limited to acts that are (i) prohibited under international counter-terrorism conventions and 
(ii) involve taking hostages, or are committed with the intent of causing death or serious 
bodily injury.
388
 The definition of terrorism contained in the European Council’s Common 
Position of 2001 includes kidnapping or hostage taking, attacks upon a person’s life or 
physical integrity or causing extensive destruction to a public place or private property which 
is likely to endanger human life or result in major economic loss.
389
 The range of acts that 
may fall within the scope of these definitions therefore vary, with the UK’s definition of 
terrorism certainly representing the broadest of these three. The meaning of terrorism in the 
context of Article 1F(c) appears to have been confused even further in the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Al-Sirri, in which it referred to the definition of terrorism contained in the UN’s 
draft Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism, as will be considered below. 
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3. The Supreme Court’s judgment in Al-Sirri 
The interpretation of Article 1F(c) was recently considered by the UK Supreme Court in the 
conjoined cases Al-Sirri and DD (Afghanistan).
390
 In its decision in the Al-Sirri case, the 
Court had to determine whether all activities defined as terrorism by UK domestic law were, 
for that reason alone, acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations, or 
whether such activities must also constitute a threat to international peace and security or 
friendly relations between nations. 
Before the Supreme Court, it was argued by the Secretary of State that, because the 
United Nations had condemned terrorism but not defined the term, Member States were free 
to adopt their own definitions, and therefore, acts falling within the UK’s domestic definition 
of terrorism would be acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations 
whether or not they had an international dimension or repercussions for international peace 
and security.
391
 In support of this argument, a number of UN General Assembly and Security 
Council resolutions on the subject of terrorism were cited, sometimes including and 
sometimes lacking the adjective ‘international’. The Supreme Court, however, rejected this 
argument, noting:  
‘it is clear that the phrase “acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United 
Nations” must have an autonomous meaning. It cannot be the case that individual 
Member States are free to adopt their own definitions.’
392
  
Rather, the Supreme Court agreed with the appellants who, supported by the UNHCR, argued 
that Article 1F must be ‘interpreted narrowly and applied restrictively’ because of the serious 
consequences of excluding a person who has a well-founded fear of persecution from the 
protection of the 1951 Convention.
393
 In relation to the nature of acts that could be considered 
to fall within the scope of Article 1F(c), the Supreme Court agreed with the UNHCR that:  
‘There should be a high threshold “defined in terms of the gravity of the act in 
question, the manner in which the act is organised, its international impact and long-
term objectives, and the implications for international peace and security”.’
394
  
The Supreme Court drew attention to the fact that the principal purposes of the United 
Nations are to maintain international peace and security, and also noted that the Court of 
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Justice of the European Union (CJEU), in its decision in the B & D case, consistently referred 
to ‘international’ terrorism.
395
 For these reasons, the appropriately cautious and restrictive 
approach was that advocated by the UNHCR in its Guidelines on International Protection: 
‘Article 1F(c) is only triggered in extreme circumstances by activity which attacks the 
very basis of the international community’s coexistence. Such activity must have an 
international dimension. Crimes capable of affecting international peace, security and 
peaceful relations between states, as well as serious and sustained violations of human 
rights would fall under this category.’
396
 
The Supreme Court therefore held that acts of terrorism could only be considered contrary to 
the purposes and principles of the United Nations for the purpose of Article 1F(c) if they 
impacted in some significant way on international peace and security.  
At para 39 of his judgment, Lord Phillips set down what he considered to be the 
‘essence of terrorism’ for the purpose of Article 1F(c):  
‘the commission, organisation, incitement or threat of serious acts of violence against 
persons or property for the purpose of intimidating a population or compelling a 
government or international organisation to act or not to act in a particular way’.
397
  
Lord Phillips drew here on the definition of terrorism in Article 2 of the UN’s draft 
Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism, and also referred to the Court of 
Appeal’s statement in Al-Sirri, noted above: ‘the use for political ends of fear induced by 
violence’. In his Lordship’s opinion, it seemed very likely that ‘inducing terror in a civilian 
population or putting such extreme pressures upon a government will also have the 
international repercussions referred to by the UNHCR.’
398
 
As to the question of whether actions taken in one state to destabilise the government 
of another would supply this ‘international character’, the Court concluded that this would 
depend on the facts of the individual case. However, the Court considered that it ‘clearly 
would be enough if the government (or those in control) of one state offered a safe haven to 
terrorists to plot and carry out their terrorist operations against another state’, as this would 
have clear implications for inter-state relations. Although the Court did note that the same 
would not be true of simply being in one place and doing things which have a result in 
another. The test is ‘whether the resulting actions have the requisite serious effect upon 
international peace, security and peaceful relations between states.’
399
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The Supreme Court in this case therefore rejected the UK’s domestic definition of 
terrorism for the purpose of Article 1F(c), and rather drew attention to the definition of 
terrorism contained in UN’s draft Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism. 
Negotiations on this counter-terrorism treaty have fallen into deadlock, primarily because of 
the problem of finding an all-encompassing definition of terrorism and the related issue of 
whether such a definition should apply to national liberation movements.
400
 Nevertheless, the 
negotiations on this convention resulted in a draft definition of terrorism in 2005, which 
covers acts such as death or serious bodily injury to any person, serious damage to public or 
private property and damage to property resulting or likely to result in major economic loss 
when the purpose is to intimidate a population or to compel a government or international 
organisation to do or abstain from doing any act.
401
 It is this definition of terrorism that Lord 
Phillips referred to in his judgment, albeit for the purpose of Article 1F(c) this appears to be 
qualified by the requirement that the activity attacks ‘the very basis of the international 
community’s coexistence’ and impacts in some significant way on international peace and 
security. 
The Supreme Court’s determination that a terrorist act must have an international 
dimension in order to fall within the terms of Article 1F(c) appears to accord with the 
ordinary meaning of the terms of the UN Charter. As noted by Lord Phillips: ‘the principal 
purposes of the United Nations are to maintain international peace and security, to remove 
threats to that peace, and to develop friendly relations among nations.’
402
 The CJEU in the B 
& D case also appear to have interpreted the UN resolutions on terrorism to refer to 
‘international terrorists’.
403
 Similarly, the court’s endorsement of the UNHCR’s position that 
Article 1F(c) is triggered only in extreme circumstances, by activity which attacks the very 
basis of the international community’s coexistence, appears to be in line with international 
guidance on the interpretation of the provision. For example, in Pushpanathan the Supreme 
Court of Canada made clear that a very high threshold must be reached before an act could be 
considered to fall within Article 1F(c), and that not every act condemned by the UN could, 
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for that reason alone, be considered contrary to its purposes and principles.
404
 Thus, in 
Pushpanathan itself, the Canadian Court held that the crime of drug trafficking did not come 
within the scope of Article 1F(c), despite co-ordinated efforts of the UN to suppress the 
activity, through treaties, declarations and institutions.
405
 Indeed, given the breadth of 
subjects covered by multilateral UN instruments, the UNHCR similarly advises that:  
‘Equating any action contrary to such instruments as falling within Article 1F(c) 
would … be inconsistent with the object and purpose of the provision. Rather, it 
appears that Article 1F(c) only applies to acts that offend the principles and purposes 
of the United Nations in a fundamental manner.’
406
 
The Supreme Court’s endorsement of the UNHCR’s guidance in this respect would therefore 
appear to accord with the ordinary meaning of the provision and is in line with the restrictive 
approach that is advised be adopted in its interpretation.
407
 Indeed, simply labelling certain 
acts ‘terrorist’ can hardly be considered to elevate those acts to be of interest to the United 
Nations or those concerned with its purposes and principles. Rather, it should be shown that 
the acts in question are of sufficient gravity to be of concern to the international community 
and impact in some fundamental way on international peace and security.  
 In this case, the Supreme Court drew on the definition of terrorism contained in the 
UN’s draft Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism. This is in contrast to the 
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approach adopted in the Court of Appeal decisions, in which reference was made to the 
definitions contained in UN Security Council Resolution 1566, the European Council’s 
Common Position on Terrorism and the UK’s domestic definition of terrorism contained in 
the Terrorism Act 2000. That different sources have been relied on in these decisions is 
reflective not only of the multiple definitions of terrorism that exist in international and 
domestic legal instruments, but also the intersection here of three different legal systems: that 
of the United Nations, the European Union and the UK’s domestic legal regime. Courts in the 
UK have therefore taken different approaches to determining the appropriate legal 
instruments that should be referred to in the interpretation of terrorism for the purpose of 
Article 1F(c).  
The Supreme Court’s rejection of the UK’s domestic definition of terrorism in Al-
Sirri appears to accord with the nature of Article 1F(c), which, as a provision of an 
international convention, should as far as possible be interpreted consistently and uniformly 
across Member States. As famously noted by Lord Steyn in ex parte Adan: ‘In principle there 
can only be one true interpretation of a treaty’.
408
 At the very least, as was recognised by the 
Court of Appeal in Al-Sirri and approved by the Supreme Court, the UK’s domestic 
definition of terrorism should, where necessary, be read down in order to fall within the 
meaning of the EU Qualification Directive.
409
 The meaning of the Qualification Directive 
itself, however, is far from clear. 
The Court of Appeal in SS (Libya) chose to refer to the definition of terrorism 
contained in the EU’s Common Position as guidance on the interpretation of terrorism within 
the meaning of Article 12(2)(c) of the EU Qualification Directive. This position is applicable 
to states parties to the Directive, and, as noted by the CJEU, ‘it is clearly in the interests of 
the European Union that … the provisions of that international agreement which have been 
taken over by national law and by EU law should be given a uniform interpretation’.
410
 This 
Common Position might therefore be considered an appropriate basis for determining the 
meaning of terrorism within the scope of the EU Directive, particularly if the Directive is 
seen as a separate regime of refugee protection, distinct from that of the 1951 Convention.
411
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However, the legal basis and purpose of the EU Directive must also be borne in mind when 
considering the meaning of Article 12(2)(c). One of the legal bases for the Directive is Article 
63 EC, under which the Council was required to adopt measures on asylum, in accordance 
with the 1951 Geneva Convention and other relevant treaties, within the area of minimum 
standards with respect to the qualification of nationals of third countries as refugees. Recitals 
3, 16 and 17 to the Directive further state that the 1951 Convention constitutes the 
‘cornerstone of the international legal regime for the protection of refugees’ and that the 
provisions of the directive for determining who qualifies for refugee status and the content of 
that status were adopted to guide the competent authorities of the Member States ‘in the 
application of the [1951] Convention’ on the basis of common concepts and criteria for 
recognising applicants for asylum as refugees ‘within the meaning of Article 1 of the [1951] 
Convention’. Commentators have approached the meaning of these provisions in different 
ways.
412
 However, in the B & D case the CJEU concluded that the Qualification Directive 
must ‘be interpreted in the light of its general scheme and purpose, and in a manner 
consistent with the 1951 Geneva Convention’.
413
 This reflects the opinion of the Advocate 
General, in which he affirmed that EU norms must be in conformity with States’ international 
legal obligations, in particular the 1951 Convention, which he described as ‘an essential 
requirement in asylum matters, which emerges from the legal basis of the Directive, in 
origins, Preamble and a number of its provisions’.
414
  
In light of the general purpose and basis of the Qualification Directive, it might 
therefore be better to approach the definition of terrorism for the purpose of Article 12(2)(c) 
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in a manner which accords to the interpretation of Article 1F(c) of the 1951 Convention. 
Under this approach, reference to definitions of terrorism which are universal in their scope, 
rather than the EU’s regional instruments, may be more appropriate when interpreting the 
meaning of terrorism for the purpose of the provision. Indeed, the preamble to the Directive 
itself does not refer to acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations by 
reference to regional or domestic interpretations of terrorism, but rather by reference to the 
preamble and Articles 1 and 2 of the UN Charter and UN resolutions relating to measures 
combating terrorism. This directs an interpreter to the terms of the UN Charter and the UN 
resolutions on terrorism outlined above, rather than regional or domestic interpretations of the 
term. The better approach to interpreting terrorism for the purpose of Article 1F(c) and/or 
Article 12(2)(c) of the Qualification Directive would therefore appear to be that adopted by 
the immigration tribunal in the early cases, where the tribunal saw its task as determining 
what the UN meant by ‘terrorism’ in its resolutions rather than any meaning that terrorism 
might have by international agreement or domestic legislation.
415
 
The Court of Appeal’s reference in Al-Sirri to the definition of terrorism contained in 
UN Security Council Resolution 1566 might therefore be an appropriate basis for 
determining the meaning of terrorism for the purpose of Article 1F(c), although it must be 
noted this was a non-binding definition of terrorism adopted in a political rather than a legal 
context. Alternately, the Supreme Court’s reference to the draft UN Comprehensive 
Convention might be considered to be universally applicable to UN Member States. 
However, as noted above, negotiations on this convention have fallen into deadlock because 
the international community has as yet been unable to agree on a comprehensive definition of 
terrorism. It is not therefore entirely clear which definition of terrorism (if any) should be 
relied on when interpreting the meaning of the term within the context of Article 1F(c), 
although it is submitted by the present author that recourse to definitions of terrorism in 
international instruments adopted under the auspices of the UN might be preferable to those 
adopted in a regional or domestic context.  
  In practice, however, the Supreme Court’s endorsement of the UNHCR’s position 
may have gone some way to dispelling many of the differences that exist between these 
different definitions of terrorism. An act of politically motivated violence that is considered 
to ‘attack the very basis of the international community’s coexistence’, being assessed with 
regard to its gravity and impact on international peace and security, would likely fall under all 
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these formulations of the terrorism.
416
 Importantly, the Supreme Court appears to have 
approved the distinction made in earlier Court of Appeal decisions between military action 
directed against government forces and acts of violence directed at civilians, the former being 
excluded from the definition of terrorism for the purpose of Article 1F(c). As a primary 
problem that states encounter when attempting to agree upon a definition of terrorism 
concerns the question of whether an exception should be made for the activities of national 
liberation movements, the exclusion of this form of military activity from the interpretation of 
terrorism for the purpose of Article 1F(c) might go some way in dispelling concerns 
regarding the lack of international consensus on this issue. In the absence of a clear 
universally accepted definition of terrorism, however, it may be preferable to focus on what 
the immigration tribunal in the early cases termed ‘acts which are the subject of intense 
disapproval by the governing body of the entire international community’.
417
 These would 
appear to include acts prohibited by international anti-terrorism conventions such as those 
relating to hostage taking, hijacking, terrorist bombings and nuclear terrorism, which are 
politically motivated and committed with the intent of causing death or serious bodily injury, 
as referred to in Security Council Resolution 1566. 
While the Supreme Court appeared to adopt a narrow interpretation of the meaning of 
terrorism for the purpose of Article 1F(c) in its decision in Al-Sirri, the same cannot be said 
for the second case considered by the Court, that of DD (Afghanistan). This case did not 
concern the meaning of terrorism for the purpose of the provision, but rather other acts that 
may be considered to constitute acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United 
Nations, in particular, military action against forces acting under UN mandate, as will be 
considered below. 
 
4. Action against UN mandated forces as acts contrary to the purposes and 
principles of the United Nations 
In DD (Afghanistan), the second case which came before the Supreme Court, the court had to 
determine whether armed insurrection directed not only against government forces, but also 
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against a UN-mandated force supporting that government, constituted acts contrary to the 
purposes and principles of the United Nations for the purpose of Article 1F(c). 
 The case concerned an asylum applicant, DD, who had been engaged in offensive and 
defensive military operations in Afghanistan against both Afghan government forces and the 
UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), established by the UN 
Security Council to assist the new Afghan authority and provide security for UN troops in 
Afghanistan.
418
 Before the Court of Appeal, the Secretary of State had argued that the asylum 
applicant’s actions constituted acts of terrorism and as such were acts contrary to the 
purposes and principles of the United Nations. As noted above, the Court of Appeal, 
however, held that military actions against the Afghan military forces  were not necessarily 
terrorist in nature, and as such not contrary to the purposes and principles of the United 
Nations for the purpose of Article 1F(c).
419
 In particular, the Court of Appeal drew attention 
to the fact that there was no evidence that DD had been involved in the commission of gross 
human rights violations against the civilian population. There was a distinction between 
armed attacks against civilians, on the one hand, and armed forces on the other, and as such 
DD’s simple participation in armed conflict against the Afghan forces did not amount to 
terrorism for the purpose of Article 1F(c). 
 However, notwithstanding the fact that DD’s actions did not amount to terrorism for 
the purpose of Article 1F(c), the Court of Appeal considered DD’s direct military action 
against UN-mandated forces to be a ‘clear example’ of action contrary to the purposes and 
principles of the United Nations.
420
 The Court reasoned that, since the UN Security Council 
implements the UN purpose of maintaining international peace and security, attacks against 
Security Council-mandated forces carrying out that mandate was action contrary to the 
purpose and principles of the United Nations, and as such fell within the scope of Article 
1F(c). The Supreme Court therefore had to determine whether the Court of Appeal had been 
correct in deciding that military action against UN-mandated ISAF forces fell within the 
scope of Article 1F(c) of the 1951 Convention as acts contrary to the purposes and principles 
of the United Nations. 
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Before the Supreme Court, it was argued on behalf of the DD that participation in an 
armed attack against forces operating under and carrying out a UN mandate does not, without 
more, engage Article 1F(c). It was argued that armed insurrection is not, in itself, contrary to 
the purposes and principles of the United Nations for a number of reasons: 
Firstly, it was argued that the appropriate legal framework for determining the 
lawfulness of actions against UN-mandated forces is international humanitarian law, which 
governs situations of internal and international armed conflict. Under international 
humanitarian law, UN-mandated non-combatant peacekeeping forces enjoy special protection 
against attack.
421
 However, it was pointed out that combatant forces such as ISAF acting 
under UN-mandate do not enjoy such protection. Therefore, there was a fundamental 
distinction between military action directed at UN-mandated peacekeeping forces and UN-
mandated combatant forces. Since UN-mandated combatant forces enjoy no special 
protection under international humanitarian law, simply engaging in military action against 
these forces was not illegitimate under the laws of war, and as such, it was argued, did not 
constitute acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations. 
Furthermore, attention was drawn to the guidance provided by the Canadian Supreme 
Court in the Pushpanathan case.
422
 It will be recalled that the Canadian Court held that acts 
could be considered contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations for the 
purpose of Article 1F(c) where: (i) ‘a widely accepted international agreement or United 
Nations resolution explicitly declares that the commission of certain acts is contrary to the 
purposes and principles of the United Nations … [and] such declarations or resolutions 
represent a reasonable consensus of the international community’, or (ii) ‘there is consensus 
in international law that particular acts constitute sufficiently serious and sustained violations 
of fundamental human rights as to amount to persecution’.
423
 DD’s actions did not amount to 
serious and sustained violations of fundamental human rights, nor had the Security Council 
ever sought to categorise opposition, even armed opposition, to UN-mandated forces as 
contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations. Consensus did not exist that 
attacks on UN-mandated forces are contrary to the purposes and principles of the United 
Nations. 
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It was therefore argued that military action against UN-mandated forces should only 
provide a basis for exclusion under Article 1F(c) where (i) the act or acts in question 
constitute a crime in international law; or (ii) the act or acts, which must be of sufficient 
gravity to have a negative impact on international peace and security, have been specifically 
identified as contrary to the purposes and principles of the UN, either by a clear decision of 
the Security Council acting within its competence, or by way of agreement or consensus 
among states at large.
424
 DD’s actions against UN-mandated combatant forces did not amount 
to a crime in international law, nor had they been specifically identified as contrary to the 
purposes and principles of the UN by the Security Council or consensus of States at large. 
Therefore, it was argued that these actions did not fall within the scope of Article 1F(c) as 
acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the UN. 
In its  judgment, the Supreme Court accepted the points made concerning the 
distinction between ISAF combatant forces and UN-mandated peacekeeping forces, but did 
not consider these differences material to the issue of whether DD was excluded from refugee 
status by virtue of Article 1F(c). In the Courts opinion:  
‘The question which rules of law apply to attacks on ISAF and [UN peacekeeping 
forces] is categorically different from (and irrelevant to) the question whether an 
attack against either body is contrary to the purposes and principles of the United 
Nations.' 
The Court stated that this question ‘must be determined in an examination of all the relevant 




The Supreme Court drew attention to the purpose of the ISAF forces: to maintain 
peace and security in Afghanistan and thereby assist in the maintenance of international 
peace and security. The Court considered the maintenance of international peace and security 
to be one of the most important purposes set out in Article 1 of the UN Charter. Although the 
UN Security Council had never sought to categorise opposition to UN-mandated forces as 
contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations, the Court noted that it was not 
suggested, either by the UNHCR or the Supreme Court of Canada in Pushpanathan, that this 
was the only criterion for determining whether actions could be considered contrary to the 
purposes and principles of the United Nations.
426
 The Court noted that, in Pushpanathan, the 
Supreme Court of Canada did not have to consider whether an attack on a UN body or UN-
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mandated force fell within the scope of Article 1F(c), and there was therefore no basis for 
restricting the approach to 1F(c) to that laid out in that case.
427
 
In the Court’s view, the correct test was that put forward by the UNHCR: 
‘Article 1F(c) is only triggered in extreme circumstances by activity which attacks the 
very basis of the international community’s coexistence. Such activity must have an 
international dimension. Crimes capable of affecting international peace, security and 
peaceful relations between states, as well as serious and sustained violations of human 
rights would fall under this category.’
428
 
On this test, the Court considered an attack on ISAF forces was in principle capable of being 
an act contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations. The Court noted that the 
fundamental aims and objectives of ISAF accorded with the first purpose stated in Article 1 
on the UN Charter: the maintenance of international peace and security. By attacking ISAF, 
the asylum applicant was seeking to frustrate this purpose. The Court concluded: ‘To hold 
that his acts are in principle capable of being acts contrary to the purposes and principles of 
the United Nations accords with common sense and is correct in law.’
429
  
The Supreme Court in this case therefore took a much broader view of action that was 
capable of falling within the scope of Article 1F(c). Although again endorsing the UNHCR’s 
guidance concerning the gravity of the act in question and its impact on international peace 
and security, the court held that DD’s activities could constitute acts contrary to the purposes 
and principles of the UN despite a lack of international consensus to this effect. In contrast to 
acts of terrorism, which have repeatedly been held to constitute acts contrary to the purposes 
and principles of the UN in a number of resolutions of the Security Council and General 
Assembly, the UN had never sought to categorise action against UN-mandated forces as 
contrary to its purposes and principles. Despite this, the Supreme Court held that DD’s 
actions were capable of falling within the scope of Article 1F(c).  
While it may be true that interpreting action against UN-mandated forces as ‘acts 
contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations’ seems to accord with ‘common 
sense’, it may however be unfortunate that the Supreme Court in this case chose to depart 
from the guidance provided by the Canadian Supreme Court in Pushpanathan regarding the 
need for international consensus. Article 1F’s status as a provision of an international 
convention indicates that it should be interpreted in accordance with the rule of treaty 
interpretation contained in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, that is, the 
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provision must be interpreted in good faith, in light of its context and object and purpose. It 
has already been noted above that these considerations mandate a restrictive approach to the 
interpretation of Article 1F(c), as advocated by the Supreme Court in this case. The debates 
surrounding the drafting of Article 1F(c) suggest that it was originally understood as applying 
to acts such as gross violations of human rights, war crimes and genocide. However, under 
the Vienna rule an interpretation of Article 1F(c) must also take into account subsequent 
practice and agreement of states parties to the treaty.
430
 Subsequent agreement and state 
practice may take a variety of forms, but what is crucial is that the agreement or practice 
establishes ‘the agreement of the parties’ to the treaty.  
Applying these rules of treaty interpretation to the terms of Article 1F(c), it would 
appear that the meaning of the phrase ‘acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the 
United Nations’ may be expanded, taking into account this subsequent practice and 
agreement where this represents ‘the agreement of the parties’ to the Convention. This 
requirement appears much like the Canadian Court’s guidance in Pushpanathan, that a 
certain level of international ‘consensus’ that certain acts constitute acts contrary to the 
purposes and principles of the UN is required before they can be considered to fall within the 
scope of Article 1F(c). However, as was pointed out in the case, such consensus does not 
exist in relation to action directed against UN-mandated forces. Indeed, as a matter of policy, 
UN Security Council resolutions do not characterise armed opposition to UN-mandated 
forces as contrary to the purposes and principles of the UN. Any such characterisation would 
foreclose the possibilities for negotiated settlement, and would also go against the principle 
that the law of armed conflict should apply equally to both parties.
431
 Similarly, there do not 
appear to be any ‘relevant rules of international law’ prohibiting military action against UN-
mandated combatant forces that can be drawn on to expand the meaning of Article 1F(c) in 
this way.  
 Thus, whilst there is clearly a dynamic aspect to both the UN Charter and the 1951 
Convention, the interpretation of the phrase ‘acts contrary to the purposes and principles’ 
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should not be expanded in the absence of clear international practice or agreement in this 
respect. Indeed, the UNHCR has stressed that the exclusion clauses in the 1951 Convention 
are exhaustive, and ‘[w]hile these grounds are subject to interpretation, they cannot be 
supplemented by additional criteria in the absence of an international convention to that 
effect.’
432
 The Supreme Court may therefore have been misplaced in departing from the clear 
guidelines provided by the Canadian Court in Pushpanathan. Indeed, even under the 
UNHCR’s approach, which the Supreme Court considered to be the ‘correct test’ in Article 
1F(c) cases, the court appears to have been misguided in determining that attacks on UN-
mandated forces constitute acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations 
for the purpose of Article 1F(c). The UNHCR’s guidance clearly refers to ‘Crimes capable of 
affecting international peace, security and peaceful relations between states’.
433
 As 
considered above, DD’s actions did not amount to a crime under international criminal law, 
nor were they in violation of the rules of international humanitarian law. It therefore seems 
the Supreme Court’s decision was flawed in this point and should be revisited. It is submitted 
that the better approach would have been to follow the guidance provided by the Canadian 
Court in Pushpanathan, and limit the application of Article 1F(c) to acts which either 
constitute gross violations of fundamental human rights, or are explicitly recognised as 
contrary to the purposes and principles of the UN by a widely accepted international 




It is well established in the UK’s interpretation of Article 1F(c) that acts of terrorism are 
capable of falling within the scope of the provision. In the early cases, the tribunal and the 
SIAC stressed that the purpose of their examination was not to rely on interpretations of 
terrorism which exist in international instruments or domestic statutes, but rather to determine 
what the UN meant by terrorism in its resolutions. The provision was therefore held to apply 
to ‘acts which are the subject of intense disapproval by the governing body of the entire 
international community’. In contrast, the Court of Appeal, in a number of decisions 
following the coming into force of the EU Qualification Directive and the UK’s domestic 
legislation on the meaning of terrorism for the purpose of Article 1F(c), relied on a variety of 
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instruments when interpreting the meaning of terrorism for the purpose of the provision. The 
Court furthermore developed an exception for military action directed against a government’s 
armed forces, and in a number of cases held the terrorist activity must have an international 
dimension in order to fall within the scope of Article 1F(c). 
 In its decision in the conjoined cases Al-Sirri and DD (Afghanistan), the Supreme 
Court rejected the UK’s domestic definition of terrorism entirely for the purpose of Article 
1F(c). The Court instead followed the UNHCR’s guidance in holding that, in order to fall 
within the scope of the provision, the act in question must ‘attack the very basis of the 
international community’s coexistence’, being assessed with regard to its gravity and impact 
on international peace and security. The Supreme Court drew on the definition of terrorism 
contained in the UN’s draft Comprehensive Convention in formulating the ‘essence’ of 
terrorism for the purpose of Article 1F(c): 
‘the commission, organisation, incitement or threat of serious acts of violence against 
persons or property for the purpose of intimidating a population or compelling a 
government or international organisation to act or not to act in a particular way’ 
Whilst this UN convention may be a more appropriate point of reference than definitions of 
terrorism contained in regional or domestic instruments, negotiations on this convention have 
fallen into deadlock and the present author therefore suggests that it should be approached 
with caution. However, the Supreme Court’s endorsement of the UNHCR’s position may, for 
the purpose of Article 1F(c), have gone some way to dispelling many of the differences that 
exist between the various definitions of terrorism that exist in international law. Importantly, 
the Supreme Court also appears to have approved the distinction made in earlier Court of 
Appeal decisions between military action directed against government forces and acts of 
violence directed at civilians, and has stressed that, in order to fall within the scope of Article 
1F(c), the acts in question must have an international dimension. The Supreme Court’s 
endorsement of the UNHCR’s guidance in general appears to accord with the ordinary 
meaning of the provision and is in line with the restrictive approach that is recommended to 
be adopted in its interpretation. The Home Office’s APG, however, still refers to terrorism for 
the purpose of Article 1F(c) as defined in section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2000, and needs to 
be updated in this respect.
434
 
 In contrast to its narrow interpretation of terrorism for the purpose of Article 1F(c), 
the Supreme Court appeared to adopt an expansive approach to the interpretation of the 
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provision when determining that military action directed against combatant forces acting 
under UN-mandate is action contrary to the purposes and principles of the UN. It appears that 
the Supreme Court may have been misguided in this aspect of the case. The principles of 
international law which govern the interpretation of the 1951 Convention, and leading 
international guidance on the interpretation of Article 1F(c) in particular, indicate that 
international consensus is required to expand the meaning of the phrase ‘acts contrary to the 
purposes and principles of the United Nations’ in this way. In the case of action directed 
against UN-mandated combatant forces, this consensus is clearly lacking. It therefore seems 







Chapter Five: Responsibility and 
Membership of a Terrorist Organisation 
 
Perhaps the most important aspect of Article 1F is the level of complicity in the commission 
of Article 1F acts that must be established for an asylum applicant to be excluded from 
refugee status. Whilst Article 1F clearly applies to those who personally perpetrate 
excludable acts, responsibility may also arise where the asylum applicant has contributed to 
or been complicit in the commission of such crimes. Terrorism has featured to a large extent 
in the UK’s interpretation of responsibility for the purpose of Article 1F. This has arisen 
primarily in relation to the extent to which an asylum applicant can be held responsible for 
the commission of the activities of a terrorist group or organisation of which they are a 
member. Since terrorism has featured largely in the interpretation of individual responsibility 
as a result of membership of an organisation in the context of Article 1F, this mode of 
incurring responsibility for Article 1F acts will be the primary focus of this chapter. 
Article 1F excludes from the benefits of the 1951 Convention those for whom there 
are serious reasons for considering have ‘committed’ or  ‘been guilty of’ the acts specified 
therein. The IRO Constitution went a little further than this. In addition to ‘war criminals, 
quislings and traitors’ and ordinary criminals extraditable by treaty, the IRO Constitution 
excluded from the organisation’s mandate those who had ‘participated’ in any organisation 
with the purpose of overthrowing the government of a UN Member State, ‘participated’ in 
any terrorist organisation or ‘become leaders’ of movements hostile to the government of a 
UN Member State.
435
 However, these forms of responsibility were not included in the terms 
of Article 1F, nor were they raised during the drafting of the provision. During the drafting of 
Article 1F, reference was repeatedly made to those who had ‘committed’ one of the 
enumerated acts, rather than being a member of or participated in a particular organisation or 
movement.
436
   
                                                          
435
 IRO Constitution, Annex I Part II, Article 6: '(a) participated in any organization having as one of its 
purposes the overthrow by armed force of the Government of their country of origin, being a Member of the 
United Nations; or the overthrow by armed force of the Government of any other Member of the United 
Nations, or have participated in any terrorist organization; (b) become leaders of movements hostile to the 
Government of their country of origin being a Member of the United Nations or sponsors of movements 
encouraging refugees not to return to their country of origin’.  
436
 Although the formulation of Article 1F referred to those who had ‘committed a crime specified in Article VI 
of the London Charter of the International Military Tribunal’ or ‘falls under’ the provisions of article 14(2), 
139 
 
 The OAU Refugee Convention similarly makes reference to those who have 
‘committed’ or ‘been guilty’ of the crimes and acts listed in its exclusion provision. The Arab 
Refugee Convention rather refers to individuals that have ‘been convicted’ of a war crime, 
crime against humanity, terrorist crime or serious non-political crime. However, Article 1F’s 
‘serious reasons for considering’ clearly mandates that a lower standard of proof is required 
than a criminal conviction.
437
 Indeed, the EU Qualification Directives do not include the 
requirement that an individual must be convicted of a crime in order to be excluded from 
refugee status, but rather replicate Article 1F’s references to those who have ‘committed’ or 
‘been guilty’ of excludable acts. The Directives furthermore specify that the exclusion 
provisions apply ‘to persons who incite or otherwise participate in the commission of the 
crimes or acts mentioned therein.’
438
 
The EU Qualification Directives’ reference to those who ‘incite or otherwise 
participate’ in the commission of an Article 1F act may be seen as reflecting the well 
established principle of criminal law, by which, although criminal liability clearly attaches to 
the physical perpetration of a crime, liability also attached to various forms of participation in 
the commission or attempted commission of the act. The rationale for this approach to 
responsibility for participation in an international crime was outline by the Appeals Chamber 
of the ICTY as follows:  
‘Most of these crimes do not result from the criminal propensity of single individuals 
but constitute manifestations of collective criminality: the crimes are often carried out 
by groups of individuals acting in pursuance of a common criminal design. Although 
some members of the group may physically perpetrate the criminal act (murder . . .), 
the participation and contribution of the other members of the group is often vital in 
facilitating the commission of the offence in question. It follows that the moral gravity 
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of such participation is often no less - or indeed no different - from that of those 
actually carrying out the acts in question.’
439
 
Thus an individual may be held responsible for the commission of an international crime 
through various modes of participation. For example, Article VI of the London Charter 
provides that individual responsibility for crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes 
against humanity attaches to ‘Leaders, organizers, instigators and accomplices participating 
in the formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit any of the 
foregoing crimes’ who are responsible for ‘all acts performed by any persons in execution of 
such plan.’ Article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute similarly provides:  
‘A person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted 
in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime referred to in articles 2 to 5 of the 
present Statute, shall be individually responsible for the crime.’
440
  
The Rome Statute of the ICC for the first time explicitly systematises the requirements of 
individual criminal responsibility, and in Article 25(3) distinguishes modes of criminal 
participation to which individual responsibility attaches.
441
 Furthermore, the ad hoc tribunals 
of Rwanda and former Yugoslavia have developed in their jurisprudence the concept of ‘joint 
criminal enterprise’, whereby an individual may be held criminally responsible for 




The UN resolutions on terrorism similarly declare not only that ‘acts, methods, and 
practices of terrorism are contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations’, but 
also that ‘knowingly financing, planning and inciting terrorist acts are also contrary to the 
purposes and principles of the United Nations’.
443
 Indeed, in Resolution 1377 the Security 
Council stressed that ‘the financing, planning and preparation of as well as any other form of 
support for acts of international terrorism are similarly contrary to the purposes and 
principles of the Charter of the United Nations’
444
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In the UK, Regulation 7(3) of the Qualification Regulations provides that Articles 
1F(a) and (b) of the 1951 Convention apply ‘to a person who instigates or otherwise 
participates in the commission of the crimes or acts specified in those provisions’, echoing 
Article 12(3) of the EU Qualification Directives.
445
 Section 54 of the UK Immigration, 
Asylum and Nationality Act 2006 goes further for the purpose of Article 1F(c), providing that 
the reference to acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations shall be 
taken as including ... (a) acts of committing, preparing or instigating terrorism ... and (b) acts 
of encouraging or inducing others to commit, prepare or instigate terrorism. Responsibility 
for Article 1F crimes in the UK is therefore not limited to those who physically perpetrate 
them, but extends to those who instigate or participate in the commission of such crimes. 
Although these provisions provide different modes of liability for Article 1F(c), as opposed to 
Articles 1F(a) and (b), in practice courts and tribunals in the UK have relied on the same 
approaches to responsibility under all three limbs, as will be considered throughout the course 
of this chapter. 
Terrorism has featured largely in the UK’s interpretation of Article 1F responsibility 
in the jurisprudence of courts and tribunals in the UK, particularly where an individual has 
not personally committed one of the crimes or acts listed in Article 1F, but is a member of, or 
associated with, a terrorist organisation that has committed such a crime. The UK Supreme 
Court has, however, recently disapproved the previous guidance on responsibility which 
focused on the terrorist nature of the organisation of which the individual was associated, and 
applied an interpretation which is more akin to that employed in international criminal law, 
although there still appear to be significant divergences between the approaches adopted in 
the refugee and criminal legal contexts. Parts 1 and 2 of this chapter examine the Gurung 
approach to Article 1F responsibility, and the difficulties encountered when trying to apply 
this approach in practice. In Part 3 the recent decisions of the Supreme Court and Court of 
Appeal are examined, while in Parts 4 and 5 there is a wider discussion of these different 
approaches to Article 1F responsibility and their interplay with the standards of liability 
employed in international criminal law.  
 
                                                          
445
 Qualification Directives, art 12(2): ‘Paragraph 2 applies to persons who instigate or otherwise participate in 
the commission of the crimes or acts mentioned therein.’  
142 
 
1. The Gurung doctrine 
The leading case on Article 1F exclusion in the UK for a number of years was Gurung v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department, a starred decision of the immigration tribunal 
which pre-dated the UK Qualification Regulations and the EU Qualification Directive.
446
 In 
the Gurung decision, the tribunal sought to provide guidance on the interpretation of Article 
1F following the recent 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States. The tribunal in this case 
advocated a dynamic approach to interpreting the provision, and noted that ‘[i]n deciding 




One of the key issues the tribunal had to determine in this case was whether simple 
membership of an organisation that had committed acts or crimes proscribed by Article 1F 
was enough to bring an individual within the scope of the provision. Whilst the tribunal 
acknowledged that mere membership of an organisation that committed such acts was not 
generally enough to bring an individual within the scope of Article 1F,
448
 it went on to state: 
‘it would be wrong to say that an appellant only came within the Exclusion Clauses if 
the evidence established that he has personally participated in acts contrary to the 
provisions of Art 1F. If the organisation is one or has become one whose aims, 
methods and activities are predominantly terrorist in character, very little more will 
be necessary.’
449  
The tribunal held that there was a presumption an asylum applicant was excluded from 
refugee status under Article 1F where they were a voluntary member of an organisation that 
was ‘predominantly terrorist in character’, even if there was no evidence the individual had 
personally participated in the terrorist activities of the group. The tribunal considered this 
form of complicity necessary in order to adequately reflect the realities of modern-day 
terrorism, as the ‘terrorist acts of key operatives are often possible only by virtue of the 
infrastructure of support provided by other members who themselves undertake no violent 
actions’.
450
 The tribunal did, however, stress that: 
‘whilst complicity may arise indirectly, it remains essential in all cases to establish 
that the appellant has been a voluntary member of such an organisation who fully 
understands its aims, methods and activities, including any plans it has made to carry 
out acts contrary to Art 1F.’
451
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Whilst the tribunal observed that international criminal law and international humanitarian 
law should be the principal sources of reference when dealing with issues such as complicity 
in international crimes, and referred to the Rome Statute and the ICTY’s Statute and 
jurisprudence,
452
 the tribunal did not go on to analyse these sources. Rather, individual 
responsibility under the Gurung approach may be incurred where an individual is a voluntary 
member of an organisation that is ‘predominantly terrorist in character’.  
 In reaching this conclusion, the tribunal in Gurung drew on a long standing line of 
jurisprudence on the interpretation of Article 1F responsibility, established by the Canadian 
Federal Court of Appeal in the seminal Ramirez decision.
453
 Since this decision pre-dated the 
statutes of the ad hoc tribunals and the Rome Statute, the Canadian Court based its analysis 
of individual responsibility in large part on domestic US and Canadian decisions, 
commentaries of academic writers, and the London Charter of the International Military 
Tribunal (IMT). Drawing particularly on the London Charter’s reference to ‘[l]eaders, 
organizers, instigators and accomplices’ in its Article VI, the Court held that Article 1F 
exclusion attaches not only to those that had physically perpetrated an Article 1F crime, but 
also accomplices and abettors. The question then remained ‘What degree of complicity is 
required to be an accomplice or abettor?’ In its judgment, the Canadian Court based its 
analysis of Article 1F responsibility on the concept of ‘personal and knowing participation in 
persecutorial acts’.
454
 In the case of crimes committed by a group, the court was of the 
opinion that ‘complicity rests … on the existence of a shared common purpose and the 
knowledge that all of the parties in question may have of it.’
455
 The requirement of ‘personal 
and knowing participation’ meant that ‘mere membership in an organization which from time 
to time commits international offences is not normally sufficient for exclusion from refugee 
status.’
456
 However, the court went on to state that ‘where an organization is principally 
directed to a limited, brutal purpose … mere membership may by necessity involve personal 
and knowing participation in persecutorial acts.’
457
 On this reasoning, responsibility so as to 
give rise to exclusion may be incurred as a result of simple membership of an organisation, 
where the organisation is considered particularly violent in nature. The Canadian approach to 
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Article 1F individual responsibility found widespread support within jurisdictions such as 
New Zealand, the UK and the United States, and was also approved by the UNHCR.
458
 
Although the UNHCR advises that ‘membership per se of an organisation that 
commits or incites others to carry out violent crimes is not necessarily decisive or sufficient 
to exclude a person from refugee status’,
459
 it further notes that ‘the purposes, activities and 
methods of some groups are of a particularly violent nature, with the result that voluntary 
membership thereof may also raise the presumption of individual responsibility.’
460
 This 
presumption of individual responsibility reverses the burden of proof, so it rests on the 
asylum applicant to demonstrate that they have not been involved in the criminal activities of 
the organisation. In the context of membership of a terrorist organisation, in its 2001 
document, ‘Addressing Security Concerns’, published shortly following the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks, the UNHCR stated: 
‘Where, however, there is sufficient proof that an asylum-seeker belongs to an 
extremist international terrorist group, such as those involved in the 11 September 
attacks, voluntary membership could be presumed to amount to personal and knowing 




This approach therefore presumes individual responsibility where an asylum applicant is a 
voluntary member of an ‘extremist terrorist organisation’. This paragraph of the UNHCR’s 
2001 document was cited by the AIT in the Gurung decision in support of its conclusion that 
an individual could be excluded under Article 1F for mere membership of an organisation 
that is ‘predominantly terrorist in character’. There are a number of difficulties with applying 
this approach to Article 1F responsibility in practice, however, as will be considered in the 
following section. 
 
2. The problems in identifying an ‘extreme terrorist organisation’ 
The Gurung approach to Article 1F responsibility based on simple membership of an 
organisation grounds individual responsibility in the nature of the organisation, i.e. whether 
the organisation is ‘predominantly terrorist in character’. One of the main difficulties with 
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this approach surrounds the issue of determining whether an organisation is ‘predominantly 
terrorist in character’ so as to fall within the Gurung doctrine.
462
 
Many States and international organisations have adopted their own lists of proscribed 
terrorist organisations.
463
 However, automatic exclusion based on membership of an 
organisation included in one of these proscribed lists has been cautioned against. In its recent 
Advisory Opinion, the CJEU stated that: 
‘the fact that a person has been a member of an organisation which, because of its 
involvement in terrorist acts, is on the [proscribed list of terrorist organisations 
adopted by the European Union] … does not automatically constitute a serious reason 
for considering that that person has committed 'a serious non-political crime' or 'acts 
contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations'’.
464
 
Rather, the CJEU was of the opinion that regard must be had to the specific facts of each case 
individually. Although membership of an organisation included on such a list is a factor to be 
taken into account during the exclusion decision, ‘the mere fact that the person concerned 
was a member of such an organisation cannot automatically mean that that person must be 
excluded from refugee status’.
465
 Indeed, the UNHCR itself has cautioned against exclusion 
based on membership of a proscribed organisation, noting that ‘lists established by the 
international community of terrorist suspects and organisations … would be drawn up in a 
political, rather than a judicial process and so the evidentiary threshold for inclusion is likely 
to be much lower [than ICTY/ICTR indictments].’
466
 Similarly, the UNHCR notes that 
‘[n]ational lists of terrorist suspects or organisations will tend to have a lower evidentiary 
threshold than their international counterparts, due to the lack of international consensus.’
467
 
This is amply demonstrated in the UK context, as considered below. 
 The UK’s list of proscribed terrorist organisations is contained in Schedule 2 of the 
Terrorism Act 2000. Organisations are included in this list at the discretion of the Secretary 
of State, where he or she believes that the organisation is ‘concerned in terrorism’.
468
 The 
subjective nature of this test, coupled with the broad definition of terrorism contained in 
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section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2000, means the decision to include an organisation within this 
list is at the discretion of the Secretary of State. It is not therefore clear that organisations 
included in this list will necessarily meet the threshold necessary to be considered 
‘predominantly terrorist in character’ under the Gurung doctrine. Thus the Court of Appeal 
has held that, although the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan: PKK) was 
included in the UK’s list of proscribed terrorist organisations, there was ‘no suggestion that it 
fell at the extreme end of the continuum’ so as to give rise to the Gurung presumption of 
exclusion.
469
 Similarly, the Court of Appeal has held that the Tamil Tigers (LTTE), again 
included on the UK’s list of proscribed terrorist organisations, could not be considered 
‘predominantly terrorist in character’ under the Gurung doctrine.
470
 
The UNHCR advises that a presumption of exclusion should arise only where the list 
has a credible basis and if the criteria for placing a particular organisation on the list are such 
that all members can reasonably be considered to be individually involved in violent 
crimes.
471
 In the absence of an international list of proscribed terrorist organisations with a 
clear and credible legal basis, it therefore falls to the national courts to determine whether an 
organisation is ‘predominantly terrorist in character’ so as to give rise to the Gurung 
presumption of Article 1F exclusion. The tribunal in Gurung suggested considering 
organisations along a ‘continuum’ for this purpose with, at one end: 
‘an organisation that has very significant support amongst the population and has 
developed political aims and objectives covering political, social, economic and 
cultural issues. Its long term aims embrace a parliamentary, democratic mode of 
government and safeguarding of basic human rights. But it has in a limited way or for 
a limited period created an armed struggle wing in response to atrocities committed 
by a dictatorial government.’
472
   
The tribunal considered that in such a case an adjudicator should be extremely slow to 
conclude an applicant’s mere membership of the organisation raises any real issue under 
Article 1F. However, at the other end of the continuum, the tribunal hypothesised an 
organisation which: 
‘has little or no political agenda or which, if it did originally have genuine political 
aims and objectives, has increasingly come to focus on terrorism as a modus operandi. 
Its recruitment policy, its structure and strategy has become almost entirely devoted to 
the execution of terrorist acts which are seen as a way of winning the war against the 
enemy, even if the chosen targets are primarily civilian. Let us further suppose that 
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the type of government such an organisation promotes is authoritarian in character 




In the case of this latter type of organisation, the tribunal was of the opinion that ‘any 
individual who has knowingly joined such an organisation will have difficulty in establishing 
he or she is not complicit in the acts of such an organisation.’
474
 Thus, following the 
Canadian Ramirez decision, the tribunal considered the key factor in establishing Article 1F 
responsibility rested on the nature of the organisation: ‘The more an organisation makes 
terrorist acts its modus operandi, the more difficult it will be for a claimant to show his 
voluntary membership of it does not amount to complicity.’
475
 
 However, a more recent trend in state practice has been to move away from focus on 
the nature of an organisation when determining whether an asylum applicant is responsible 
for the commission of Article 1F acts. As noted above, in its recent Advisory Opinion, the 
CJEU stated that the fact that an asylum applicant had been a member of a proscribed 
terrorist organisation does not automatically constitute serious reasons for considering they 
are individually responsible for the crimes committed by that group.
476
 Rather, the Court 
stressed that there must be an individual assessment of the facts of each case, so as to make it 
possible to determine whether there are serious reasons for considering the individual 
committed, instigated or participated in an Article 1F crime or act within the meaning of the 
Qualification Directive.
477
 Indeed, a number of problems with the Gurung approach to Article 
1F responsibility were highlighted by the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court in the seminal 
JS (Sri Lanka) cases, which concerned exclusion under Article 1F(a).
478
  
In the JS (Sri Lanka) case, both the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court 
considered the level of responsibility required to bring an individual within the scope of 
Article 1F. The Court of Appeal stated it did not find it helpful to try and place organisations 
along a ‘continuum’ as suggested by the tribunal in Gurung.
479
 In his leading judgment, 
Toulson LJ noted that ‘it provides a subjective and unsatisfactory basis for determining 
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whether as a matter of law an individual is guilty of an international crime.’
480
 Firstly, he 
considered that the tribunal: 
‘rolled up a number of factors which might cause somebody wedded to the ideals of 
western liberal democracy to take a more or less hostile view of the organisation and 
to use an assessment of where the organisation stands in relation to those values in 
deciding whether its armed acts were “proportionate”.’
481
 
In Toulson LJ’s opinion, factors such as whether the organisation’s long term aims embraced 
a democratic mode of government did not seem relevant to the question of individual 
responsibility for the purpose of Article 1F.
482
 Indeed, his Lordship considered the 
fundamental problem with the continuum approach adopted by the tribunal in Gurung was 
that it:  
‘takes the decision maker’s eye off the really critical questions whether the evidence 
provides serious reasons for considering the applicant to have committed the actus 




The Supreme Court in the JS (Sri Lanka) case also criticised the ‘continuum’ approach, 
stating that ‘[t]he reality is that there are too many variable factors involved in each case, 
some militating one way, some the other, to make it helpful to try to place any given case at 
some point along a continuum.’
484
 Lord Brown, in his leading judgment, found it ‘more 
troubling still’ that: 
‘the tribunal in these paragraphs introduces considerations which properly have no 
place at all in determining how article 1F applies. Whether the organisation in 
question is promoting government which would be “authoritarian in character” or is 
intent on establishing “a parliamentary, democratic mode of government” is quite 
simply nothing to the point in deciding whether or not somebody is guilty of war 
crimes. War crimes are war crimes however benevolent and estimable may be the 
long-term aims of those concerned. And actions which would not otherwise constitute 
war crimes do not become so merely because they are taken pursuant to policies 
abhorrent to western liberal democracies.’
485
 
The Supreme Court and Court of Appeal in these cases therefore disapproved the Gurung 
approach to exclusion. Rather than focus on the nature of the organisation in question when 
determining Article 1F responsibility, both the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court 
preferred to approach the issue from the basis of international criminal law, as considered 
below. 
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3. Towards convergence with international criminal law 
In the JS (Sri Lanka) cases, both the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court preferred to 
approach the issue of Article 1F responsibility by employing the standards of international 
criminal law, rather than focus on the nature of an organisation of which an asylum applicant 
was a member.  
 In his leading judgment in the Court of Appeal, Toulson LJ based the standard of 
individual responsibility in Article 1F cases on the ICTY’s doctrine of joint criminal 
enterprise,
486
 formulating the requirements for joint criminal enterprise liability as follows:  
‘in order for there to be joint enterprise liability, there first has to be a common design 
which amounts to or involves the commission of a crime provided for in the statute. 
The actus reus requirement for criminal liability is that the defendant must have 
participated in the furtherance of the joint criminal purpose in a way that made a 
significant contribution to the crime’s commission. And that participation must have 
been with the intention of furthering the perpetration of one of the crimes provided for 
in the [Rome] statute.’
487
 
His Lordship thus aligned Article 1F responsibility closely with international criminal 
jurisprudence on individual responsibility, departing from the ‘personal and knowing 
participation’ standard traditionally employed by States Parties to the 1951 Convention. 
Toulson LJ’s approach rather focuses on the level of participation of the asylum applicant in 
the commission of the international crime, employing the standards of mens rea and actus 
reus established by the ICTY. In particular, the individual must have made a ‘substantial 
contribution’ to the commission of the crime, with the mens rea intent of furthering the 
perpetration of one of the crimes enumerated in the Rome Statute. 
As regards membership of an extremist organisation, Toulson LJ noted that:  
‘[a] person who becomes an active member of an organisation devoted exclusively to 
the perpetration of criminal acts may be regarded as a person who has conspired with 
others to commit such acts and will be criminally responsible for any acts performed 
in pursuance of the conspiracy.’
488
  
However, Toulson LJ cautioned that he used the words ‘active member’ deliberately, since 
issues of responsibility were unlikely to present a problem in the case of an active member of 
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an organisation dedicated entirely to terrorist activities.
489
 However, he considered that ‘it is 
another matter if an organisation pursues its political ends in part by acts of terrorism and in 
part by other means. Joining such an organisation may not involve conspiring to commit 
criminal acts or in practice doing anything that contributes significantly to the commission of 
criminal acts.’
490
 Toulson LJ’s approach therefore departs from the Gurung decision of the 
tribunal in two important respects. Firstly, his Lordship bases Article 1F responsibility 
predominantly on the standards of individual responsibility established by the ICTY’s 
doctrine of joint criminal enterprise, rather than the ‘personal and knowing participation’ 
standard traditionally employed by States Parties in the refugee context. Secondly, 
membership of an organisation will only give rise to Article 1F responsibility where the 
individual was an ‘active member’ of an organisation ‘devoted exclusively to the perpetration 
of criminal acts’, rather than a voluntary member of an organisation that is ‘predominantly 
terrorist in character’. The Court of Appeal in JS (Sri Lanka) thus set a much higher standard 
of complicity required to give rise to exclusion under Article 1F, particularly in relation to 
membership of a ‘terrorist organisation’.  
 The UK Supreme Court in JS (Sri Lanka) similarly based its analysis of Article 1F 
responsibility largely on international criminal sources.
491
 In disapproving the Gurung 
approach to individual responsibility, Lord Brown in his leading judgment stated that the 
correct approach to Article 1F responsibility is that ‘article 1F disqualifies those who make “a 
substantial contribution to” the crime, knowing that their acts or omissions will facilitate 
it.’
492
 However, Lord Brown considered Toulson LJ’s formulation of Article 1F 
responsibility in the Court of Appeal too narrowly drawn, as it ‘is all too easily read as being 
directed to specific identifiable crimes’. Rather, Lord Brown considered that liability should 
attach to wider concepts of common design, ‘such as the accomplishment of an organisation’s 
purpose by whatever means are necessary’.
493
 Lord Brown therefore stated: 
‘Put simply, I would hold an accused disqualified under article 1F if there are serious 
reasons for considering him voluntarily to have contributed in a significant way to the 
organisation’s ability to pursue its purpose of committing war crimes, aware that his 
assistance will in fact further that purpose.’
 494
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Thus under Lord Brown’s formulation of Article 1F responsibility, it must be established that 
the individual made a ‘substantial contribution’ to the criminal purpose of the organisation, 
although this does not need to be directed toward the commission of a specific crime. It will 
suffice if the individual intended to further the organisation’s general criminal purpose. 
Lord Brown furthermore outlined a number of factors which should be taken into 
account by a decision maker when determining Article 1F responsibility, which ‘ultimately 
must prove to be the determining factors in any case’.  These include: (i) the nature and the 
size of the organisation (ii) whether and, if so, by whom the organisation was proscribed, (iii) 
how the asylum-seeker came to be recruited, (iv) the length of time he remained in the 
organisation and what, if any, opportunities he had to leave it, (v) his position, rank, standing 
and influence in the organisation, (vi) his knowledge of the organisation’s war crimes 
activities, and (vii) his own personal involvement and role in the organisation.
495
 
The Supreme Court’s decision in JS (Sri Lanka) has been followed by a number of 
decisions of the Court of Appeal and tribunal in Article 1F(a) cases.
496
 It has also been 
approved by the Supreme Court and Court of Appeal in relation to Article 1F(c), where it has 
been held that ‘the JS (Sri Lanka) criteria ‘inevitably apply when it is article 1F(c) which is 
under consideration.’
497
 The Home Office’s APG has similarly been amended to include the 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence: 
 ‘membership of, or employment in, an organisation which uses violence, or the threat 
of violence, as a means to achieve its political or criminal objectives is not enough on 
its own to make a person guilty of an international crime, and is not sufficient to 
justify exclusion from refugee status … the exclusion clauses will apply if there are 
serious reasons for considering that the individual has voluntarily contributed in a 
significant way to the organisation’s ability to pursue its purpose of committing war 
crimes, aware that the assistance will in fact further that purpose. If the person was 
aware that in the ordinary course of events a particular consequence would follow 
from his actions, he would be taken to have acted with both knowledge and intent.’
498
 
The guidance also include Lord Brown’s ‘factors’ which must be taken in to account in every 
case,  and acknowledges that although the ‘judgment related to Article 1F(a) cases, the test 
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articulated on this issue by the Supreme Court extends to Article 1F generally (i.e. crimes and 
acts other than war crimes).’
499
 
The approach to Article 1F responsibility laid down by the Supreme Court in JS Sri 
Lanka has also been followed by the New Zealand Supreme Court and most recently the 
Supreme Court of Canada, in which the JS approach to responsibility was elaborated on to a 
large extent.
500
 There therefore appears to be an emerging trend among some States Parties to 
the 1951 Convention to determine Article 1F responsibility by focusing on the level of 
participation of the individual in the commission of an Article 1F crime, rather than simply 
looking to the nature of the organisation of which they are a member. This move appears to 
have been influenced to some degree by the jurisprudence of Courts in the UK. The following 
sections will discuss these approaches to Article 1F responsibility, and their relationship with 
the standards of criminal liability employed in international criminal law. 
 
4. International criminal law and the Gurung doctrine 
In the JS (Sri Lanka) cases, both the Supreme Court and Court of Appeal chose to depart 
from the ‘personal and knowing participation’ approach of the tribunal in Gurung, and rather 
draw on the standards of responsibility employed in international criminal law. This may be 
seen as a positive development in the jurisprudence surrounding Article 1F, as it would 
appear that international criminal instruments are a more appropriate source for determining 
the standards of responsibility in the context of the provision. In Gurung itself the tribunal 
noted that ‘[i]n deciding such issues as complicity we will need to look more and more to 
international criminal law definitions‘.
501
 Indeed, at least in the context of Article 1F(a) it 
would appear that resort to international criminal law sources is warranted.  
The ordinary meaning of the phrase ‘has committed’ in Article 1F indicates that, in 
order to be excluded from refugee status, an asylum applicant must have been individually 
involved in the commission (or attempted commission) of the act, i.e. that some form of 
individual responsibility be established. The context of this term in Article 1F(a)’s reference 
to international crimes ‘as defined in the international instruments drawn up to make 
provision in respect of such crimes’ suggests that the standard of individual responsibility 
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that must be established for the purpose of Article 1F(a) should similarly be drawn from the 
international instruments employed to define such crimes.
502
 This conclusion is reinforced 
when the term is viewed in its context: since the object and purpose of Article 1F(a) is to 
deny suspected international criminals the protection of the 1951 Convention, excluding 
those who would not be considered criminally responsible for the acts in question would run 
counter to the rationale of the provision, and indeed the protective purpose of the 1951 
Convention as a whole. 
Similarly, Article 1F(c) makes reference to acts which are necessarily international in 
nature. As such, it would appear that the standard of individual responsibility for Article 
1F(c) should be interpreted by reference to the international criminal sources employed in the 
interpretation of responsibility for the purpose of Article 1F(a). Whilst the acts referred to in 
Article 1F(c) may not necessarily be defined as international crimes, acts ‘contrary to the 
purposes and principles of the United Nations’ must meet a threshold of international 
condemnation approaching that of international crime.
503
 Responsibility for these acts may 
therefore be considered to fall to be governed by the rules and principles of responsibility for 
that exist as a matter of international law.
504
 Furthermore, applying well established rules of 
individual responsibility to Article 1F(c) maintains the protective objective of the 1951 
Convention by ensuring a level of certainty in the application of what is an inherently vague 
ground of exclusion. Although Article 1F(c) employs the terminology ‘been guilty of’ rather 
than ‘committed’, it does not appear that this wording should be read as introducing a higher 
threshold of responsibility, such as actual conviction for the act in question, as Article 1F’s 
reference to ‘serious reasons for considering’ clearly mandates that a lower standard of proof 
is required than a criminal conviction.
505
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In contrast to sub-paragraphs (a) and (c) of Article 1F, Article 1F(b) does not 
necessarily concern the exclusion of the perpetrators of crimes of an international nature, but 
rather those that have committed ‘serious non-political crimes’. It may therefore be thought 
inappropriate to apply standards of individual responsibility that concern international crimes 
to a provision that generally covers those of a lesser character. However, it has been 
suggested that the international sources concerning individual responsibility for international 
crimes should also be considered the appropriate standard in respect of Article 1F(b).
506
 The 
absence of clear international standards defining individual responsibility for serious non-
political crimes means that any other approach would result in the fragmented application of 
individual responsibility in Article 1F(b) cases, depending on the criminal law of the 
domestic regime in which the asylum application fell to be considered. The principle that the 
1951 Convention be interpreted so as to have one true autonomous meaning mandates an 
interpretive approach that applies internationally agreed rules and principles of individual 
responsibility to the application of the provision. 
It may therefore be concluded that resort to international criminal law standards of 
responsibility is warranted for Article 1F(a) crimes, and, in the absence of clear international 
standards defining individual responsibility for serious non-political crimes and acts contrary 
to the purposes and principles of the United Nations, may also be appropriate sources for 
determining responsibility in the context of Articles 1F(a) and (c).
507
 
If international criminal law standards are seen as the appropriate sources for 
determining Article 1F responsibility, then the problems with the Gurung approach to Article 
1F exclusion appear even more pronounced. It will be recalled that under the Gurung 
doctrine, responsibility for the commission of Article 1F crimes could be incurred where an 
individual was a voluntary member of an organisation that is ‘predominantly terrorist in 
character’. This approach to Article 1F responsibility based on simple membership of an 
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 However, some caution must be exercised when incorporating criminal law standards into the refugee status 
determination procedure. See for example Jennifer Bond’s critique of the UNHCR’s reliance on international 
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International Criminals, Sixth Colloquium on Challenges in Refugee Law, University of Michigan, 22-24 March 
2013, para 3. 
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organisation grounds individual responsibility in the nature of the organisation. However, 
this appears inconsistent with the standards of responsibility in international criminal law.  
Whilst the various forms of participation which give rise to individual responsibility 
in international criminal law have different requirements regarding the actus reus and mens 
rea, they all share a common characteristic: under international criminal law, an individual 
cannot be held responsible for the criminal acts of an organisation as a result of their simple 
membership of that group. Although the London Charter contained provisions which 
effectively attributed individual responsibility on the basis of membership of a criminal 
organisation,
508
 criminal responsibility on the basis of group membership has been 
consistently rejected by the ICTY.
509
 As noted by the ICTY Trial Chamber in Kvocka: 
‘mere membership in a criminal organisation would not amount to co-perpetrating or 
aiding and abetting in the criminal endeavour implemented by that organization, 
despite knowledge of its criminal purpose. For liability to attach, it must be shown 
that either (1) the accused participated in some significant way, or (2) the accused 
held such a position of responsibility – for example commander of a sub-unit – that 
participation could be presumed.’
510
 
International criminal law does not focus on the nature of the group or organisation of which 
the individual is part when determining criminal responsibility, but rather whether the 
individual knowingly made a ‘substantial’ or ‘significant’ contribution to the commission of a 
crime, be this through committing the crime; participating in a ‘joint criminal enterprise’; 
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 Furthermore, it is not clear that the reversal of the burden of proof implied in the 
Gurung presumption of exclusion where the applicant is a voluntary member of an ‘extremist 
terrorist organisation’ is warranted in the context of Article 1F. Indeed, reversing the burden 
of proof appears to contravene one of the fundamental principles of international criminal 
law: the presumption of innocence.
512
 Whilst the refugee status determination is an 
administrative decision, and therefore not subject to the right to fair trial contained in many 
human rights instruments,
513
 it is generally recognised that the process is subject to basic 
requirements for a fair procedure.
514
 Indeed, it is well established in UK jurisprudence that in 
Article 1F decisions the burden of proof lies upon the Secretary of State to establish that 
Article 1F applies.
515
 Bearing in mind the serious consequences of exclusion from refugee 
status, an approach that reverses the burden of proof has the potential to seriously 
compromise the protective object and purpose of the 1951 Convention.
516
 Perhaps for these 
reasons, the UNHCR warns that caution must be exercised where such a presumption of 
responsibility arises, ‘to consider issues including the actual activities of the group, its 
organisational structure, the individual’s position in it, and his or her ability to influence 
significantly its activities, as well as the possible fragmentation of the group.’
517
 However, 
these factors advocated by the UNHCR still focus primarily on determining the nature of the 
organisation, an aspect of the refugee status determination procedure that has presented 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
aware that they were supporting the commission of the crime and wished to provoke the commission of the 
crime, or be aware that there was a ‘substantial likelihood’ the commission of the crime would result from their 
actions.  
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shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty before the Court in accordance with the applicable law.’ To this 
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considerable problems in practice and does not appear to be in line with the standards of 
individual responsibility employed in international criminal law.
518
 
The departure of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal from the Gurung 
approach to Article 1F responsibility in the JS (Sri Lanka) case may therefore be seen as a 
positive development in the jurisprudence on Article 1F responsibility. As was noted above, 
the Gurung approach to responsibility where an asylum applicant is a member of an 
organisation that is ‘predominantly terrorist in character’ is not in line with the standards of 
individual responsibility employed in international criminal law, which rather mandates an 
approach that focuses on the contribution to the commission of the crime made by an 
individual, rather than their membership of a particular organisation or group. However, the 
Supreme Court’s decision in JS (Sri Lanka) is not without its difficulties, as will be 
considered below. 
 
5. International criminal law and Lord Brown’s formulation of Article 1F 
responsibility 
In formulating the test of Article 1F responsibility in JS (Sri Lanka), Lord Brown based his 
approach on the ICTY’s doctrine of joint criminal enterprise.
519
 The doctrine of joint criminal 
enterprise can be traced back to the seminal case of Tadic, in which the ICTY Appeals 
Chamber held this mode of participation was grounded in post-World War II jurisprudence 
that had become part of customary international law, and was implicitly contained in Article 
7(1) of the ICTY Statute.
520
 This concept has subsequently also been adopted by the ICTR 
and hybrid criminal courts.
521
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158 
 
Under the doctrine of joint criminal enterprise, a participator in a criminal act will be 
deemed individually responsible as a perpetrator of the act where there exists a ‘common 
plan, design or purpose’ among a plurality of persons which amounts to or involves the 
commission of a crime against international law, and the accused participates in this common 
design.
522
 Whilst the individual need not have physically perpetrated the crime, they must 
have contributed to the common plan. The ICTY’s joint criminal enterprise therefore has at 
its core: (i) a common plan, (ii) a significant contribution to that plan, and (iii) knowledge and 
criminal intent. However, in formulating the test for Article 1F responsibility Lord Brown 
curiously only mentions in passing the very aspect which makes joint criminal enterprise a 
unique form of liability in international criminal law: a common plan or design. Although 
Lord Brown’s formula is couched in joint criminal enterprise language, the lack of reference 
to a common design makes it resemble another form of criminal liability, namely, aiding and 
abetting. 
Aiding or abetting can suffice as a basis for criminal responsibility in international 
law, as provided in Article 25(3)(c) Rome Statute and recognised under customary 
international law.
523
 Although the assistance need not be essential, it must have had a 
‘substantial effect’ on the commission of the crime.
524
 The assistance can include 
encouraging the perpetrator, providing the means for the crimes commission or granting other 
moral support.
525
 The person granting the assistance must be aware that his or her 
contribution is supporting the commission of the crime, however, it is not necessary that the 
aider and abettor knows the precise crime that was intended and that was committed, but he 
must be aware of the essential elements of the crime.
526
 Crucially, in order for an individual 
to be found liable under this secondary mode of participation there is no requirement that 
they be part of or contribute to a ‘common plan or design’. 
Lord Brown’s lack of reference to the crucial ‘common plan’ element of joint 
criminal enterprise means that either he has provided an incomplete definition of joint 
criminal enterprise, or he has collapsed all aspects of complicity into one type of criminal 
liability: aiding and abetting. It has been suggested that in reality the judgment only seems to 
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represent one type of extended liability, and that in practice this may lead the immigration 
tribunal to try and fit all forms of participation into the ‘straightjacket’ of joint criminal 
enterprise, rather than other easier and often more appropriate forms of extended liability.
527
 
Furthermore, attention must be drawn to the list of ‘factors’ outlined by Lord Brown 
in the Supreme Court, which he advised should be taken into account by a decision maker 
when determining Article 1F responsibility, and which ‘ultimately must prove to be the 
determining factors in any case’.
528
 It will be recalled that these factors included (i) the nature 
and the size of the organisation (ii) whether and, if so, by whom the organisation was 
proscribed, (iii) how the asylum-seeker came to be recruited, (iv) the length of time he 
remained in the organisation and what, if any, opportunities he had to leave it, (v) his 
position, rank, standing and influence in the organisation, (vi) his knowledge of the 




 Although an individual’s standing an rank in an organisation may be relevant to 
whether an individual is responsible for the commission of crimes under international 
criminal law,
530
 factors such as the nature and size of the organisation and whether or not it is 
proscribed tend back towards the Gurung and Ramirez focus on the nature of an organisation 
when determining Article 1F responsibility. This may make it possible for tribunals to engage 
in an assessment of whether the organisation is ‘predominantly terrorist in character’.
531
 As 
noted above, criminal liability in international criminal law focuses on the contribution of the 
individual to the commission of an international crime, rather than details of an individual’s 
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membership of a particular organisation. Indeed, in his separate opinion in the JS (Sri Lanka) 
case, Lord Kerr cautioned:  
‘While the six factors that counsel identified will frequently be relevant to that 
evaluation, it seems to me that they are not necessarily exhaustive of the matters to be 
taken into account, nor will each of the factors be inevitably significant in every case. 
One needs, I believe, to concentrate on the actual role played by the particular person, 
taking all material aspects of that role into account so as to decide whether the 
required degree of participation is established.’
532
 
It appears that Lord Brown’s reliance on these factors is a move back towards the Gurung 
and Ramirez approach to responsibility and away from than that of the international criminal 
tribunals. While examination of these factors might prove practically useful to decision 
makers unfamiliar with the standards of individual responsibility employed in international 
criminal law, this approach may import factors into an assessment of Article 1F responsibility 




6. Conclusions  
Terrorism has featured to a large extent in the UK’s interpretation of responsibility for the 
purpose of Article 1F. This has arisen primarily in relation to the extent to which an asylum 
applicant can be held responsible for the commission of the activities of a terrorist group or 
organisation of which they are a member. The leading case on Article 1F responsibility in the 
UK for a number of years was the Gurung decision of the immigration tribunal, in which 
responsibility for the commission of an Article 1F act could be presumed where the 
individual was a voluntary member of an organisation that is ‘predominantly terrorist in 
character’. However, a number of practical difficulties emerge when trying to characterise an 
organisation in this way. An approach which is based on the inclusion of an organisation in a 
proscribed terrorist list has been cautioned against, and in many cases such groups may be 
fractured and pursue their political objectives in part through acts of terrorism, but also 
engage in legitimate acts of political persuasion. Indeed, the Supreme Court and Court of 
Appeal recently disapproved the Gurung approach to exclusion, preferring to approach the 
question of Article 1F responsibility through recourse to standards of criminal liability 
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employed in international criminal law rather than focus on the ‘terrorist’ nature of an 
organisation.  
The Supreme Court’s approach to determining Article 1F responsibility appears to be 
a positive development in the jurisprudence surrounding Article 1F, as it would appear that 
international criminal standards are a more appropriate source for determining the standards 
of responsibility in the context of the provision. However, the Supreme Court’s formulation 
of Article 1F responsibility is not without its difficulties. Lord Brown’s formulation of Article 
1F responsibility seems to collapse all aspects of criminal complicity into one type of 
criminal liability, an approach that may in practice prove difficult for immigration tribunals 
and lead them away from applying other easier and often more appropriate forms of extended 
liability. Furthermore, Lord Brown’s reliance on a number of ‘factors’ when determining 
whether an individual may be considered responsible for the commission of an Article 1F act 
may import considerations that are not strictly relevant to such an assessment, and indeed 
seems to tend back towards the Gurung focus on the ‘terrorist’ nature of an organisation of 





Chapter Six: The Application of Article 
1F  
 
The UK does not at present publish comprehensive data on exclusion from refugee status 
under Article 1F. This means that it is extremely difficult to establish what is happening in 
practice in relation to the application of the provision in the UK. As explained by a 
member
534
 of the Home Office’s Special Cases Unit (SCU): 
SCU 1:  "But of course at the root of all this, which is for you, and for me and for 
the judiciary, is the lack of reliable data. It isn’t recorded by them it isn’t recorded 
by us, particularly at appeal." 
A number of sources are therefore drawn on in this chapter in an attempt to provide an 
overview of the application of Article 1F in the UK. These sources include data provided by 
the Home Office in response to a number of Freedom of Information (FOI) requests made by 
the present researcher, questionnaires and interviews conducted with immigration judges 
sitting in tribunals throughout the UK, interviews conducted with legal practitioners and a 
member of the Home Office’s SCU team and analyses of published cases concerning Article 
1F.
535
 These sources will be employed in answering a number of questions relating to 
exclusion under Article 1F in the UK: 
 When is Article 1F raised? 
 Which limb of Article 1F is relied upon in exclusion decisions? 
 How often is Article 1F raised, and has this changed over time? 
 Who is being excluded under Article 1F? 
Throughout this examination particular attention will be given to the application of Article 1F 
to suspected terrorists.  
 
1. When article 1F is raised 
Article 1F can be raised at a number of stages during the asylum process: at initial decision of 
the Home Office, on appeal or to revoke or cancel refugee status previously granted. The 
majority of asylum applications which raise Article 1F issues are handled by the Home 
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Office’s Special Cases Unit (SCU).
536
 A small number of Article 1F cases are also dealt with 
by the Criminal Casework Directorate.
537
 When an asylum applicant is deemed to fall under 
Article 1F in the initial decision of the Home Office their asylum application is refused and 
the reasons for this decision are communicated to them in a ‘Reasons for Refusal’ letter. The 
Secretary of State will also issue a certificate (known as a section 55 certificate) to the effect 
that Article 1F has been applied.
538
 Article 1F may additionally be raised in the Reasons for 
Refusal letter as a supplementary ground of refusal, i.e. the application for asylum is refused 
on the grounds that the applicant does not have a well-founded fear of persecution, but even 
if they did have such a fear they would nevertheless be excluded from refugee status by virtue 
of Article 1F. 
When an individual has not been excluded from refugee status under Article 1F at 
initial decision exclusion may nevertheless be raised at the appeal stage, either by the Home 
Office or the appeal tribunal. This normally occurs when an asylum application has been 
refused by the Secretary of State on the grounds that the asylum applicant does not in fact 
have a well-founded fear of persecution and the applicant appeals this decision. Article 1F 
issues may arise before the tribunal when Article 1F was raised as a supplementary ground of 
refusal in the Reasons for Refusal letter or as a result of additional evidence given by the 
asylum applicant during cross-examination. Immigration Judges have a legal duty to consider 
exclusion in cases that raise Article 1F criminality issues even when this has not been raised 
by the Home Office.
539
 
 Article 1F may also be raised by the Secretary of State to cancel or revoke a grant of 
refugee status from a person previously recognised as a refugee.
540
 Cancellation of refugee 
status may occur where information subsequently comes to light which provides serious 
reasons for considering the individual should have been excluded by virtue of Article 1F. In 
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this case, a person’s refugee status may be cancelled on the basis that Article 1F applies. 
Additionally, an individual’s refugee status may be revoked where, subsequent to the grant of 
asylum, a person engages in activity falls within the scope of Article 1F(a) or (c).
541
 
From the sources analysed, it seems that in the overwhelming majority of cases 
Article 1F is raised by the Home Office at initial decision. Figure 3 shows the responses 
given when judicial participants were asked when, in their experience, Article 1F is most 
often raised. Over 85% of judicial participants indicated Article 1F is most often raised in the 




Figure 3: When immigration judges consider Article 1F is most often raised (n = 21)
543
 
Judge B: "I think mostly in my experience exclusion cases mostly present when 
the decision maker has made a section 55 certification. Before it gets to the first 
tier tribunal it’s already an exclusion case really. I certainly, in my very limited 
experience, haven’t seen anything in the last couple of years where the Secretary 
of State has tried to raise it in the course of proceedings." 
This finding is supported by the cases analysed as part of this research. Table 1 shows when 
Article 1F was raised in these cases, and reveals that in 42% of cases the individual was 
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excluded under Article 1F at initial decision, and in a further 13% of cases Article 1F was 
raised by the Secretary of State in the reasons for refusal letter as a supplementary ground for 
refusing the grant of asylum.   
Table 1: When Article 1F is raised, case analysis (n=24)
544
 















Frequency 10 3 3 5 4 




42% 13% 13% 21% 17% 
 
In a further 21% of the cases analysed, Article 1F was relied upon by the Secretary of State to 
revoke refugee status that had previously been granted to an individual. All of these cases 
involved suspected terrorists whom the Secretary of State sought to exclude under Article 
1F(c). In the majority of these cases initial appeal went to the Special Immigration Appeals 
Commission (SIAC) rather than the tribunal, as the Secretary of State had certified the 
appeals under s.97 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act (the 2002 Act) as the 
decision was based wholly or partly in reliance on information which should not be made 
public in the interests of national security.
546
 Figure 3 shows that 9.5% of judicial participants 
indicated that Article 1F is raised by the Secretary of State to revoke refugee status. That this 
percentage is lower than that apparent from the case analysis may be explained by the fact 
that the majority of judicial participants that responded to questionnaires had experience 
sitting at the tribunal rather than the SIAC, and it is therefore likely they would not have 
come across cases in which revocation of refugee status was intertwined with national 
security issues. 
Article 1F is also frequently raised during appeal, either by a tribunal judge or Home 
Office Presenting Officer (HOPO), when it hasn’t previously been considered by the Home 
Office at initial decision. Table 1 shows that in 13% of the cases analysed as part of this 
research Article 1F was raised by the Home Office during the appeal. Similarly, Figure 3 
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shows that 14.2% of judicial participants indicated that Article 1F is raised by the Border 
Agency during the appeal.  
Judge 3: "In the cases that have come before me the vast majority have arisen 
during oral evidence at which it becomes apparent that there are issues which the 
UKBA have not previously taken on board and they decide during the course of 
the hearing that they wish to consider Article 1F." 
Judge D: "It was raised by a HOPO at the hearing which to me was an example of 
someone who has thought it should have been raised earlier." 
Judge 10: "Once arose as a result of answers given in [cross examination of the 
asylum applicant]." 
However, no judicial participants in response to the questionnaire indicated Article 1F is 
often raised by an immigration judge during the appeal. In only 17% of the cases analysed as 
part of this research was Article 1F raised by the immigration judge hearing the case at 
appeal, rather than by the Home Office. However, it is clear that there is a legal duty on 




Barrister E: "I’m certainly conscious of cases where exclusion wasn’t raised by 
the decision maker, where it then fell to be raised by the tribunal ex officio, 
sometimes without the assistance of the decision maker having considered 
exclusion at all." 
SCU 1: "Another issue which stretches back to the Gurung determination, which 
is still good law to some extent, is the notion that if we don’t raise the exclusion 
clause it’s still incumbent on the judge to consider it." 
Article 1F was raised by tribunal judges, rather than the Home Office, in the earliest reported 
Article 1F cases analysed as part of this research: the seminal cases T v Secretary of State for 
the Home Department and Gurung v Secretary of State for the Home Department.
548
 Since 
the Gurung determination in 2002, however, Article 1F has only been raised by the judiciary 
in two of the cases analysed, and in one of these cases Article 1F(b) was simply considered in 
addition to the 1F(a) and (c) grounds relied upon by the Secretary of State. Thus while the 
early cases show a predominance of Article 1F being raised by the judiciary, this trend does 
not seem to have continued through more recent cases. 
It may be concluded that in the overwhelming majority of Article 1F cases exclusion 
is raised by the Home Office at initial decision, although it is also relied upon by the Home 
Office to revoke refugee status and is sometimes raised during the course of an appeal by the 
Home Office or occasionally by an immigration judge. 
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A similar pattern appears when Article 1F is raised in relation to suspected terrorists. 
Table 2 shows when Article 1F was raised in the cases involving suspected terrorists analysed 
as part of this research. In 38% of the cases analysed Article 1F was raised by the Secretary 
of State at initial decision or as a supplementary ground for refusal (as compared to 55% in 
the overall case analysis). The proportion of cases in which Article 1F is raised by the 
Secretary of State on appeal remains the same as when Article 1F cases were analysed as a 
whole (13%). However, in the cases involving suspected terrorists there is a marked increase 
in the number of cases in which Article 1F is relied upon to revoke refugee status (31% in 
cases involving suspected terrorists as opposed to 21% in the overall case analysis). There is 
also a slight increase in the proportion of cases in which exclusion is raised by the 
immigration judge (19% in cases involving suspected terrorists as opposed to 17% in the 
overall case analysis), although this result appear to be influenced to a large degree by the 
early T and Gurung cases considered above. 
 
Table 2: When Article 1F is raised in relation to suspected terrorists, case analysis (n=16)
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19% 19% 13% 31% 19% 
It therefore seems to be more common for Article 1F to be relied upon by the Secretary of 
State to revoke refugee status in cases involving suspected terrorists. Indeed, there were no 
cases analysed in which Article 1F was relied upon to revoke refugee status other than in 
relation to suspected terrorists.  
This difference may be due to the nature of the criminal acts at issue. Individuals 
excluded on the basis they have committed a war crime or crime against humanity (under 
Article 1F(a)) are likely to have committed this act outside the UK, since these are crimes 
committed in the context of an armed conflict or a widespread and systematic attack upon a 
population. Similarly, Article 1F(b) requires serious non-political crimes to have been 
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committed outside the country of refuge prior to his admission to the country as a refugee. In 
cases involving crimes that are allegedly committed outside the UK it is more likely that 
exclusion under Article 1F will be considered during the initial asylum application process 
rather than at a later date, as it is unlikely that information which implicates the individual in 
the commission of an excludable crime will be brought to the attention of the Home Office by 
a foreign state after an individual has been granted refugee status (unless it is a particularly 
high profile case). Conversely, under Article 1F(c) individuals may be excluded for 
committing terrorist acts in the UK, after being granted refugee status, since there are no 
similar temporal and geographical limitations as are found in Article 1F(b).
551
 An individual 
suspected of committing a serious crime in the UK or abroad after being granted refugee 
status will therefore likely fall to be excluded under Article 1F(c), and such a case will 
concern revocation of previously granted refugee status. Since terrorism has explicitly been 
held to fall under Article 1F(c), it is likely that a number of the individuals excluded from 
refugee status under this provision will be described as terrorists. Article 1F is therefore more 
likely to be relied upon to revoke refugee status where the individual is alleged to be a 
terrorist and falls under Article 1F(c), as considered in section 2.3 below. 
Overall, it seems that in the majority of cases Article 1F is raised in the initial 
decision of the Home Office, although in cases which involve suspected terrorists the 
provision is often relied upon to revoke refugee status. 
 
2. The limb of Article 1F that is relied upon 
From the above discussion it is clear that the question of when Article 1F is raised is 
intimately linked to the limb of Article 1F that is relied upon to exclude an individual from 
refugee status, which is the topic of this section.  
2.1. The limb of Article 1F relied upon by the Secretary of State 
The vast majority of cases that are referred to the Home Office’s SCU and ultimately 
excluded under Article 1F by the Home Office at initial decision fall under 1F(a) (war crime 
or crime against humanity). Figure 4 displays the mean number of initial decisions, per 
annum, that the different limbs of Article 1F were relied upon by the UK Border Agency  
between 2008 and 2012. Article 1F(a) was relied upon in over 80% of exclusion decisions, 
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with Article 1F(b) (serious non-political crime) and Article 1F(c) (acts contrary to the 
purposes and principles of the United Nations) relied upon approximately equally. 
 
 




The reliability of the information displayed in Figure 4 may be limited however, in that the 
data outlines the refusals based on limbs (a), (b) and (c) of Article 1F separately, and does not 
therefore indicate instances where the limbs were relied upon in conjunction, or indeed, 
where no particular limb of Article 1F was specified in the refusal decision. However, the 
responses provided by judicial participants to the questionnaires appear to support the 
reliability of the trends indicated by the Home Office data, as considered below. 
 Figure 5 shows the data provided by judicial participants when asked which limb(s) of 
Article 1F they consider to be most often relied upon by the Home Office in Article 1F 
decisions. Examination of Figure 5 reveals a similar pattern of results to the Home Office 
data, in that judicial participants consider Article 1F(a) to be by far the most frequently relied 
upon limb of Article 1F, whilst Article 1F(c) is the least frequently relied upon. It also 
appears that judicial participants do not consider it very common for the different limbs of 
Article 1F to be relied upon in combination (only 15% of participants indicated this option), 
and no participants raised the issue of no particular limb(s) of Article 1F being specified in 
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 This serves to increase the reliability of the Home Office data, as it 
appears to be a minority of cases in which the limbs of Article 1F are relied upon in 
conjunction and no instances of non-specification of the limb relied upon has been raised. 
 
 
Figure 5: The limb of Article 1F judicial participants consider is most often relied upon by the Home 
Office (n = 20)
554
 
Judge 2: "1F(b) used to be virtually only limb. 1F(a) now more common." 
Judge D: "I think it’s usually one that’s relied on and it’s usually war crimes 
[1F(a)]." 
Judge 14: "b and c". 
Judge 23: "The allegation in my one case was involvement in a crime against 
humanity [1F(a)]." 
Judge 33: "Generally all three". 
Judge B:" I suppose to the extent that I get feedback … there seem to be more 
1F(a)’s".  
The results of the Home Office data and responses of judicial participants analysed above 
reveal that Article 1F(a) is overwhelmingly the limb of Article 1F that is relied upon by the 
Home Office in exclusion decisions. However, the results of the case analysis conducted as 
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part of this research reveal somewhat more nuanced results. Table 3 shows the number of 
cases in which the different limbs of Article 1F were relied upon by the Home Office, and 
reveals that although Article 1F(a) is relied upon by the Home Office in a large number of 
cases, it is 1F(c) that is relied upon most frequently. Indeed, Article 1F(c) was relied upon by 
the Home Office in over 67% of cases.  
Table 3: The limb of Article 1F relied upon by the Home Office, case analysis (n=21)
555
 
When raised 1F(a) 1F(b) 1F(c) 
Home Office: Initial 
Decision 




0 0 3  
Home Office: On 
Appeal 
0 2  2 
Home Office: 
Revocation 
0 0 5  
Total 6 4 14 
% of total cases
556
 29% 19% 67% 
  
That Article 1F(c) is relied upon in such a large proportion of these cases is curious, as it 
doesn’t accord with the data provided by the Home Office relating to initial decisions, nor the 
results of questionnaires completed by judicial participants. 
The reason for the large number of 1F(c) cases that appear in the case analysis may be 
due to the nature of the provision itself. As considered in Chapter 4, jurisprudence on the 
meaning of the phrase ‘acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations’ 
that appears in Article 1F(c) is still very much in development. It may therefore simply be the 
case that permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal and higher courts is allowed in more 
cases involving Article 1F(c) than the other limbs of Article 1F which are more certain in 
their scope, as the judiciary seek to clarify this area of law. Therefore a higher number of 
reported Article 1F cases are likely to concern Article 1F(c), rather than the other limbs of 
Article 1F. 
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 The higher number of Article 1F(c) cases that appear in the case analysis, as 
compared to the Home Office data and responses of judicial participants, might also be due to 
the nature of the cases concerned. A large number of the cases in which Article 1F(c) was 
relied upon by the Home Office involved revocation of refugee status where the initial appeal 
went to the SIAC rather than the tribunal. All of these cases involved revocation of refugee 
status as a result of the individual’s suspected terrorist activities after they were granted 
refugee status in the UK.
557
 That these revocation cases were not picked up on in the 
responses of judicial participants is unsurprising, as the overwhelming majority of judges that 
responded to the questionnaires sat in the immigration tribunals rather than the SIAC.
558
 The 
revocation cases were also not covered by the Home Office data, which relates only to initial 
decisions of the Border Agency and therefore do not include instances where Article 1F is 
raised at a later time, i.e. upon appeal or revocation. 
 It may be concluded that, aside from when Article 1F is relied upon to revoke refugee 
status, in the overwhelming majority of Article 1F cases one limb of Article 1F is relied upon 
by the Home Office, and this is Article 1F(a): war crime or crime against humanity. It seems 
there are two primary reasons that this limb of Article 1F is relied upon over and above (b) 
and (c), which relate to the development of Article 1F screening by the Home Office and the 
nature of asylum applications in the UK, as will be considered in more detail below. 
2.1.1. The development of Article 1F screening by the Border Agency 
An important reason that 1F(a) is relied upon by the Home Office at initial decision over and 
above the other grounds of exclusion seems to be related to the development of Article 1F 
screening by the Home Office. From the mid-1990’s to the early 2000’s there was ‘virtually 
no application of 1F at all’
559
 by the Home Office. However, in 2003 the War Crimes Unit of 
the Border Agency was established. This Unit’s remit was closely tied to the government 
policy of no safe haven for war criminals. It was at this stage that the Border Agency began 
proactively screening asylum applications for possible exclusion under Article 1F. Because 
the specialisation of the War Crimes Unit was the commission of international crimes, this 
category of exclusions received the most attention from the Border Agency.  
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SCU 1: We were dealing with international crimes and that was our remit … In fact 
before we were assimilated into Special Cases we probably hardly ever thought of 
Article 1F(b) or (c). 
The War Crimes Unit was fully assimilated into the Special Cases Unit in 2009. Over the last 
three years the Border Agency has also begun to focus more on screening for 1F(b) and (c) 
grounds for exclusion. Within the Border Agency systematic screening of immigration cases 
in search of individuals who should be excluded under Article 1F(a) started in 2005, whereas 
screening for 1F(b) and (c) cases is still in the early stages of development.
560
 
SCU 1: 1F(b) will probably be increasingly used as we at the Directorate take in more 
cases, but again you’re probably talking two or three years down the line. 
At present over 80% of cases referred to the SCU and excluded from refugee status at initial 
decision by the Home Office fall under Article 1F(a).
561
 
2.1.2. The nature of asylum claims 
Another reason that Article 1F(a) is relied upon by the Home Office over the other limbs of 
Article 1F relates to the nature of asylum claims in the UK. Unsurprisingly, a large number of 
asylum applications in the UK emanate from conflict-ridden zones. As explained by the 
Home Office in their Immigration Statistics report covering the year 2012: 
‘World events have an effect on which nationals are applying for asylum at any 
particular time. For example, there has been a large proportionate increase in the 
number of applicants from Syria since the outbreak of the Syrian civil war. Political 




Figure 6 displays the top ten nationalities that applied for asylum in the UK in 2012. This 
year saw Pakistan, Iran, Sri Lanka, India and Bangladesh the top countries of nationality of 
asylum applicants in the UK, while there were also a substantial number of applicants from 
Afghanistan and Syria. The year 2011 saw Pakistan, Iran, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan and Libya 
feature as the five main citizenships of asylum applicants in the UK, while 2010 also saw 
Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Sri Lanka in the five main citizenships, and Zimbabwean 
nationals came top with 2,435 applications for asylum.  
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Countries like Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, Syria and Libya, which feature highly in the countries 
of nationality, have all experienced large scale internal or international conflicts in recent 
years. Asylum applicants from conflict zones that are suspected of committing serious crimes 
are likely to have committed this crime in the context of the armed conflict. As such, their 
crime is more likely to fall under Article 1F(a) as a ‘war crime’ rather than a ‘serious non-
political crime’ under Article 1F(b) or ‘acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the 
United Nations’ under 1F(c).  
Barrister H: "A lot of people claiming asylum will be claiming asylum in the 
context of having taken a side in a conflict, and when you take a side in a conflict 
and find your case is that you’re going to be in trouble in your own country 
because you are deemed as being ‘on the other side’, it’s not that surprising that 
issues about what you did as part of your activity in the conflict might raise an 
exclusion issue." 
Asylum applicants who come from non-conflict zones may also fall under Article 1F(a) 
where they have played a role in the activities of a repressive regime, as individuals who have 
assisted a regime’s widespread or systematic inhumane treatment of a population may be 
considered to have committed a ‘crime against humanity’ under Article 1F(a). For example, a 
large number of Zimbabwean nationals have been excluded under Article 1F(a) for their role 
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in the activities of Robert Mugabe’s Zanu-PF regime.
564
 The nature of asylum applications in 
the UK therefore means that it is more likely that an individual will fall to be excluded under 
Article 1F(a), rather than the other limbs of Article 1F, as a result of their past actions in their 
country of origin. 
The development of Article 1F screening in the Border Agency and the nature of 
asylum applications in the UK tend towards the Home Office relying on Article 1F(a) to 
exclude individuals from refugee status over and above the other grounds of exclusion. The 
exception to this seems to be where the case involves an individual suspected of involvement 
with terrorism, as was the case with the revocation cases discussed above. The limb of Article 
1F relied upon by the Home Office to exclude suspected terrorists from refugee status will be 
considered in section 2.3 below. 
2.2. The limb of Article 1F raised by immigration judges 
In a very small number of cases analysed as part of this research Article 1F was raised by the 
immigration judge hearing the case at appeal, rather than by the Home Office. Table 4 shows 
the number of cases in which the different limbs of Article 1F were raised by an immigration 
judge hearing an asylum appeal. In the majority of these cases 1F(b) was raised. These 
include the seminal cases T v Secretary of State for the Home Department and Gurung v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department, which both involved the exclusion of suspected 
terrorists and are the earliest reported Article 1F cases analysed as part of this research. It 
may be tentatively concluded that Article 1F(b) is the most common limb of Article 1F raised 
by immigration judges, although the sample size is too small to make any firm findings on 
this matter. 
Table 4: The limb of Article 1F raised by immigration judges, case analysis (n=4)
565
 
When raised 1F(a) 1F(b) 1F(c) Total 
Immigration Judge 0 3 1 4 
 
It has been suggested that Article 1F(b) might be the preferred limb of Article 1F raised by 
immigration judges because the provisions relationship with the law of extradition makes it 
more familiar to judges than the concepts ‘war crime’, ‘crime against humanity’ or ‘acts 
contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations’. 
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Barrister E: "And in a sense I would have thought, considering the case law, that 
in most cases where (b) is raised nowadays, the courts find that easier because 
that refers to concepts with which they are more familiar because that is non-
political crime, a concept of law which most lawyers have grown up with and 
most judges will have had exposure to elsewhere. Concepts under (a) are much 
more based in public international law, and of course the fast moving and 
changing area of international criminal law, which they may not be familiar with. 
And 1F(c) is in one sense not connected to any area of law they might be familiar 
with because it doesn’t link into identifiable crimes or acts but is linked to a 
number of concepts such as the purposes and principles of the United Nations and 
acts contrary to those purposes and principles, neither of which are easy concepts 
to identify or construe." 
However, it is not possible to make any firm findings on this matter since Article 1F seems to 
be raised by the judiciary in only a minority of cases. 
2.3. The limb of Article 1F relied upon in relation to suspected terrorists 
Figure 7 shows the number of cases analysed as part of this research in which the different 
limbs of Article 1F were raised by the Secretary of State in relation to suspected terrorists. In 
the overwhelming majority of cases concerning suspected terrorists Article 1F(c) was raised 
by the Secretary of State. Indeed, 1F(c) was relied upon in 85% of cases, while in the 
remaining 15% 1F(c) was relied upon in conjunction with 1F(b). There were no instances of 
the Home Office relying exclusively on 1F(b), and 1F(a) was not relied upon at all in relation 







Figure 7: The limb of Article 1F relied upon by the Secretary of State in cases involving terrorism, 




It therefore seems that in the majority of cases involving suspected terrorists Article 1F(c) is 
relied upon by the Home Office as the ground of exclusion. This is unsurprising, since 
terrorism has explicitly been declared to fall within the scope of Article 1F(c) in resolutions 
of the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council, the EU’s Qualification 
Directive and domestic legislation. As noted above, all the cases analysed as part of this 
research in which Article 1F was relied upon to revoke refugee status concerned the 
exclusion of suspected terrorists under Article 1F(c). 
2.3.1. The use of Articles 1F(b) and 1F(c) to exclude suspected terrorists from refugee 
status 
Historically, 1F(b) was the limb of Article 1F relied upon to exclude suspected terrorists from 
refugee status. This was the limb of Article 1F raised by immigration judges in the early 
cases T and Gurung. In both of these cases, the judiciary explicitly held that, although Article 
1F(b) refers to serious non-political crimes, terrorists acts are capable of falling within the 
scope of the provision.
567
  
Judge B: "I think if you go back to the period straight after 9/11 then it was 
mainly 1F(b) that was being used." 
                                                          
566
 Appeals heard together concerning 1F were counted as separate cases. This analysis excludes duplicate cases 
as they proceeded through the high courts. 
567










































However, in more recent years there seems to have been a move on the part of the Secretary 
of State to rely on Article 1F(c) rather than 1F(b). There seem to be a number of reasons for 
this change in approach. 
 Firstly, Article 1F(b) does not cover terrorist acts committed after refugee status has 
been granted, or those committed in the country of refuge, since the provision is temporally 
and geographically limited to acts committed outside the country of refuge prior to the 
asylum applicants entry as a refugee. As noted above, a number of the cases involving 
suspected terrorists concerned revocation of refugee status. In these cases Article 1F(b) could 
not be relied upon, since the terrorist acts had allegedly been committed after refugee status 
had been granted in the UK. The Secretary of State therefore relied on Article 1F(c) to 
exclude the individuals from refugee status. Indeed, in the majority of revocation cases the 
key legal issue that had to be determined by the SIAC was whether or not Article 1F(c) is 
geographically or temporally limited in a similar manner as Article 1F(b).
568
 The SIAC held 
it was not,
569
 and therefore the Secretary of State has been free to rely on this provision to 
exclude individuals who have allegedly committed terrorist acts in the UK after being granted 
refugee status.  
 A further reason that it may be more convenient for the Secretary of State to rely on 
Article 1F(c) over 1F(b) concerns the nature of the acts the asylum applicant is alleged to 
have been involved in. Not only does Article 1F(b) require that a specific crime be 
committed, the provision also explicitly provides that the crime must be ‘serious’. Whilst the 
implication of Article 1F(c) is that for an act to be considered ‘contrary to the purposes and 
principles of the United Nations’ it must be a serious crime, this requirement is not explicitly 
mentioned in the provision and therefore there is greater scope for interpretation on this 
point.
570
 Furthermore, unlike Article 1F(b), under Article 1F(c) there is no requirement that 
the crime or act be non-political. There is therefore no balance between the act committed 
and any political motivation or objective. 
 As the United Nations has repeatedly declared that ‘acts methods and practices of 
terrorism are contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations’ without providing 
a legal definition of the term, the meaning of terrorism for the purpose of Article 1F(c) is 
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 As considered previously, in the UK this resulted in the extremely broad definition 
of terrorism contained in the Terrorism Act 2000 being employed in the interpretation of ‘acts 
contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations’ for the purpose of Article 
1F(c).
572
 Although the restrictive approach that should be adopted in the interpretation of 
Article 1F(c) points to the conclusion that only acts that violate the purposes and principles of 
the United Nations in a ‘fundamental manner’ fall under this provision, this has only recently 
been stressed by the Supreme Court
573
 and the precise scope of the provision is far from 
clear. In many cases Article 1F(c) may therefore be the preferred ground of exclusion for 
those suspected of involvement with terrorism as this limb of Article 1F includes more scope 
for the crimes or acts that fall to be excludable. A large proportion of judicial participants 
also considered Article 1F(c) was often relied upon by the Home Office in cases involving 
suspected terrorists, as will be considered below. 
2.3.2. The use of Article 1F(a) in relation to suspected terrorists 
Figure 8 shows the responses provided by judicial participants when asked which limb of 
Article 1F they consider to be most often relied upon by the Home Office in relation to 
individuals suspected of involvement with terrorism. The majority of participants that 
responded to this question considered Articles 1F(a) and (c) were most often relied upon, 
with Article 1F(b) relied upon much less regularly. Two participants indicated a combination 
of limbs was relied upon, one of which specified the combination was 1F(a) and (c). 
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Figure 8: The limb of Article 1F judicial participants consider is most often relied upon by the Home 




Whilst the responses of judicial participants support the finding that in a large proportion of 
cases concerning suspected terrorists Article 1F(c) is relied upon by the Home Office, a 
curious result is that a large proportion of judicial participants also considered 1F(a) is often 
relied upon. In the cases analysed as part of this research there were no instances in which 
Article 1F(a) was raised in relation to suspected terrorists. Indeed, the word ‘terrorism’ was 
not mentioned in any of the cases analysed in which Article 1F(a) was raised.
575
 
 This must mean that, whilst ‘terrorism’ may not explicitly feature in the majority of 
cases in which the Home Office relies on Article 1F(a) to exclude individuals from refugee 
status, judicial participants nevertheless perceive the individuals to be terrorists. For example, 
a military combatant engaged in an armed conflict for whom there is evidence they 
committed atrocities against civilians will likely be excluded from refugee status by the 
Home Office not on the basis that they are a ‘terrorist’ as such, but, as the alleged act was 
committed in the context of an armed conflict, under Article 1F(a) on the basis that they have 
committed a ‘war crime’. Nevertheless, that the individual is alleged to have committed 
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atrocities against civilians may mean that judicial participants perceive the individual to be a 
terrorist, even if this terminology does not feature in the Home Office’s grounds for exclusion 
nor the tribunal determination.  
Indeed, there may be difficulties in differentiating between crimes that may amount to 
war crimes or crimes against humanity under Article 1F(a), serious non-political crimes 
under Article 1F(b) and acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the UN under Article 
1F(c).  
Barrister E: "From looking at the cases, especially as it is sometimes quite 
difficult to draw the distinctions between (a) and (c), the more I look at it I 
actually find it quite difficult to take a categorical approach and say this is (a) or 
(c), rather than it being 1F. … I mean of course we have historically, ex parte T 
being the obvious case, argued [terrorism] under (b) as a serious non-political 
crime … Applying it after T there is no reason why it couldn’t be (b), and in the 
case of an internal armed conflict why it couldn’t be (a) either." 
The Home Office’s process guidance itself points out that:  
‘Acts of terrorism are widely considered contrary to the purposes and principles of the 
United Nations, and may potentially fall within Article 1F(c). But they may also fall 
within Article 1F(b) because acts of terrorism are not necessarily political crimes, or 
even within Article 1F(a).’
576
 
The responses of judicial participants indicate that in a number of cases in which the asylum 
applicant could potentially be classed as a ‘terrorist’, or are perceived as such by the 
judiciary, the Home Office relies on Article 1F(a) rather than 1F(c). There are a number of 
reasons this might be the case.  
Firstly, as noted above, the development of Article 1F screening in the Border Agency 
means that the units within the Home Office that consider Article 1F cases have been more 
specialised in the definitions of war crimes and crimes against humanity than ‘terrorism’ per 
se. Therefore, when the past activities of an asylum applicant could equally be characterised 
as a crime against humanity or an act of terrorism, it may be that the Border Agency staff are 
more familiar with crime against humanity and therefore classify the act as such. It is also 
acknowledged that Article 1F(a) offences are easier to define than ‘acts contrary to the 
purposes and principles of the United Nations’, and as such this is a more concrete ground of 
exclusion, as considered further below. 
Furthermore, the nature of asylum applications in the UK might tend towards acts 
being classified as war crimes rather than acts of terrorism. As noted above, a large 
proportion of asylum applications in the UK are from nationals of conflict-ridden countries, it 
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is therefore more likely that an excludable act was committed in the context of an armed 
conflict. The fact that an alleged crime was committed in the context of an armed conflict 
may tend towards the exclusion being considered under Article 1F(a) rather than (c), both 
because the concept of war crime under Article 1F(a) is more suited to acts committed during 
armed conflict, and also because the interpretation of ‘terrorism’ by courts and tribunals in 




Where it is difficult to differentiate whether an excludable act should fall under 
Article 1F(a) or (c), overall Article 1F(a) may be the preferred ground of exclusion for the 
Home Office because it refers to more concrete international legal standards contained in 
international criminal law instruments than the imprecise phrase ‘acts contrary to the 
purposes and principles of the United Nations’ contained in Article 1F(c). Furthermore, 
international guidance on the interpretation of Article 1F(c) stresses that, due to the vague 
nature of Article 1F(c), it should only be relied upon in exceptional circumstances. Where 
possible, recourse should rather be made to the more certain Articles 1F(a) or (b).
578
  
SCU 1: "I think 1F(c) is vague and difficult to pin down. Most of the reasons to 
exclude someone are covered by 1F(a) and 1F(b) anyway, 1F(c) has a sort of 
residual character. It has also been, perhaps wrongly, used as a counter-terrorism 
exclusion clause." 
Judge B: "I think my reading of it anyway is that Al-Sirri essentially confirms 
UNHCR approach in that it [1F(c)] shouldn’t be the first recourse just because 
something that looks like terrorism is involved. And so if you take 1F(c) out of 
the picture, then I suppose 1F(a) is the most obvious clause to use. And … it’s 
easier for a judge to look at a case and say are there certain crimes being 
committed here by reference to international legal standards than saying well is 
this person a terrorist, and what does that mean in terms of the combination of our 
domestic terrorism legislation and the Refugee Convention and the Qualification 
Directive and so on so … its easier for us than trying to engage with the issue of 
terrorism per se." 
Barrister E: "JS (Sri Lanka) is the classic case in the Supreme Court where it is 
not classed as terrorism [but as a war crime]." 
Barrister A: "An act of terrorism could in principle be a war crime of course. 
There’s no reason to exclude terrorism from war crimes, it’s a matter of applying 
international law, and determining what is a war crime. And 1F(b), serious non-
political crime, again, it could fall within that. And UNHCR’s view is absolutely 
clear, that because you’ve got more clearly defined provisions in 1F(a) and 1F(b), 
you really want to be starting there. If you’re looking at a situation in the context 
of an armed conflict, then you need to analyse the whole case under IHL 
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[international humanitarian law]. And if something is a war crime under IHL, 
then you’d be looking at a case of exclusion based on 1F(a)." 
Overall, Article 1F(a) seems to be the limb of Article 1F overwhelmingly relied upon by the 
Home Office in exclusion decisions, although in cases where terrorism is explicitly cited as 
the ground of exclusion it seems to be Article 1F(c) that is relied upon over and above the 
other limbs of Article 1F. Whilst the predominance of Article 1F(a) cases may simply be a 
fortunate result of the nature of asylum claims and the history of Article 1F screening in the 
Border Agency, the Home Office’s trend towards relying on Article 1F(a) over the other 
grounds of exclusion where possible ensures recourse to more objective international legal 
norms than the vague terms ‘terrorism’ and ‘acts contrary to the purposes and principles of 
the United Nations’ encapsulated in Article 1F(c), and is in line with the residual character of 
Article 1F(c). 
 
3. How often Article 1F is raised 
At present, the Home Office’s SCU receives around 150-200 potential Article 1F referrals per 
year. Ultimately around a quarter of potential Article 1F cases that are referred to the SCU 
result in an exclusion decision.
579
 Table 5 shows the number of individuals excluded from 
refugee status under Article 1F at initial decision by the UKBA between 2008 and 2012. This 
data reveals that Article 1F exclusion decisions represent an extremely small number of 
initial UKBA decisions in the UK, on average only 0.1% of initial decisions and 0.2% of 
refusals.
580
 It is also notable that Article 1F(a) (war crime, crime against humanity) is by far 
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 SCU 1. This seems to include instances where Article 1F is raised as a supplementary ground of refusal. 
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 Data on the total number of refusals made by the UKBA were also included in the data provided by the 



























Article 1F as a 
proportion of 
initial decisions 
2008 19,398 14 11 0 3 0.07% 
2009 24,287 20 16 3 1 0.08% 
2010 20,261 26 26 0 0 0.13% 
2011 17,380 31 23 5 3 0.18% 
2012 16,918 21 15 5 1 0.12% 
 
Exclusion under Article 1F therefore represents an extremely small number of initial 
decisions made by the UKBA. The Home Office data is displayed in chart form in Figures 9 
and 10. These figures reveal that there has been a slight increase in the use of Article 1F 
during this time period. The main feature of this increase has been a rise in reliance on Article 
1F(a), which rose from 11 to 26 in the period 2008-2010, before falling again in 2011 and 
2012.
582
 The use of Article 1F(c) and (b) appear to have remained relatively constant over 
this time period, with only a very small increase in the use of Article 1F(b) in 2011 and 2012. 
When the number of Article 1F initial decisions is given as a proportion of the total number 
of decisions made by the UKBA rather than by frequency, the same trends can be observed 
(see Figure 11). 
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 Although the data for 2011 and 2012 is provisional. The reason for this dip seems to be restructuring of SCU 
at UKBA. SCU 1: ‘Internally we’d just been restructured, the war crimes unit was essentially disbanded, it’s 
actually not that less people were eligible for 1F(a) exclusion, it’s probably just that we just weren’t getting 
round to processing the cases as quickly because we were dealing with new workstreams as a result of the 
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Figures 9, 10 and 11 show that, while there has been a slight increase in the use of Article 1F 
at initial decision between 2008 and 2012, there has not been a significant increase and 
exclusion under Article 1F has remained exceptionally applied. 
Table 6 details the responses given by judicial participants when asked how often, in 
their experience, Article 1F is raised by the Home Office. The results support the conclusion 
that Article 1F is raised very infrequently in the UK. The overwhelming majority of 
participants (97.3%) indicated that Article 1F is raised by the Home Office “Rarely” or 
“Never”.
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 It must also be noted that a number of judicial participants explained that although they indicated “Rarely” as 
their response, they had actually only had strictly speaking less than 1% of Article 1F cases. Similarly, a number 
of participants indicated “Never” although they had come across a small number of Article 1F cases, but not 
enough to meet the 1% threshold of “Rarely”. These inaccuracies, however, do not detract from the conclusion 

















































Table 6: How often judicial participants consider Article 1F is raised by the Home Office 
Percentage of 
respondents 
providing a positive 
answer 













n 36 36 36 36 36 
Frequency 0 0 1 24 11 
Percent % 0% 0% 2.8% 66.7% 30.6% 
 
These figures are supported by anecdotal evidence collated from the questionnaires and 
interview transcripts. Many judicial participants indicated they had dealt with only 1 or 2 
cases in their entire experience, some had dealt with none.  
Judge 23: "As far as I can remember I have only ever had one case." 
Judge 7: "Only 1 time in entire career." 
Judge D: "The number of cases where Article 1F is used is very infrequent … It’s 
only going to be a couple a year at the moment. … it’s not a big issue. At the 
moment it’s not a big issue." 
Judge 29: "Sorry to be unhelpful but in all my years of sitting [14 years] this issue 
has never been raised before me."  
Judge 13: "I do not recollect the last time I dealt with such an appeal." 
Judge 10: Only done 4 in all the time I’ve been sitting." 
Judge 11: "My perception is that Art 1F is rarely used. The topic was covered in a 
Training Conference some years ago and only one [Immigration Judge] in my 
group had any practical experience of the exclusion clause." 
Judge 16: "I have only twice come across it." 
Judge 18: "Unlike some other jurisdictions (e.g. Canada), Article 1F is rarely used 
in the UK." 
Judicial participants reported a very low number of Article 1F cases. Indeed, a number of 
participants indicated they could not complete the questionnaire as they had never come 
across such a case. Some indicated they had dealt with so few cases they could not reliably 
provide responses to many of the questions.
587
 The responses of judicial participants support 
the exceptional nature of Article 1F decisions apparent from the Home Office data. However, 
there are a number of factors that must be taken into account when considering the small 
number of Article 1F cases that have come before judicial participants. 
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 For 11 judicial participants the remainder of the questionnaire was not applicable as they stated Article 1F 
had never been raised before them in relation to an individual suspected of involvement with terrorism. Various 
participants were unable to answer specific questions as too few cases had come before them, as specified in the 
individual results tables and figures throughout this chapter.  
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One reason that a number of judicial participants that responded to questionnaires 
may have encountered a particularly small number of Article 1F cases is that decisions to 
allocate cases by the Presidential team may be made on the basis of a Judges’ seniority or 
experience. Judges who are not senior and/or do not have experience in Article 1F cases may 
not therefore be allocated these cases as often as other judges who have more relevant 
experience.   
Another reason judicial participants may have encountered a particularly small 
number of Article 1F cases is due to the limitations on the right of appeal against a decision 
to exclude under Article 1F.
588
 An individual excluded from refugee status under Article 1F 
but who can nevertheless not be removed from the UK on human rights grounds may appeal 
against the Secretary of State’s decision to grant him limited leave to remain. However, the 
right to appeal the Secretary of State’s refusal of the asylum claim is limited to those who 
have been granted leave to enter or remain in the UK for a period exceeding one year.
589
 An 
individual excluded under Article 1F and granted Restricted Leave for a period of six months 
will therefore have to have this form of leave renewed twice before they have leave to appeal 
to the tribunal. 
SCU 1: "There is also a little kind of grey area in this: have you heard of 
restricted leave? Some of these cases that are excluded that may appear in your 
figures are not necessarily going into the appeal system, and sometimes they can 
be on restricted leave for quite a long time." 
However, all the data employed in this study supports the conclusion that Article 1F 
decisions represent an extremely small proportion of the total number of asylum decisions 
made in the UK: the use of this provision appears be very exceptional. 
3.1. How often Article 1F is raised in relation to suspected terrorists 
In total, 36% of judicial participants that completed questionnaires as part of this research had 
had experience in a case in which Article 1F had been raised in relation to a suspected 
terrorist. Table 7 shows the responses of judicial participants with experience in Article 1F 
cases when asked how often they considered Article 1F is raised by the Home Office in 
relation to an asylum applicant suspected of involvement with terrorism. The majority of 
judicial participants stated that such a case had never been raised before them, whilst those 
that had heard such a case were divided over how often Article 1F is raised is this respect. 
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 See Chapter 7 for more on this. 
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 2002 Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act, s 83.  
189 
 
Table 7: How often judicial participants with experience in Article 1F cases consider Article 1F is 






providing a positive 
answer 


















Article 1F  
cases) 
n 23 23 23 23 23 
Frequency 3 3 3 3 11 
Percent % 13% 13% 13% 13% 48% 
 
Case analysis reveals a much higher proportion of Article 1F cases involving individuals 
suspected of involvement with terrorism, with 67% of the cases concerning terrorism.
591
  
There are a number of factors which may explain the difference between the case 
analysis results and the responses of judicial participants. Firstly, it may simply be that 
individuals excluded on the ground they are suspected of involvement with terrorism are 
more often granted leave to appeal to the higher courts and tribunals. Indeed, 75% of the 
Article 1F cases analysed in which terrorism was raised concerned exclusion under Article 
1F(c), whilst a further 13% concerned exclusion on (b) and (c), respectively.
592
 As noted 
previously, the phrase ‘acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations’ 
contained in Article 1F(c) is particularly vague, as is the term ‘terrorism’. These cases may 
appear more often in the case analysis simply because leave to appeal to the higher courts and 
tribunals is granted more often in cases concerning Article 1F(c) as higher courts seek to 
clarify this area of law. 
Another reason for the difference between the case analysis results and the responses 
of judicial participants may relate to the nature of the cases themselves. Cases involving 
suspected terrorists are much more likely to go to appeal before the SIAC rather than the 
tribunal, as the cases are more likely to be based on evidence that the Secretary of State 
considers should not be made public in the interest of national security. Indeed, 38% of the 
Article 1F cases concerning suspected terrorists that were analysed as part of this study were 
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 For 11 participants the question was not applicable as they stated Article 1F had never been raised before 
them. 2 participants stated that too few cases had come before them to be able to answer the question.  
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 16 of 24 cases. Appeals heard together concerning 1F were counted as separate cases. This analysis excludes 
duplicate cases as they proceeded through the high courts. 
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 12 of the 16 cases were solely based on 1F(c), two on 1F(b) and (c) together and two on 1F(b) alone. 
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heard by the SIAC.
593
 Since the judicial participants that responded to questionnaires as part 
of this study overwhelmingly have experience of the tribunal system rather than experience 
sitting at the SIAC, they may not have come across as many of these cases.  
Judge A: "I can’t remember dealing with a pure terrorism case. They tend to be 
allocated to judges at Field House, which is part of SIAC, because special 
security clearance is needed to deal with some of this evidence." 
It may therefore be that in practice a higher number of Article 1F cases involve suspected 
terrorists than indicated by the judicial participants that took part in this research. 
 
4. The increase in the application of Article 1F  
Although the Home Office data indicates that the use of Article 1F has remained fairly 
constant over the last five years (see Figures 9, 10 and 11), there has been an increase in the 
application of the provision by the Home Office in the last decade. Before the establishment 
of specialised units within the Border Agency it seems there was very little application of 
Article 1F by the Home Office. 
SCU 1: "Historically, mid-90’s to early noughties where there was no War 
Crimes Unit, there was no aggressive use of screening, virtually no application of 
1F at all … basically before my team existed, the old War Crimes Unit, you 
would be talking about less than 5 exclusions a year, we’re talking tiny figures, so 
although we might have figures of 30 per year [at present], that is actually 
representing quite a significant sea change." 
Interviewer: "So you do think there has been quite a big increase then?" 
SCU 1: "Yes, yes, in comparison to 10 years ago. So I would say since probably 
about 2004, from then on there was a general pick up in exclusion under the 
Convention, but we are not talking scores of people each year." 
SCU 1: "A really key point from my perspective is that 10 years ago it [Article 
1F] wasn’t really being used at all but there has been a marked increase since 
about 2004. This is further evidenced by the number of cases, involving 1F(a) in 
particular, that have made it to the Upper Tribunal, Court of Appeal or Supreme 
Court in the last five years. There is little doubt in my mind that this has been as a 
direct result of our screening for suspects. All of the cases that have made the 
higher courts were originally referred to us." 
The establishment of specialised units within the Border Agency seems to have contributed to 
an increase in the application of Article 1F by the Home Office. 
Judicial participants, however, were divided over whether or not there had been an 
increase in the use of the provision. Figure 12 displays the responses provided by judicial 
                                                          
593
 6 of the 16 cases. All of these cases concerned Article 1F(c), rather than (b) or (a). 
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participants when asked if they considered the use of Article 1F had increased, decreased or 
remained the same in the time they had been sitting as an immigration judge. Whilst there 
were clearly differences of opinion between judicial participants, the majority of participants 
were of the opinion that the number of Article 1F cases had remained the same in the time 
they had been sitting. Less than half this number thought use of the provision had increased, 
and a very small minority felt it had decreased. 
 
 
Figure 12: Judicial participant’s opinion on whether the use of Article 1F had increased, 
decreased or remained the same in the time they had been sitting (n = 21)
594
 
Judge 2: "It appears to go up and down but overall, and surprisingly, I don’t see it 
has gone up." 
Judge 14: "[Increased] In the sense that it was raised hardly at all but a little more 
now." 
Judge D: “Increase. Definitely using it more.” 
Judge A: “It tends to come in waves.” 
When these responses were analysed according to the number of years the participants had 
been sitting as immigration judges, no clear link emerged between the response given and 
how long judicial participants had been sitting.  
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 For 11 participants the question was not applicable as they stated Article 1F had never been raised before 
them. 3 participants stated that too few cases had come before them to be able to answer the question. Data was 
















































Figure 13 shows how long judicial participants had been sitting as immigration 
judges, divided by the response given to the question of whether the use of Article 1F had 
increased, decreased or remained the same in the time they had been sitting. Those that 
considered the use of the provision had remained the same had a higher median number of 
years sitting (13 years) than those that considered the use of the provision had increased (9 
years) or decreased (10.75 years). Judicial participants that considered the use of the 
provision had remained the same also had a wider range of years sitting (18 years) than those 
that considered the use of Article 1F had increased (13 years) or decreased (7.5 years), 
encapsulating both those with the longest and shortest experience sitting as an immigration 
judge. However, the differences between these groups are so small that it is not safe to draw 
conclusions as to whether the length of time the judicial participants had been sitting as 
immigration judges influenced their opinion on whether or not the frequency with which 







Figure 13: How long judicial participants had been sitting as immigration judges, divided by the 
response given to the question of whether the use of Article 1F had increased, decreased or remained 




Judicial participants were divided over whether or not there had been an increase in the use of 
Article 1F, although most participants indicated they thought the use of the provision had 
remained the same during the time they had been sitting as an immigration judge.  
 Judicial participants that had experience in Article 1F cases involving suspected 
terrorists were also divided as to whether there had been an increase in the number of these 
cases. Figure 14 shows the responses of judicial participants when asked whether the number 
of cases in which Article 1F is raised in relation to those suspected of involvement with 
terrorism had increased, decreased or remained the same in the time they had been sitting. Of 
the judicial participants that had experience in Article 1F cases involving terrorism, the 
majority felt the use of Article 1F had either increased or remained the same in relation to 
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 For 11 participants the question was not applicable as they stated Article 1F had never been raised before 
them. 3 participants stated that too few cases had come before them to be able to answer the question. Data was 
missing for 1 participant. 
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those suspected of involvement with terrorism. No judicial participants indicated use of the 
Article 1F had decreased. 
 
Figure 14: Judicial participant’s opinion on whether the use of Article 1F had increased, decreased or 
remained the same in relation to an individual suspected of involvement with terrorism in the time 




Judicial participants were again divided in opinion, although, significantly, no participants 
considered the number of cases in which Article 1F is raised in relation to those suspected of 
involvement with terrorism had decreased in the time they had been sitting. 
However, a number of judicial participants found it difficult to comment on overall 
trends in the use of Article 1F, given the limited number of Article 1F cases that had come 
before them.  
Judge A: "Overall there could be an increased percentage of the total number of 
cases that are coming through but I don’t think any of us would know." 
Judge B: "Very difficult to say." 
Judge 3: "It is difficult to extrapolate across the Tribunal given the low numbers 
that have come before me and it is not really possible to express a valid opinion." 
Judge 23: "Cannot reply to this as have only had one case." 
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 For 22 participants the question was not applicable as they stated Article 1F had never been raised before 
them in relation to an individual suspected of involvement with terrorism. 1 participant stated that too few cases 

















































A number of legal practitioners interviewed were similarly unable to comment on any overall 
trends, given their limited experience in Article 1F cases. Those that did, however, indicated 
that they thought there had been an increase in the use of the provision. 
Barrister A: "They’re becoming used more frequently now, to exclude people 
who are labelled domestically as terrorists." 
Barrister H: "Recently exclusion has been becoming more and more used … I’d 
have thought that was relatively uncontroversial. Certainly in the last decade, 
possibly going a bit further back than the last decade, the last decade and a half." 
Solicitor A:"I think there has been an increase in number of exclusion cases based 
on Article 1F(a) and (c), and I think this is likely to continue." 
Barrister B: "I think now they’re [the Home Office] much more on the ball [in 
relation to raising Article 1F]." 
The cases analysed as part of this research show that there has been an increase in the number 
of Article 1F cases brought before courts and tribunals in the UK. Figure 15 shows the 
number of Article 1F cases heard before courts and tribunals, per year, from 1996 to 2012. 
Between 1996 and 2002 there was not a single Article 1F case in the sample. However, aside 
from a significant decrease in 2008, from 2002 onwards there seem to have been a steady 
stream of cases, overall showing an increase over this time period. 
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These case analysis results may be influenced by the fact that more tribunal decisions have 
been reported in the last decade than two decades ago. However, even allowing for this 
influence it seems that there has been an increase in the number of cases in which Article 1F 
is raised, particularly from the latter half of the 1990s.  
 Analysis of Article 1F cases involving suspected terrorists revealed similar results. 
Figure 16 shows the total number of Article 1F cases concerning suspected terrorists analysed 
as part of this research, divided by year. Between 1996 and 2002 there was not a single 
Article 1F case involving a suspected terrorist in the sample. However, again, aside from a 
significant decrease in 2008, from 2002 onwards there seem to have been a steady stream of 
cases, showing an overall increase over this time period with a peak in 2009, after which the 
number of Article 1F cases involving suspected terrorists seems to have decreased somewhat. 
 





Overall, although the responses provided by judicial participants were mixed, it may be 
concluded that there has been an increase in the use of Article 1F in the UK in the last two 
decades. This includes an increase in the number of Article 1F cases concerning suspected 
terrorists, although the number of cases concerning suspected terrorists appears to have 
decreased in the last few years. 
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4.1. Factors relevant to the increase in the application Article 1F 
There are a number of factors which may be relevant to the increase in the number of cases in 
which Article 1F is raised in the UK. Figure 17 shows the responses of judicial participants 
when asked which factors they considered relevant to any increase or decrease in the use of 
Article 1F. The majority of participants that thought the use of Article 1F had increased 
considered policies and guidance provided to UKBA Staff and developments in 
national/international law to be relevant factors in this increase, while some also considered 
the resources available to the UKBA to be important. Some participants who though the use 
of Article 1F had decreased also stated developments in national/international law was a 
relevant factor, although overwhelmingly the number of asylum applications was considered 









As noted above, no judicial participants with experience in Article 1F cases involving 
suspected terrorists considered the number of these cases had decreased. Figure 18 shows the 
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 The influence of these factors on the number of Article 1F decisions in the UK, and the disparate responses 
of judicial participants in this respect, are explored further in sections 4.1.1-4.1.3 below. 
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 6 judicial participants considered the number of cases in which Article 1F is raised had increased, whilst 2 
thought it had decreased. For 13 participants the question was not applicable as they considered the number of 
cases in which Article 1F is raised had remained the same. For 11 participants the question was not applicable as 
they stated Article 1F had never been raised before them. 3 participants stated that too few cases had come 



































































responses of judicial participants who considered the number of cases involving suspected 
terrorists had increased when asked what factors they considered relevant to this change. 80% 
of judicial participants considered policies and guidance provided to UKBA staff and 
increased awareness of the provision to be relevant factors to the increased use of Article 1F 
in relation to suspected terrorists, and 60% also cited legal developments and resources 
available to the UKBA to be relevant. Only 20% of judicial participants considered number 
of asylum seekers to be a relevant factor. 
 
 
Figure 18: The factors judicial participants considered relevant to increase in the use of Article 1F in 




The potential influence of a number of these factors on the application of Article 1F in the 
UK will now be considered in more detail below. 
4.1.1. The policies and resources of the Border Agency 
A factor which seems to have had a great impact on the number of Article 1F decisions made 
by the Home Office is the approach of the Border Agency to the issue. Recently, there has 
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 For 22 participants the question was not applicable as they stated Article 1F had never been raised before 
them in relation to an individual suspected of involvement with terrorism. For 7 participants the question was 
not applicable as they considered the use of Article 1F in relation to individuals suspected of involvement with 
terrorism had remained the same. 1 participant stated that too few cases had come before them to be able to 





















































been ‘a greater desire on the Home Office’s part to make the point that the Refugee 
Convention is not there for fugitives from justice’.
602
 In line with this approach, it seems that 
a greater amount of resources have been dedicated to ensuring that refugee status is not 
abused by the perpetrators of serious crimes. This has led to the establishment of specialised 
units within the Border Agency, in particular, the establishment of the War Crimes Unit in 
2003, the remit of which was closely tied to the governmental policy of no safe haven for war 
criminals.
603
 The establishment of the War Crimes Unit led to a number of exclusions based 
on Article 1F(a), while screening for Article 1F(b) and (c) has been developing since the War 
Crimes Unit was assimilated into the Special Cases Unit.  
Indeed, of the judicial participants that considered the use of Article 1F had increased 
during the time they had been sitting, 67% considered this change was due to policies and 
guidance provided to Border Agency staff and 33% considered it was due to the resources 
available to the Border Agency. Of those that considered the application of Article 1F to 
suspected terrorists had increased this percentage increased to 80% and 60% respectively.  
Judge D: "I just think it’s because they’ve had better training, the caseworkers." 
Judge 2: "I thought about ticking all of these but given that many more cases than 
are recognised have 1F overtones I think the most important factor by far is 
resources."  
Judge 14: "I am unaware of any concerted effort on the part of the UKBA to 
identify this issue." 
Judge 3: "I would consider any such change being as a result of the resources 
available to the UKBA to undertake proper research and analysis of the claims 
made." 
Judge 35: "There is a specialist war crimes section of the UKBA." 
The amount of time and resources Border Agency staff have to dedicate to investigating 
potential Article 1F cases clearly has a huge impact on the number of Article 1F decisions 
made. As noted by one barrister ‘it’s a very tiny number [of cases], but they soak up a huge 
amount of resources when they come up’.
604
 Indeed, the SCU member interviewed as part of 
this research indicated that the drop in the number of Article 1F(a) decisions in 2011 (see 
Figure 11) was due to a restructuring of the SCU and consequent drop in resources.
605
 The 
allocation of resources and policies by the Home Office has therefore clearly had a great 
impact on the number of Article 1F decisions made by the Border Agency.  
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 See n 582 and accompanying text. 
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4.1.2. Numbers of asylum applications 
The number of asylum applications made in the UK may also influence the number of Article 
1F decisions made by the Home Office. Figure 19 shows the number of asylum applications 
made per year in the UK for the years 2001 – 2012, and demonstrates that there has been a 
dramatic reduction in the number of asylum applications in the last decade. 
 
 




The fall in the number of asylum application in the UK may affect the number of Article 1F 
decisions made by the Home Office in two ways. Firstly, it might be expected that, as fewer 
individuals are applying for asylum in the UK, fewer individuals would fall under Article 1F 
and be eligible for exclusion. 
Judge B: "I noticed one of the bullet points in your questionnaire was the fall in 
asylum numbers and I’m sure that may play a significant part in whatever answer 
you’re going to get. Because if you’ve got a drastic reduction in asylum figures 
it’s not surprising that you don’t see many exclusion cases." 
Figure 17 shows that 100% of judicial participants that considered the use of Article 1F had 
decreased indicated that numbers of asylum applications was a relevant factor in this 
decrease, whilst no participants that considered the use of Article 1F had increased felt this 
was a relevant factor. However, the fall in the number of asylum applications might also 
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mean that the Border Agency is able to dedicate more time and resources to potential Article 
1F cases. 
Judge 15: "This area has tended to develop once the Home Office were no longer 
completely overwhelmed by the number of asylum applications." 
Figure 18 reveals that 20% of judicial participants that considered the use of Article 1F in 
relation to suspected terrorists had increased felt that number of asylum applications was 
relevant to this increase. It is not therefore possible to conclusively state the impact of the 
drop in the number of asylum applications on the number of Article 1F decisions made by the 
Home Office. 
4.1.3. Judicial awareness 
Another factor which may have contributed to the increase in the number of Article 1F cases 
is increased judicial awareness of the provision. As noted previously, in the earliest cases 
analysed as part of this research, T and Gurung, Article 1F was raised by the tribunal rather 
than the Home Office. As suggested by two interviewees, the trend towards applying Article 
1F more often in the UK may have originated in the judiciary’s increased awareness of the 
provision, which was later picked up on by the Home Office. 
Barrister H: "I think that back 10 or so years ago, certainly in the 1990’s there 
were very few exclusion decisions. And then particularly with cases like Gurung, 
the tribunal, some of the more on the ball tribunal judges, realised the Refugee 
Convention treated exclusion under Article 1F as mandatory, so that any 
approach that might have been the previous practice, along the lines of ‘it’s a 
matter for the Secretary of State in a refusal decision to decide whether or not 
they’re excluded’ changed slightly into a business of saying that where the 
evidence brings up a question of exclusion then exclusion must be considered by 
the appeal tribunal if it hasn’t been considered by the Secretary of State, on the 
basis of the Article 1F wording. And so from then you have more and more the 
tribunal making a point which the Secretary of State very much picked up on, and 
so it tends to be more of an issue." 
Judge B: "After 9/11 we obviously had a lot of discussions not only within the 
UK but also through the International Association of Refugee Law Judges who 
were very exercised about what were the implications for the work of judiciaries 
involved in asylum work … I think that [the time of the Gurung decision] was a 
time when we all took stock about what we were doing in relation to the 
exclusion clauses and all these issues, start to look at inclusion first or exclusion 
first. I suppose Gurung in many ways reflects what we all thought was the right 
approach then." 
The tribunal’s Gurung decision in 2002 seems to have had a great impact in bringing Article 
1F into the fore of judicial awareness. Indeed, the tribunal in Gurung held that it was 





 It is from the date of the Gurung determination onwards that Article 1F 
cases seem to arise more often before courts and tribunals in the case analysis. 
Judge D: "The one case (in private practise) I thought it was relevant was a 
Bosnian case and I think if that case was in court now it would have been raised 
as a war crimes issue. But back then the decision maker did not deal with it." 
However, it must be noted that the increase in the number of Article 1F cases following the 
Gurung determination may also have been due to the establishment of the War Crimes Unit 
within the Home Office, as the periods coincide.  
4.1.4. Developments in national and international law 
50% of judicial participants who considered there had been an increase in the use of Article 
1F indicated developments in national and/or international law was a factor relevant to this 
change. 60% of participants that considered the use of Article 1F in relation to suspected 
terrorists had increased also felt that this was a relevant factor. However, 50% of participants 
that considered there had been a decrease in the use of Article 1F also cited developments in 
national and/or international law as a factor relevant to this decrease. 
 As noted throughout the course of this thesis, in the past two decades there have been 
significant legal developments in relation to Article 1F and the 1951 Convention as a whole. 
At the international level, a number of resolutions of the UN General Assembly and Security 
Council have called on States to exclude terrorists from refugee status and have influenced 
the interpretation of ‘acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations’ under 
Article 1F(c). Regional regimes of refugee protection have also undergone development, 
including in particular the establishment of the EU’s Common European Asylum System, and 
the UNHCR and other international bodies have issued detailed guidance on the 
interpretation and application of Article 1F. Other regimes of international law which are 
often drawn on in the interpretation of Article 1F have also undergone significant 
development, particularly international human rights, criminal and humanitarian law, and this 
has influenced the interpretation of the provision domestically. At the national level, in part in 
response to these international developments, legislation and guidance has been adopted 
concerning the interpretation and application of the provision, and there has been a 
substantial increase in the number of cases concerning Article 1F being heard by the appellate 
courts of not only the UK but many other states parties to the 1951 Convention. 
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 These legal developments may influence the application of Article 1F in a number of 
ways. While these developments may have in some ways resulted in restrictive state policies 
and legislation concerning the application of Article 1F, there has also been a great focus on 
ensuring that decisions to exclude are in line with international human rights and refugee law 
and that Article 1F be interpreted restrictively and applied with caution. Particularly in light 
of the mixed responses provided by judicial participants noted above, it is not possible to 
draw general conclusions as to the relevance of legal developments on the frequency with 
which Article 1F is applied in the UK. Indeed, overall it seems that the factor that has had the 
greatest impact on the frequency with which Article 1F is applied is the establishment of 
specialised units within the Home Office.  
 
5. Who is being excluded under Article 1F 
The final question that will be examined in this section is who is being excluded under the 
Article 1F. Figure 20 shows the number of Article 1F exclusions made in the initial decision 
of the Border Agency between 2008 and 2012, divided by country of nationality of the 
asylum applicant. The data reveals that, between 2008 and 2012, of a total of 112 Article 1F 
exclusion decisions at initial decision the highest number related to nationals of Zimbabwe 
(26 Article 1F decisions),
608
 followed by nationals of Afghanistan (14 Article 1F 
decisions),
609
 Sri Lanka (14 Article 1F decisions)
610
 and Iraq (13 Article 1F decisions).
611
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 Zimbabwe: all but one were Art 1F(a) cases.  
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 Afghanistan: ten 1F(a) cases, two 1F(b) and two 1F(c). 
610
 Sri Lanka: all but one were Art 1F(a) cases.  
611




Figure 20: The number of UKBA initial Article 1F decisions from 2008-2012, divided by country of 
nationality (n=112) 
 
Figure 21 shows the number of Article 1F cases analysed as part of this research divided by 
nationality of the asylum applicant. A large number of these cases also concern nationals of 
Zimbabwe, Afghanistan and Sri Lanka, although nationals of Iraq did not feature so highly, 
with only one reported case. Nationals of Egypt and Algeria also featured highly in the cases 
analysed, although these did not feature in the Home Office data. Nationals of countries that 
























































































By far the largest number of Article 1F cases in the Home Office data concerned nationals of 
Zimbabwe. Nationals of Zimbabwe also featured highly in the cases analysed as part of this 
research. These cases involved Zimbabweans that supported the Mugabe regime, and include 
members of the Zanu PF youth militia involved in attacks on white-owned farms and a 
former police officer. National of Afghanistan and Sri Lanka also featured highly in both the 
Home Office data and case analysis. Nationals of Afghanistan were members of various 
Islamic militias, particularly Jamait-e-Islami, the Taliban and Hizb-e-Islami, and also the 
KhAD Intelligence Service. Sri Lankan nationals were exclusively members of the Tamil 
Tigers (LTTE). Libyans also feature in both the case analysis and the Home Office data, and 
in the case analysis relate to members of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG). 
Nationals of two countries in the case analysis were PKK members: Syria and Turkey, 
although these countries did not feature in the Home Office data.
613
 
Judge 15: "The countries currently productive of Article 1F exclusions are Sri 
Lanka (LTTE involvement), Turkey (PKK) and Afghanistan (Various 
possibilities)." 
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 This analysis excludes duplicate cases as they proceeded through the high courts. 
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 Shah suggests that Turkish nationals have increasingly relied on the Ankara agreement to gain 
‘establishment’ status in the UK, thereby avoiding applying for asylum. This could explain their absence from 
the Home Office data and the small number of Turkish nationals in Figure 21. Shah P, ‘Activism in the 
European Court of Justice and changing options for Turkish citizen migrants in the United Kingdom’ in: Kay 
Hailbronner, Bilgin Tiryakioglu, Esin Kucuk and Katja Schneider (eds.) Vatandaşlık, Göç, Mültecive 
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Judge A: "Mainly people from Sri Lanka and Libya." 
Judge 14: "Afghan commander of Taliban group." 
Judge D: "I think they have raised it in two Libyan cases in the last two years." 
Barrister B: "I think the commonest is probably the LTTE. I’ve also dealt with 
exclusion when national security issues have been raised. In particular in relation 
to imputed connection with Al-Qaida." 
Although Iraq nationals did feature highly in the Home Office data, only one case analysed 
involved an Iraqi national, who was a Commando under Saddam Hussein’s Regime.  
Judge 18: "Such cases that I have seen have really arisen under Saddam Hussein’s 
Ba’aath Party in the years immediately following his fall." 
Judge D: "I have had it raised for Iraqi cases, for people that were in Saddam’s 
army at particular points." 
Iranian and Palestinian nationals both also featured in both sets of data. In the cases analysed, 
the Iranian national was a member of the Basij, a volunteer paramilitary force, whilst the 
Palestinian was a member of Islamic Jihad movement in Gaza.  
Whilst nationals of Egypt and Algeria did not feature in the Home Office data, a 
number of cases involving nationals of these countries emerged in the case analysis. The 
Egyptian nationals were suspected of involvement with Islamic terrorist organisations and 
Al-Qaida, whilst most of the Algerian nationals were similarly suspected of involvement with 
Islamic terrorist organisations, both in Algeria and Europe, although one Algerian national 
was rather suspected of committing serious fraud in Algeria. The early Gurung determination 
in 2002 also involved a Nepalese national who was a member of the Nepalese Communist 
Party. It also seems that Article 1F has been applied to Rwandan nationals in the past. 
Judge B: "We had some high profile people from Rwanda, particularly say back 
in 2000, up till about 2008, they’re not so frequent anymore." 
The most notable result of this analysis is that overwhelmingly Article 1F cases involve 
members or supporters of State regimes or rebel organisations, rather than individuals acting 
alone. Supporters of repressive State regimes include members of the Zanu PF youth militia 
and police officer in Zimbabwe; a member of the KhAD Intelligence Service in Afghanistan; 
a Commando under Saddam Hussein’s Ba’aath Regime in Iraq and a member of the Basij 
paramilitary force in Iran. Members of non-State rebel groups also featured highly in the case 
analysis, and include members of the LTTE in Sri Lanka, the LIFG in Libya and the PKK. A 
large number of individuals were members of various cross-border Islamic militias including 
Jamait-e-Islami, the Taliban, Hizb-e-Islami, Al-Qaida and the Jihad Islamic movement. 
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 That the majority of Article 1F cases involve individuals who are members of 
organisations that commit Article 1F crimes rather than act alone is supported by the 
responses of judicial participants that took part in this research. Figure 22 shows the 
responses of judicial participants when asked which type of individual Article 1F cases most 
often concern. The overwhelming majority of judicial participants (70%) indicated that 
Article 1F cases most often concern individuals who are a member of an organisation that has 
committed a serious crime, rather than a senior member of such an organisation (5%). A third 
of judicial participants indicated that Article 1F cases most often involve those who have 
personally perpetrated a serious crime, while 19% considered that Article 1F was most often 
raised in relation to an individual associated with others that have committed a serious crime.   
 
 
Figure 22: The responses of judicial participants when asked which type of individual Article 1F cases 
most often involve (n=21)
614
 
Judge 23: "It was alleged that the person was a member of an organisation that 
committed the crime." 
Judge 14: "Most appellants appearing in Tribunal do not claim to be the highest 
leaders of the movements to which they belong but rather junior 
commanders/footsoldiers/ordinary members." 
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 For 11 participants the question was not applicable as they stated Article 1F had never been raised before 
them. 2 participants stated that too few cases had come before them to be able to answer the question. Data was 

























































Type of individual 
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The responses provided by judicial participants may be skewed somewhat by the possibility 
that Article 1F cases involving senior members of an organisation might be allocated to more 
senior immigration judges, or those with greater experience dealing with exclusion issues. 
  
6. Conclusions 
The qualitative and quantitative methodologies employed in this research all involve 
relatively small sample sizes, which reflect the exceptional use of Article 1F in the UK, and 
therefore the small number of people involved in the exclusion process. Viewed together, 
however, these sources provide a unique and compelling overview of the use and application 
of Article 1F in the UK.   
All the data employed in this study supports the conclusion that Article 1F decisions 
represent an extremely small proportion of the total number of asylum decisions made in the 
UK: the use of this provision appears be very exceptional. The Home Office data employed 
in this research suggests that Article 1F is relied upon by the Border Agency to exclude 
individuals from refugee status in 1% of initial decisions, while over 90% of immigration 
judges that responded to questionnaires indicated the provision is raised in less than 1% of 
the cases that come before them. Overall, it seems that in the majority of cases when Article 
1F is relied upon it is raised in the initial decision of the Home Office, either as a primary or 
supplementary ground for refusal. However, in cases which involve suspected terrorists the 
provision is also often relied upon to revoke refugee status. It seems that Article 1F is rarely 
raised by an immigration judge where it has not previously been considered by the Home 
Office. 
The majority of Article 1F cases involve nationals of Zimbabwe, Afghanistan, Sri 
Lanka, and Iraq, Libya, Egypt and Algeria. Article 1F cases predominantly involve members 
of a State or non-State organisation that has committed serious crimes, rather than individuals 
who commit serious crimes acting alone. Such organisations include State regimes such as 
Saddam Hussein’s Ba’aath regime in Iraq and Robert Mugabe’s Zanu PF regime in 
Zimbabwe. Non-state ‘terrorist’ rebel groups include the PKK, LTTE and LIFG and also a 
large number of Islamist militias including the Taliban and Al Qaida. 
Article 1F(a) appears to be the limb of Article 1F overwhelmingly relied upon by the 
Home Office in exclusion decisions. This seems to be a result of the close relationship of the 
Special Cases Unit (and its predecessor the War Crime Unit) with the governmental policy of 
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‘no safe haven for war criminals’, with the consequence that these units are more specialised 
in the definitions of war crimes and crimes against humanity than ‘serious non-political 
crime’ and ‘acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations’ under Articles 
(b) and (c). Furthermore, increased reliance on Article 1F(a) rather than the other limbs of 
Article 1F may be a result of the nature of asylum claims in the UK. An interesting 
consequence of this focus on Article 1F(a) is that many individuals who could very readily be 
depicted as ‘terrorists’ are not described as such in the exclusion decision. It is suggested that 
the Home Office’s trend towards relying on Article 1F(a) over the other grounds of exclusion 
ensures recourse to more objective international legal norms than the vague terms ‘terrorism’ 
and ‘acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations’. 
In cases where terrorism is explicitly cited as the ground of exclusion, it seems to be 
Article 1F(c) that is relied upon over and above the other limbs of Article 1F. That this 
ground of exclusion is relied upon to exclude terrorists from refugee status is unsurprising, as 
‘terrorism’ has explicitly been held to fall within the scope of the provision in both 
international instruments and domestic legislation. Furthermore, this limb of Article 1F may 
be a preferable ground of exclusion for the Home Office as it is not temporally or 
geographically limited in the same manner as Article 1F(b). The Home Office has therefore 
relied upon Article 1F(c) in a number of cases to revoke refugee status. Another reason 
Article 1F(c) might be a preferable ground for excluding terrorists is that, unlike Article 
1F(b), the provision does not require that a specific crime have been committed. Rather, it is 
sufficient that an individual significantly contributed to the terrorist purposes of an 
organisation. Article 1F(c) has therefore been applied in a number of cases to members of 
organisations considered to be ‘terrorist’ in character. Indeed, although Article 1F(b) was the 
limb of Article 1F traditionally relied on to exclude terrorists from refugee status, this 
provision appears to now be very rarely applied in the UK.  
Overall, although the responses provided by judicial participants were mixed, it may 
be concluded that there has been an increase in the use of Article 1F in the UK in the last two 
decades. This includes an increase in the number of Article 1F cases concerning suspected 
terrorists. The main factor which seems to have contributed to the increased application of 
Article 1F in the UK is the establishment of specialised units within the Home Office and the 
resources dedicated to this issue. However, it must be stressed that in practice the use of the 
provision has remained exceptional. The number of cases in which the Home Office has 
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excluded individuals from refugee status for committing terrorist acts remains infrequent, and 





Chapter Seven: The Exclusion Process 
 
The 1951 Convention does not set out procedures for the determination of refugee status, nor 
the process by which an individual may be considered for exclusion from refugee status 
under Article 1F. It is therefore left to contracting states to establish appropriate procedures in 
this respect.
615
 However, in accordance with the Vienna rules, states must apply the 1951 
Convention in good faith.
616
 The UNHCR and other commentators have therefore distilled a 
number of procedural requirements from international human rights law instruments, which it 
is recommended be applied to refugee status determination process to ensure fair and 
efficient procedures.
617
 In the UK, the majority of procedural issues which would affect a fair 
hearing in the immigration appeal tribunals are covered in the Tribunal’s procedure rules.
618
 
The UK is also party to the EU’s Procedures Directive, which forms part of the EU’s 
Common European Asylum System by setting down minimum standards on procedures for 
refugee status determination in Member States.
619
 However, an examination of the entire span 
of refugee status determination procedures and processes in the UK is beyond the scope of 
this chapter, which rather focuses specifically on the procedures and processes by which an 
individual is considered for exclusion from refugee status under Article 1F. 
 Part 1 of this chapter therefore focuses on the process by which an Article 1F decision 
is made within the Home Office, and the evidence relied upon to support such a decision. In 
Part 2, the practical and legal consequences of an Article 1F decision on an excluded 
individual are explored, while in Part 3 the treatment of evidence and the legal issues 
involved in Article 1F cases before the immigration tribunal and the Special Immigration 
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Appeals Commission (SIAC) are examined. Again, a large part of this research is drawn from 
the interviews conducted and cases analysed as part of this research.  
1. The Exclusion Decision 
1.1. The Referral Process 
When an individual applies for asylum in the UK, their application is considered by a Home 
Office caseworker, who will interview them and assess their claim for protection. Decision 
makers are instructed to consider both whether an applicant has a well-founded fear of 
persecution so as to qualify as a refugee under the 1951 Convention, and then whether the 
applicant falls to be excluded by virtue of Article 1F.
620
 If an issue of Article 1F criminality 
arises, the case is referred to the Special Cases Unit (SCU). Around 80% of the cases referred 
to the SCU fall under Article 1F(a) (war crime; crime against humanity).
621
  
The SCU’s research team provides caseworkers with specialised country profiles 
which are aimed at assisting the identification of applicants who could potentially fall under 
Article 1F. About 60 country profiles have been developed and are updated every six months, 
and include information on organisations that operate in the relevant country, state bodies 
including the military, the general history of the country and other relevant factors.
622
 Article 
1F issues often come to light during the asylum applicant’s interview.  
SCU 1: What we say to caseworkers initially is to err on the side of caution. With a 
1F case basically we would expect anybody who is confessing to either being 
involved in obvious sorts of organisations and armed groups, Taliban whatever it 
might be, or they’re saying they’ve otherwise been involved in a crime, they would be 
expected to be referred to my department.   
A large number of potential Article 1F issues come to light as a result of the asylum 
applicant’s own testimony. A caseworker’s assessment of the credibility of the applicant is 
therefore an important factor in determining whether or not a case raises potential Article 1F 
issues and should be referred to the SCU for further investigation.  
Particularly in the early years of Article 1F screening in the Border Agency, there 
seem to have been a number of cases in which Article 1F was not raised due to caseworkers’ 
negative findings on credibility. Indeed, a number of judicial participants noted that Home 
Office decision-makers often refuse an asylum application on credibility grounds, denying 
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the asylum applicant is fleeing persecution, rather than raise Article 1F, even when it is 
apparent that the case may raise Article 1F criminality issues. 
Judge D: "Instead of saying ‘1F’ they said ‘we don’t believe you’ which is 
another way of the Home Office dealing with the issue is to simply state that the 
applicant is not credible and refuse the application on credibility grounds rather 
than deal with a 1F scenario which might lead to positive credibility findings and 
insufficient evidence for exclusion." 
Judge 28: "…What is more a problem is when the UKBA do not raise [Article 
1F] as they do not think the claim is credible yet if I find for the Appellant Article 
1f or often Article 33(2) should be considered." 
Judge A: "It’s a Home Office view that if they can ‘not believe’ anything, they 
won’t believe it. Which I find, I and colleague judges, land up are more and more 
unhappy with. Particularly when you’re looking at the 1F situations, the degree of 
institutional disbelief that the Home Office present doesn’t actually help their 
case at all, because it sets anyone looking at the situation objectively against the 
Home Office position." 
Judge E: "In First-tier tribunal decisions now you’ll often see asylum dealt with 
first and then they’ll go on to the different lower levels of protection … But then 
it’s very rarely Article 1F there, it’s just ‘I don’t believe you when you say you 
were part of the MDC
623
 and can’t be sent back because you can’t demonstrate 
loyalty to the President’." 
Negative findings on credibility were identified by judicial participants as a major factor 
which contributed to Article 1F not being raised by the Home Office in asylum decisions. An 
individual cannot be excluded from refugee status under Article 1F if they would not 
otherwise qualify for protection due to a well-founded fear of persecution. However, in a 
system in which a large number of asylum applications that are refused on credibility grounds 
go on to appeal, and are ultimately considered credible by an immigration judge, considering 
any potential Article 1F issues at initial decision would increase the efficiency of the asylum 
system and lessen the possibility that undeserving applicants ‘slip through the net’.
624
 Indeed, 
the Border Agency’s Asylum Process Guidance (APG) provides: 
‘If an applicant’s account of his Article 1F-related activities is not credible, those 
findings cannot justify a decision to exclude. But there must also be argument on 
exclusion to ensure that should an Immigration Judge believe the applicant and 
conclude that he is a refugee, consideration is given to exclusion.’
625
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These instructions make clear that even when an asylum applicant’s account is not credible, 
potential Article 1F issues must nevertheless be considered. In this situation, Article 1F could 
be relied upon by the Home Office as a supplementary ground of refusal. The fact that a 
number of participants involved in this research identified credibility as an issue indicates 
that this is possibly an area which should be explored further by the Home Office.  
 There are a number of reasons that caseworkers may opt to refuse an asylum 
application on credibility grounds without thoroughly considering any potential Article 1F 
issues. Firstly, caseworkers are under constant pressure to make decisions on and resolve 
asylum applications quickly. Article 1F cases, however, are extremely time consuming. They 
involve specialised areas of law and investigation by the SCU may take a considerable 
amount of time. Caseworkers may therefore be deterred from referring a potential Article 1F 
case when the faster route may be simply to refuse the asylum application on credibility 
grounds.  
 Secondly, it may be that caseworkers are not familiar with or confident in identifying 
and applying Article 1F to asylum applications that come before them. 
Judge 1: "I worked as an asylum and immigration solicitor prior to becoming a 
judge and found that 1(f) was rarely if ever raised even in cases where I would 
have expected that it would be a factor (eg former Yugoslavia). My conclusion 
was that BA staff were not confident in using this provision to refuse asylum 
applicants." 
Cases that give rise to potential Article 1F issues are extremely rare. However, as shown in 
this chapter, it is crucial that caseworkers are trained in identifying potential Article 1F cases 
and refer these cases to the SCU team for further investigation.  
The importance of considering Article 1F, even as a supplementary ground for 
refusal, is made clear from the histories of the cases analysed as part of this research. In 13% 
of the cases analysed Article 1F was relied upon by the Home Office as a supplementary 
ground of refusal in the initial decision.
626
 These cases include the seminal DD (Afghanistan) 
case that made its way all the way to the Supreme Court, and the SS (Libya) case which was 
heard before the Court of Appeal, both of which resulted in the individuals concerned being 
excluded under Article 1F. Were Article 1F not raised by the Home Office as a 
supplementary ground of refusal, there is no guarantee that in these cases the issue would 
have been spotted by an immigration judge or Home Office Presenting Officer (HOPO) on 
appeal. Early identification and investigation of potential Article 1F issues within the Border 
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Agency is likely to avoid long and protracted appeals in which Article 1F issues have to be 
considered afresh, and also lessens the possibility that those who should be excluded under 
the provision ‘slip through the net’.
627
 
1.2. The collation of evidence  
Cases that are referred to the SCU are considered by their research team which is made up of 
country specialists, experts in conflict, international relations and international criminal 
law.
628
 The SCU receives around 150-200 potential Article 1F referrals per year. Of these, in 
at least 50% of cases there is insufficient evidence to take the case further. In the remaining 
50% of cases further interviews are conducted and research undertaken by the SCU team. 




1.2.1. Testimony of the asylum applicant 
In cases where there is sufficient evidence to pursue the Article 1F issue, further interviews of 
the asylum applicant are conducted by an Interviewing Officer, based on background 
research conducted by the SCU team. In some cases the research officer will be present 
during the interview in order to provide relevant information.
630
 Interviews are obviously a 
key source of evidence on which the Home Office rely in Article 1F cases.  
Judge 15: "Usually the clue has been given by confessional evidence." 
Barrister H: "In a lot of exclusion cases the evidence will be the person’s own 
statements in evidence, in probably the majority in practice of exclusion cases 
that I’ve come across. I’d suggest that in the majority of exclusion cases, and in 
the majority of the reported exclusion cases, the evidence comes from the mouth 
as it were of the person who is at risk of being excluded." 
Judge 14: "Home office are not very good at obtaining evidence to show 
behaviour alleged if matter not admitted by applicant." 
Barrister E: "I think in most cases the evidence that determines exclusion is in 
fact the evidence of the asylum seeker himself rather than positive evidence 
collated by the Home Office. One exception may be the area of war crimes, 
where research is being done and where there is a political commitment to do 
everything to make sure war criminals do not use the UK as a refuge. Certainly in 
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most terrorism-related cases I would have thought, except perhaps for some of the 
most high-profile of cases, a large part of the evidence, if not all the evidence that 
determines exclusion comes from the applicant himself." 
Recent jurisprudence of the Supreme Court has placed a great deal of emphasis on the need 
for an Article 1F decision to be based on the individual facts of each case.
631
 The Border 
Agency’s APG therefore provides that ‘the individual circumstances of the case must be fully 
explored at interview when exclusion is an element to the case.’
632
 A great deal of work 
therefore needs to go into the task of ascertaining the specifics of each situation. 
Barrister G: "If you were applying the Supreme Court judgement [in JS (Sri 
Lanka)] you’ve got to be really on top of that country situation and you need to 
have some specific grip on the facts, and then you probably need quite an adept 
interviewer, you need someone who, it’s not just an issue of the basic questions 
‘tell me your story’, you actually need someone who is able to look and see and 
draw from the interview the requisite information. I think that what the judgment 
[in JS (Sri Lanka)] does is it places a lot more emphasis on that fact finding 
investigation, you’ve got to delve quite deeply into the facts in order to develop a 
case that’s going to be able to withstand scrutiny in the courts. … The UK Border 
Agency has to work a bit harder to justify these cases." 
However, some concerns have been raised over how effectively these interviews are 
conducted. Interviewing Officers may not be specialised in the specificity and type of 
information needed to substantiate an Article 1F refusal. In some cases this may leave room 
for the asylum applicant to later change or modify their account on appeal. 
SCU 1: "There is a probable need to do more at interview stage. We find that 
applicants are likely to be more truthful early on in the process. Once a case gets 
to appeal the applicant’s story could have changed markedly and that is why we 
could do with tightening things up at interview, to reduce their ‘wriggle room’. 
This is something we will be looking at in 2014." 
Ineffective interviewing may also result in unnecessary delays and the need for repeated 
interviews. Solicitor A reported that his client was interviewed over five times on the 
instruction of the War Crimes Unit. In his opinion, it would have been better if the War 
Crimes Unit had conducted the interview directly as this would have saved the need for 
repeated interviews and improved the quality of the refusal letter.
633
 It might therefore be 
recommended that the SCU has a more direct role in the interviewing process in future. 
Concerns have also been raised as to whether asylum applicants are generally 
informed of the purpose of these further interviews. The Border Agency’s Asylum Process 
Guidance clearly states that during interviews ‘[t]he applicant must be given an opportunity 
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to explain their level of involvement in the crime or act and the motivation or reasoning 
behind their actions’, and that the question of whether he has a valid defence must also be 
explored.
634
 However, some legal practitioners cited cases in which their clients had not been 
informed why further interviews were being conducted. Solicitor A, for example, stated that 
neither he nor his client were informed that the purpose of the further interviews was to 
collect evidence to exclude the asylum applicant under Article 1F, even though the interviews 
had been ongoing for over 1 ½ years.
635
 
Barrister B: "In context of their initial decisions, it’s very unsatisfactory if you 
interview someone, you refuse their asylum claim and you then purport to 
exclude them, and you haven’t actually put the suspicions on the allegation to 
them in the course of the interview, to ask for their comment." 
Indeed, this issue was even noted by the tribunal in one of the cases analysed as part of this 
research: 
‘We bear in mind that the record of her asylum interview does not show that she was 
given as full an opportunity as is envisaged in Asylum Policy Instructions to answer 
questions relating to her possible involvement in crimes against humanity.’
636
   
It therefore seems that there are a number of ways in which the interview process within the 
Home Office could be improved. Closer involvement of the SCU team with Interviewing 
Officers has begun, and a need to provide Article 1F interviewers with further training has 
been identified. This will likely greatly improve the quality and efficiency of the interview 
process and help to reduce the need for repeated interviews. Interviewing Officers should also 
be fully aware that the purpose of the interview must be communicated to the asylum 
applicant, so they have a chance to explain and answer any allegations put to them. This 
would not only add a greater degree of fairness to the process, but also hopefully lessen the 
prospect of lengthy appeals in which the asylum applicant has to make further representations 
in order to address the allegations made.   
1.2.2. Other evidence relied upon 
Although the testimony of the asylum applicant is an extremely important source of evidence 
that the SCU team draws on in Article 1F cases, exclusion decisions are very rarely based 
solely on an asylum applicant’s own testimony. 
SCU 1: "Evidence. Yes it could be the person’s testimony but it would never 
solely be the person’s testimony. The context in which they operate is often key 
to the decision and this is also something that some immigration judges overlook 
or don’t understand." 
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Indeed, an asylum applicant may completely deny the criminal allegations made. 
Barrister H: "There are however a number of cases I’ve dealt with where 
evidence doesn’t come from what the person’s said, the person virulently denies 
the evidence which relates to ‘serious reasons for considering’. And then you get 
more interesting issue." 
Particularly in relation to Article 1F(a) and (c) cases, the SCU team ‘rely on absolutely tonnes 
of open sourced reporting’ to corroborate or refute an asylum applicant’s testimony: ‘UN, 




SCU 1: "Any sort of 1F(c) type stuff, 1F(a), is always contextualised. Our Iraqi 
Ba’athist regime evidence runs to about 4 boxes of A4. Tamil Tigers, that’s 
another one with a significant caseload … If it’s a 1F(a) case there’s definitely 
plenty for judges to look at." 
For example, in the MT case, which concerned a former police officer in Zimbabwe, the 
Upper Tribunal was presented with an extensive array of background material. In total 61 
documents were considered, these included oral and written evidence from two expert 
witnesses, reports from the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, Human Rights Watch, 
Amnesty International, the US State Department, Physicians for Human Rights, Freedom 
House Report, the Redress Trust and the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights. 
The list of documents considered can be viewed in Appendix D.
638
 
SCU 1: "Sometimes we can place the person at a particular spot, ‘I was working 
in this prison, this was my role, I wasn’t involved in any abuses’, but we’ll say 
‘well circumstantially you were there for five years, we’ve got these three Human 
Rights Watch reports that say torture was systematic all the time, everybody in 
the town knew about it’, and we would say circumstantially there are serious 
reasons to consider that you at least were part of a joint criminal enterprise of 
that, i.e. you would have known about the abuses and your role would have made 
a significant contribution to them. This doesn’t strike us as a particularly 
outlandish premise." 
A number of legal practitioners interviewed as part of this research seemed overwhelmed by 
the amount of material relied on by the Home Office in Article 1F cases. 
Solicitor A: "I was extremely surprised by the length and depth of the UKBA war 
crimes unit report and the size of the Home Office bundle and the tremendous 
amount of work which had to be done. … The report provided by the UKBA was 
105 pages long, and full of footnotes. The report included 125 factual points." 
Barrister B: "I think in some cases, in one case in particular, we were swimming 
in evidence, between the two sides I think there was around 5000 pages of 
evidence. … I remember getting incredibly long letters explaining why they were 
excluding, with millions of individual allegations." 
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The only exception to the SCU’s extensive reliance on open sourced documents seems to be 
certain types of Article 1F(b) cases which involve the alleged individual commission of 
specific crimes, committed by the asylum applicant as a private actor, rather than as part of a 
State regime or rebel organisation.  
SCU 1: "The only time we might rely just on a person’s confession, and this is 
increasing a little bit, is around 1F(b) stuff. Because 1F(b), sometimes it’s quite hard 
to corroborate that. [*Gives example of a case of revenge killings*] now it’s going to 
be very hard for us to corroborate that happened, but in the context of the country, in 
the context of the fact that this guy has given a broadly credible account." 
The SCU team also rely on a large amount of legal information: ‘a 50 page summary 
document, all up to date case law, international criminal law and domestic law’.
639
 One 
judicial participant in particular found the legal information provided by the Border Agency 
very useful. 
Judge 9: "In one case, UK BA provided a very useful report from a specialised 
body within UK BA, which included references to case law from other 
jurisdictions." 
However, a number of judicial participants and legal practitioners were concerned that the 
evidence relied upon by the Home Office, and allegations made, are often too generalised, 
and based predominantly on circumstantial evidence.  
Barrister B: "They’re often not very accurate in what they mean. They’ll try to 
link conduct associated with a war crime or whatever, yet they don’t really mean 
that, it’s a more a generalised allegation, that you are a member of a movement 
… I think basically what happens is that the Home Office will make these 
allegations, looking in very generous terms, and they don’t actually really test the 
basis of the allegations. … they do quite often make particular allegations, quite 
often based on a very bland, rather speculative reading of the facts, which they 
don’t then properly test." 
Solicitor A stated that although the Border Agency report was over 105 pages long, it was 
very circumstantial and overly general. The basic gist was that if an individual was in a 
certain place at a certain time they were implicated, and there was no real consideration of the 
individual circumstances of the applicant.
640
 For example, the detention centre at which the 
asylum applicant Solicitor A represented had worked at was not mentioned in the report 
relied upon by the Home Office, but the report mentioned other detention centres where 
torture took place. Therefore the Home Office concluded that torture took place in the 
detention centre at which the asylum applicant worked, even though this centre was not 
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specifically cited in the report.
641
 A number of judicial participants also raised concerns 
regarding the nature of evidence relied upon by the Home Office. 
Judge A: "When the Home Office are dealing with senior members of the 
organisation, what they tend to do is cut and paste into the refusal letter news 
broadcasts saying that senior members of x were involved in a particular day with 
this activity, and because that happened and you were in the area, you’re one of 
those. And what the appellant can often establish is either they weren’t there, or 
the news item that’s being used against them is inaccurate." 
Judge 19: "The Home Office is generally loathe to try and prove anything." 
Judge D: "It’s very generalised, that’s the trouble, and that’s why I think they’re 
not successful because the evidence is just not specific enough in the cases I’ve 
had." 
The concerns raised by judicial participants regarding the generality of the evidence relied 
upon by the Home Office in Article 1F cases were put to the SCU team member interviewed 
as part of this research. He pointed out that one of the major problems encountered by his 
team is that immigration judges often do not have an understanding of the regime or 
organisation the asylum applicant is alleged to be a member of, the context of the Article 1F 
allegation. 
SCU 1: "Often an immigration judge has limited conception of the organisation 
that person is a member of, the country they were operating in, the security 
apparatus they were operating in - they’ve got the objective evidence which 
sometimes can be quite voluminous and due to the vagaries of the appeal system 
there is often limited opportunity for judges to read around the topic. My team 
has, for example, looked at over a thousand Iraqi cases where there are indicators 
the applicant has been involved in abuses; we understand about this regime inside 
and out, whereas an immigration judge, with respect, doesn’t, so they find it very 
hard to contextualise who that person is and what they may have done." 
For this reason, the SCU team member thought his team often had greater success with 
Zimbabwean cases, as immigration judges might be more familiar with the context of what 
has been happening in the country. 
SCU 1: "I think Judges think ‘well it’s bad, I know it’s bad, they say bad things 
about Britain, they invaded farms’. I’m being simplistic but you know what I 
mean, they can understand that more easily, they can contextualise it." 
The fact that immigration judges may not have more than a rudimentary understanding of the 
country situation in issue before an Article 1F case comes before them means that the Home 
Office often has a difficult task making out the Article 1F allegation. Another factor pointed 
out by the SCU team member is that often immigration judges are unfamiliar with the nature 
of evidence required in Article 1F cases. 
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SCU 1: "They possibly have a problem with circumstantial evidence, which of 
course can convict you in a criminal court. The fact is just because you’ve only 
got evidence that the Iranian security force wholesale committed these types of 
crimes, and this guy says ‘this was my job, I would get people and drag them out 
of cars’, just because we’ve not been able to say ‘it happened in this town on this 
day and here’s a photo of him doing it’, we would and do still argue there are 
serious reasons for considering that he was involved." 
The SCU team member, and indeed a number of judicial participants themselves, stated that 
immigration judges often want more specific evidence of a particular crime being committed 
at a particular time, rather than circumstantial evidence that the asylum applicant was 
involved in the activities of a particular regime or organisation.
642
 Similarly, the SCU team 
member pointed out that immigration judges often want to see an individual who is 
personally responsible for committing the crime, rather than those who assisted in the 
commission of a crime.  
SCU 1: "One of the things I think judges struggle with is this issue of wanting the 
‘smoking gun’, wanting the kind of ‘we want to see the rapist not the guy who 
caught the woman that detained her in a cell for three days’. For a lot of 
immigration judges that doesn’t seem to compute. Of course from our perspective 
we are driven entirely by international legal information and UK precedents." 
Whilst the Supreme Court has made it clear that an asylum applicant cannot fall to be 
excluded under Article 1F simply for being a member of a brutal organisation, they also made 
clear that, in order to fall under Article 1F, the asylum applicant does not have to personally 
commit an excludable act. Rather, it is sufficient if the individual made a significant 
contribution to the organisation’s criminal purpose.
643
 However, criminal responsibility is an 
extremely complex area of law, and one with which many immigration judges will not be 
immediately familiar. As will be considered in section 3.1, it is therefore unsurprising that 
some confusion arises as to the nature of evidence, involvement or crime required to bring an 
asylum applicant within the scope of Article 1F.  
Although there have been concerns raised regarding the non-specifity of evidence 
relied upon by the Home Office in Article 1F cases, much of this concern may arise from 
unfamiliarity with what is required to bring an individual within the scope of Article 1F. 
Indeed, the SCU team member pointed out that the small number of asylum applicants 
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excluded under Article 1F by the Home Office indicates that there is not an ‘exclusion 
culture’ within the department. 
SCU 1: "But the point is that although we try and be creative with the exclusion 
clauses we don’t try and just exclude people for the sake of it. Certainly in the last 
seven, eight years there’s quite a bit of rigour attached to what we do. There is no 
exclusion culture, which I think your stats bear out really." 
It therefore appears that aside from the testimony of an asylum applicant a large amount of 
evidence is relied upon by the SCU team to support an Article 1F decision. This includes 
international and domestic legal information, and, particularly in cases falling under Article 
1F(a) and (c), a large amount of open sourced material.
644
 Although the SCU team clearly 
draws on a large amount of evidence in formulating Article 1F decisions, and indeed a 
number of legal representatives appeared overwhelmed by the volume of evidence produced 
in Article 1F cases, concerns have been raised regarding the non-specificity of the evidence 
relied upon, in particular that the information is often too generalised and based 
predominantly on circumstantial evidence. However, it seems that much of this concern may 
arise from unfamiliarity with what is required to bring an individual within the scope of 
Article 1F, a point which will be considered further in section 3.1 below. 
 
2. The Consequences of Exclusion 
2.1. The relevance of Article 1F for removal  
An individual who is excluded from refugee status by virtue of Article 1F is denied the rights 
and benefits that attach to a grant of asylum under the 1951 Convention.
645
 Thus individuals 
excluded from refugee status under Article 1F do not benefit from the 1951 Convention’s 
right of non-return to persecution (non-refoulement).
646
 Where possible, the Secretary of 
State will seek to remove an excluded individual from the UK.
647
 However, exclusion from 
the protection of the 1951 Convention (or the EU Qualification Directive) does not mean that 
the individual will cease to benefit from the protections offered by other international 
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instruments, particularly human rights instruments. Importantly, an individual excluded from 
refugee status under Article 1F will still benefit from the protection offered by the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). For example, the individual may allege that their life 
will be at risk (Article 2), they will suffer inhuman or degrading treatment (Article 3), 
unlawful detention (Article 5) or an unfair trial (Article 6) on return. The rights embodied in 
these provisions apply to all individuals within the jurisdiction of the UK whether or not they 
have engaged in criminal conduct.
648
 Although excluded individuals do not benefit from the 
protection against refoulement contained in the 1951 Convention, they will nevertheless 
continue to benefit from the protections of human rights instruments and cannot be removed 
from the UK where to do so would breach the UK’s human rights obligations. 
 Since asylum applicants may be excluded from refugee status under Article 1F despite 
a well-founded fear of persecution in their country of origin, in many cases individuals 
excluded from refugee status can nevertheless not be removed, as to do so would be in breach 
of the UK’s human rights obligations as the individual will be at risk. The practical impact of 
exclusion from refugee status under Article 1F is therefore said to have lost much of its 
significance.  
Judge 19: "Since a person cannot be excluded from human rights protection 
exclusion under 1F is not as important as it might at first seem." 
Barrister C: "The long stop that is now in place of non-extradition or non-
deportation to a country where your human rights will be violated has really 
removed the question of ‘are you a refugee or not’ from the centrality of what is 
at hand. Now that you’ve got your article 3, article 6, article 8 protections, in any 
event from deportation or extradition to a country that will torture you, abuse you, 
expose you to a trial on methods obtained by torture or a grossly or flagrantly 
unfair trial, the Refugee Convention is no longer the only protection you have." 
Judge E: "Well one of the problems is that most regional organisations like the 
European Union have now adopted far-reaching protection measures and so old 
fashioned asylum is now less important than it used to be. And also the deal that 
was done between the States when they negotiated the Refugee Convention and 
the Protocol was that you could put yourself outside protection by particularly 
bad behaviour of one type or another, but the [European] Convention won’t have 
that, however badly you behave you can’t put yourself outside certain categories 
of protection. … I think Article 1F basically is now a bit of a backwater." 
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Barrister H: "In effect exclusion is meaningful only for a person who is otherwise 
going to be protected. If you’re excluded from the inner sanctum of the refugee 
protection but you’re not entitled to protection in the first place then it doesn’t 
really make all that much difference anyway does it?" 
Since many individuals excluded from refugee status under Article 1F cannot (at least 
immediately) be removed from the UK, it is not overly clear what the benefits of excluding 
individuals under Article 1F are for the Home Office.  
Indeed, a number of participants that took part in this research suggested that the 
Home Office raising an Article 1F issue based on an asylum applicant’s own evidence may in 
some cases support the applicant’s credibility and thus claim to protection. Furthermore, it 
was pointed out that if the Home Office argues that the asylum applicant has committed a 
serious crime or been a member of a prominent organisation in their country of origin this 
will often bolster their claim to protection. A number of participants therefore questioned 
why in practice the Home Office would wish to raise an Article 1F point at all.  
Judge 20: "As I see it (and from the occasional 1F cases that I have done), it 
rarely makes sense for the Home Office to raise Article 1F. When they do so, the 
Home Office are arguing on the one hand that the appellant has (for example) 
committed some atrocity / crime against humanity in his / her home country. But 
arguing on the other hand that there is no real risk of someone doing serious harm 
to the appellant if he / she returns to his / her home country." 
Judge D: "An allegation of Article 1F by the Home office can also be seen as an  
admission by the Home Office that the Appellant is at least partially credible 
rather than a complete dismissal of his claim and the focus is then not primarily 
on credibility." 
Barrister B: "One case [I was involved in] didn’t in fact go ahead in the end. [The 
Home Office] withdrew ahead of a four day hearing, because I think they 
recognised they weren’t going to win on risk on return. And in a sense pushing 
the exclusion didn’t make a great deal of sense to them really, as they knew they 
were going to lose on risk. They were perfectly entitled to maintain the exclusion, 
not have it maintained in court, and grant limited transit of leave, which is what 
they did. So in some cases it’s almost counter-intuitive to push it at times." 
However, the SCU team member interviewed as part of this research pointed out that there is 
in fact no disincentive for the Home Office to apply Article 1F to those that fall within its 
scope, as applying the provision has minimal bearing on whether or not the individual can be 
removed from the country.  
SCU 1: "Article 1F is a key part of the Refugee Convention, it is also extremely 
important to government policy and wider European policy. The individual’s 
returnability is immaterial to its application. If we didn’t apply it then we could 
effectively be waving perpetrators of extremely serious crimes through to British 
Citizenship, which is both politically and morally unacceptable." 
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Once an individual is referred to the SCU team, the practice seems to be that, whether or not 
an asylum applicant can be removed from the UK, any potential Article 1F issues are pursued 
and applied.  
SCU 1: "Has there been any pressure around whether we should just refuse this 
person on credibility grounds? We know they’re a war criminal but we’ll just 
refuse them and say ‘you can go back’. No that doesn’t happen and, to be frank, 
in the majority of cases would not make someone more ‘returnable’." 
It therefore seems that the Home Office will pursue exclusion under Article 1F whether or 
not the asylum applicant can be removed from the UK. In the case of an applicant whose 
asylum claim is refused as they are not considered to have a well-founded fear of persecution, 
and can therefore be removed, Article 1F is often relied upon by the Home Office as a 
supplementary ground of refusal. This practice ensures full consideration of any potential 
Article 1F issues at initial decision and thus avoids the possibility of long and protracted 
appeals in which Article 1F issues have to be considered afresh if, on appeal, an immigration 
judge determines the applicant would in fact face risk on return. The practice also avoids the 
possibility that those who should be excluded under the provision ‘slip through the net’ at the 
appeal stage. Furthermore, although the application of Article 1F to those who would face 
risk on return no longer means they can be removed from the UK, exclusion under Article 1F 
does indeed have serious practical consequences for those who remain in the UK, as will be 
considered below. 
2.2. Excluded individuals in the UK 
Even if a failed asylum applicant cannot be removed from the UK, exclusion under Article 1F 
has serious practical consequences for individuals that remain. They are denied many of the 
social and economic rights that attach to a grant of asylum. Excluded individuals are also 
denied the identity papers and travel documents refugees are entitled to on recognition of 
their status. As of September 2011, individuals who are excluded from refugee status by 
virtue of Article 1F, but cannot be removed from the country due to the UK’s human rights 
obligations, are subject to a Restricted Leave policy.
649
 In contrast to the five years leave 
                                                          
649
 UK Border Agency, Asylum Casework Instruction ‘Interim Asylum Instruction: Restricted Leave’ (2012), 
<http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/sitecontent/documents/policyandlaw/asylumprocessguidance/considering
anddecidingtheclaim/guidance/restricted-leave-article-1f-pdf?view=Binary> accessed 12 December 2013. This 
policy of Restricted Leave replaced the previous policy of granting six months Discretionary Leave, which did 
not include the restrictions and conditions which now attach to Restricted Leave. This policy of restricted leave 
resembles the ‘special immigration status’ set out in sections 130-137 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration 
Act 2008, which was the government’s response to defeat in the High Court and Court of Appeal over the 
longstanding failure and ultimate refusal of the Home Office to grant discretionary leave to a group of Afghan 
national who hijacked an aircraft to travel to the UK. However, this section of the 2008 Act has not come into 
226 
 
granted to those recognised as refugees, the Restricted Leave policy grants an individual 
leave to remain in the UK for a maximum of six months at a time. A number of restrictions 
may be attached to this form of leave, including restrictions on employment; residence; 
education and a requirement that the individual report to an immigration officer at regular 
intervals. The grant of leave is reviewed prior to the six month expiration date, and if the 
person can still not be deported, leave is renewed. As explained in the Casework Instruction: 
‘The policy imposes a short period of leave and appropriate conditions while removal 
options continue to be pursued. Persons excluded from refugee protection (and from 
Humanitarian Protection) continue to be a priority for removal even where removal 
cannot currently be enforced. Such cases will remain under close review by UK 
Border Agency and will be removed at the earliest opportunity. These reviews will be 




Exclusion under Article 1F does therefore have serious practical consequences for individuals 
that cannot be deported from the UK in terms of family reunification, employment and the 
ability to travel, and may include a number of the restrictions cited above. Furthermore, this 
form of leave is extremely precarious, and is frequently reviewed with an eye to removing the 
individual from the UK at the earliest possibility.    
SCU 1: "We can prevent people from settling here, we can prevent them from 
having their families come over … we also have to bear in mind the system as a 
whole: if we don’t exclude someone at the earliest juncture the likelihood is that 
they will still stay here. The whole picture is that if we don’t exclude there’s a 
very good chance that person could end up being a British citizen." 
Barrister B: "If you’re left without leave or a period of short leave, then this has 
all sorts of implications in terms of your ability to be reunited with your family, to 
get employment, because no employer’s going to look at you if you only have six 
months leave." 
Barrister H: "In terms of the leave people get, of course it’s an enormous issue. If 
you succeed in showing that you are at risk of sufficiently bad harm if you’re 
removed from the country then the difference between being excluded and not 
being excluded is enormous, because if you’re not excluded then you’ll either get 
refugee status or humanitarian protection, and that’s a relatively safe status to 
have, you normally get 5 years leave and then an application for indefinite leave. 
If you’re excluded from the Refugee Convention for 1F reasons you’ll 
automatically be excluded from humanitarian protection as well … and you’ll get 
this six months excluded leave status which is a very unhappy status for people. 
You have all sorts of restrictions put on you and you can’t leave the country. So 
yes it has enormous consequences. And then there’s all these types of new 
restrictions where they restrict your right to work, and the rest of it, which is 
potentially very damaging … It’s been made very clear, and increasingly clear 
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over the years, you’re a very unwelcome guest in this country, tolerated but not 
wanted, tolerated for the time being. Plus of course it means your status vis a vis 
protection is extremely vulnerable, it is reviewed, you need to reapply every six 
months and it gets reviewed, with a hostile eye." 
Although Article 1F may be said to have lost much of its raison d’etre, exclusion from 
refugee status clearly does still have a large amount of practical significance for individuals 
that remain in the UK. There are of course a number of other reasons the Home Office would 
wish to exclude individuals from refugee status under Article 1F, even if exclusion means 
they cannot be immediately removed from the country.  
Firstly, the purpose of Article 1F must be borne in mind. As explained in the Border 
Agency’s APG: ‘Article 1F is … intended to protect the integrity of the asylum process from 
abuse.’
651
 As a matter of international policy, excluding suspected criminals from refugee 
status under Article 1F promotes the integrity of the international refugee protection regime 
by ensuring undeserving individuals do not claim the protection of the 1951 Convention. 
Furthermore, application of the provision ensures that such persons do not misuse the 
institution of asylum to evade legitimate prosecution. 
SCU 1: "And also of course there are links to helping other jurisdictions, international 
tribunals etc. If a country like the UK wasn’t active in the Article 1F field it would be 
a dereliction of duty … The exclusion clause is mandatory. We are required to apply 
them, that’s what international and our own law says." 
Ultimately, however, it seems that the greatest benefit to the Home Office in excluding 
individuals from refugee status under Article 1F is that it leaves the door open to future 
removal, and prevents the excluded individual from establishing firmer ties to the UK that 
may result in their permanent settlement.
652
 In the year 2012, 35 individuals were granted 
restricted leave in the UK.
653
 
2.3. The right to appeal 
Exclusion from refugee status under Article 1F also has repercussions in terms of an 
individual’s right to appeal against such a decision. An asylum applicant excluded from 
refugee status under Article 1F who cannot be removed from the UK on human rights 
grounds may appeal against the Secretary of State’s decision. However, the right to appeal 
the Secretary of State’s refusal of an asylum claim is limited to those who have been granted 
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leave to enter or remain in the UK for a period exceeding one year.
654
 An individual excluded 
under Article 1F and granted Restricted Leave for a period of six months will therefore have 
to have this form of leave renewed twice before they have leave to appeal to the tribunal. This 
process takes a considerable period of time and meanwhile leaves the individual in a 
precarious legal position. For this reason a number of challenges to Article 1F decisions are 
brought under judicial review. 
Barrister B: "Under Home Office policy, if you’re granted refugee status, you get 5 
years. If you get excluded, they will only give you 6 months at a time. And if they 
give you 6 months at the outset, then you can’t appeal that. Once you get to 12 
months, you can appeal, and at that point you can test the allegations. Otherwise you 
have to go on judicial review. And in something like exclusion allegations judicial 
review is pretty hopeless really, because you need a full review merits hearing, live 
evidence, all the things you need under judicial review." 
The type of leave granted to those excluded under Article 1F therefore seriously impacts the 
possibility of appealing such a decision. Furthermore, the often voiced concerns
655
 regarding 
the difficulty of asylum seekers to access adequate legal representation is even more acute in 
Article 1F cases, since the legal and factual issues raised are extremely complex and 
unfamiliar to many legal practitioners. 
Barrister A: "And it’s a real concern, especially where a lot of people don’t get proper 
representation, or any representation. How on earth are you expected to navigate your 
way through the finer points of Article 1F(c) without the help of a legal team? It 
would be impossible doing it by yourself, it would be pretty bad if you only had a 
high street solicitor with no expertise in refugee law. And it also wouldn’t be great if 
you had a mediocre barrister, or simply not enough hours. The cases will show you 
how complex this area of law is." 
Exclusion from refugee status under Article 1F therefore impacts the right to appeal against a 
refused asylum application, a problem that may be exacerbated by the complex legal and 
factual issues that surround Article 1F decisions which may not be familiar to many legal 
representatives. 
Overall, exclusion from refugee status under Article 1F does therefore have serious 
legal and practical consequences for individuals. An exclusion decision limits the type of 
leave an individual may be granted to a six months renewable form of leave, which may 
include restrictions on employment; residence; education and a requirement that the 
individual report to an immigration officer at regular intervals. Excluded individuals will 
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furthermore not benefit from many of the social and economic rights that attach to a grant of 
asylum, and will have their grant of leave reviewed with an eye towards removal every six 
months. Excluding an individual from refugee status under Article 1F ultimately leaves the 
door open to future removal and prevents the excluded individual from establishing firmer 
ties to the UK that may result in their permanent settlement. It is therefore essential that these 
decisions are reviewed robustly at the appeal stage, which is the topic of the next section. 
 
3. The Appeal 
As noted in Chapter 6, Article 1F issues may be raised at an appeal against the Secretary of 
State’s refusal of an asylum claim where the Secretary of State relies on Article 1F as either 
the primary or as a supplementary ground for refusing the asylum application in the initial 
decision, or where Article 1F is raised by an immigration judge or Home Office Presenting 
Officer during the course of the hearing. Appeals lie in the first instance to the First-tier 
tribunal, which involves a full re-hearing of the case during which the asylum applicant is 
likely to make further representations and be cross examined. Appeals to the Upper Tribunal 
are on the ground of error of law only. 
 If the Home Office’s initial decision was wholly or partly taken in reliance on 
information which should not be made public in the interests of national security, the 
relationship between the UK and another country, or otherwise in the public interest, the 
Secretary of State may certify the appeal under s.97 of the Nationality, Immigration and 
Asylum Act of 2002. In these cases appeal lies to the Special Immigration Appeals 
Commission (SIAC) rather than the tribunal. In this section appeals before the tribunal and 
before the SIAC will be considered in turn. 
3.1. Appeal to the tribunal 
The procedures of Article 1F hearings before the tribunal do not differ substantially from 
other asylum appeals. The main exception is where the Secretary of State has certified the 
case under s.55 of the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006 that Article 1F or 33(2) 
of the 1951 Convention apply to the asylum applicant. In these cases, an immigration judge 
must begin by considering whether the certificate it made out and, if so, dismiss the rest of 
the asylum claim, although any human rights considerations raised in the appeal will still 
have to be taken into account. 
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This practice of considering exclusion before inclusion does not appear to be contrary 
to the 1951 Convention as a matter of law. However, the UNHCR Guidelines advise that, 
‘given the possible serious consequences of exclusion, it is important to apply [the exclusion 
clauses] with great caution and only after a full assessment of the individual circumstances of 
the case.’
656
 States do not appear to be under a legal duty to consider the claim for protection 
before consideration of exclusion.
657
 However, in order to ensure fair procedure in the 
application of Article 1F it is likely that the context in which the crime is alleged to have 
occurred, the surrounding circumstances, and the treatment an individual is likely to face on 
return will need to be examined.
658
 The UNHCR therefore advises that a ‘holistic approach 
facilitates full assessment of the factual and legal issues of the case and is necessary in 
exclusion cases, which are often complex’.
659
 It seems that, in practice, immigration judges 
prefer to consider the case as a whole, an approach which appears to be in line with the 
guidance provided by the UNHCR. 
Judge B: "By statute you’ve got to look at whether the certificate is made out or not, 
so you’re essentially required to look at the exclusion issue first although I think in 
practice we, for want of another word we look at it holistically, because I think it’s 
broadly accepted that you can’t decide an exclusion issue in isolation from the 
account, from the narrative of the asylum seeker, but you know that’s actually what 
our jurisdiction demands that we make a decision on the certificate." 
The need to adopt an holistic approach to Article 1F cases was indeed stressed by the tribunal 
in the seminal Gurung decision: 
‘The place of the Exclusion Clauses in the overall schema of the Convention also 
demonstrates that exclusion issues should never be examined in complete isolation 
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Another way in which Article 1F appeals differs from other asylum appeals is that the burden 
of proof rests on the Secretary of State, as is noted by the Home Office’s APG.
661
 
Judge B: "In the context of the remaking of the decision there may be issues 
about the Secretary of State being expected to go first because of the evidential 
burden." 
Furthermore, s.34 of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 explicitly precludes an 
immigration judge from balancing or considering the proportionality of the extent of 
persecution feared by an asylum applicant against the gravity of the Article 1F crime or act 
alleged to have been committed.
662
 Indeed, the notion that any balancing exercise should be 
adopted in deciding Article 1F cases has been robustly and repeatedly refuted by courts and 
tribunals in the UK.
663
 Again, although there is no legal duty on states to balance the 
persecution feared by an asylum applicant against the crime or act they have allegedly 
committed, the UNHCR advises this practice ‘is an important safeguard in the application of 
Article 1F’, derived from ‘the nature and rationale of the exclusion clauses and the overriding 
humanitarian object and purpose of the 1951 Convention’.
664
 It might therefore be advised 
that a proportionate or balancing approach be adopted when determining Article 1F cases, 
although the apparent tendency of immigration judges to consider cases ‘holistically’ might, 
in practice, mitigate the preclusion of such considerations set out in UK legislation. It must 
also be remembered that any risk an asylum applicant would face on return will be 
considered in the context of whether the applicant’s removal from the UK would breach the 
UK’s human rights obligations.
665
 
 The main ways the procedures of Article 1F hearings before the tribunal differ from 
other asylum appeals is that the burden of proof rests on the Secretary of State to make out 
the exclusion decision, and UK legislation directs a decision maker to consider exclusion 
before inclusion and precludes a balancing test be adopted in relation to the extent of 
persecution feared by an asylum applicant on return. However, in practice it appears that 
immigration judges tend to consider Article 1F cases holistically, an approach which accords 
with UNHCR guidance on the topic. Another manner in which Article 1F hearings differ 
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from other asylum appeals relates to the standard of proof employed in such cases, which will 
be considered further in section 3.1.3. 
3.1.1. The legal issues 
At the appeal hearing, the Home Office is represented by a Home Office Presenting Officer 
(HOPO), or for some significant cases the Home Office instructs a barrister from the 
Treasury Solicitor's Department to conduct the case. Some concerns were raised by 
participants in this research regarding the familiarity of HOPOs with Article 1F issues. In 
light of the complex legal and factual issues that Article 1F cases frequently raise, the amount 
of time HOPOs have to prepare cases was also highlighted as an issue of concern. 
Judge 6: "HOPOs seem to have limited knowledge of the issue. When I have 
occasionally raised the issue at review hearings I am always told they will need to 
take advice." 
SCU 1: "Unfortunately due to the appeals system in general, it is often the case 
that a PO will have virtually no time to prepare for a 1F hearing." 
Article 1F cases are extremely specialised and involve complex areas of law, and the 
provision is raised in an extremely small number of cases. It is therefore unsurprising that 
HOPOs may not be overly familiar or confident in dealing with the provision. Indeed, a 
number of immigration judges themselves expressed frustration over the lack of experience 
they had in the complex legal issues involved in Article 1F cases. 
Judge B: "Our problem is that we don’t do enough cases to become expert in it 
[Article 1F] in any distinct way. So when we get one we have to sort of do our 
best, which is a bit frustrating because you make the effort to get to grips with the 
case law and you may not deal with it for another 3, 6 months." 
Judge 9: "I found the issued raised in these appeals very complex. Especially as 
there was no evidence of any direct involvement with the offences." 
These concerns were echoed by other participants interviewed as part of this research. 
Barrister E: "I think one of the difficulties judges find with 1F(a) which is shown 
clearly by the way the Court of Appeal dealt with JS, is that concepts like joint 
criminal enterprise in international criminal law is something judges find 
difficult, our Court of Appeal found difficult, I think our Supreme Court found 
difficult. …. [This] can lead to a greater divergence of practice it seems to me and 
understanding, and therefore a greater need for clear guidance by the higher 
courts, and consequently cases lasting longer and even the higher courts being 
inconsistent 
SCU 1: I think immigration judges struggle with international criminal law, 
circumstantial evidence and criminal responsibility … Why would a family 
lawyer in Scotland, sitting as a part time immigration judge, understand issues 
such as customary international law?" 
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However, it was stressed by the SCU team member interviewed that this was not a criticism 
of the judges, but simply a consequence of the complex areas of law at issue and the fact that 
Article 1F cases are allotted a similar timescale to other immigration appeals which do not 
raise such complex areas of law. He suggested that more time and consideration should be 
given by immigration judges to these cases at the appeals stage. 
SCU 1: "But that isn’t a significant criticism of the judges, that’s more about 
CMRs [Case Management Reviews], directions hearings, shouldn’t they be 
asking for reading time, shouldn’t judges have an opportunity to read over the 
reports, come up with questions they might want to ask, direct the Secretary of 
State or the other side to come back on x, y and z and potentially run the cases in 
a more effective way?" 
The SCU team member stated that the unfamiliarity of many immigration judges with the 
legal concepts involved meant that it was sometimes difficult for his team to succeed in 
Article 1F cases. 
SCU 1: "I think there’s quite a complexity of issues involved in the question of ‘can 
we convince that judge’. It’s quite difficult to convince someone of something if 
they’re starting from a position of ignorance of the law and the contextual issues."  
However, it does seem that recent clarification of the law by the Supreme Court has helped 
provide immigration judges with guidance on how to approach Article 1F decisions. This 
guidance seems to have had an impact on how the judiciary approach the provision in the 
tribunal. 
SCU 1: "Article 1F for judges can be difficult, but one thing I would say is that since 
about 2010 you can almost, if we say JS (Sri Lanka) is a watershed, I think since then 
the law has been getting clearer … I think since JS the law has just settled down a 
little bit and judges understand it more." 
Judge B: "I think now we probably consider that the law is settled, particularly after 
Al-Sirri clarifying 1F(c)." 
Indeed, the clarity provided by higher courts appears to have impacted the number of cases 
that are successful before the tribunal. The SCU team member interviewed as part of this 
research indicated that until a few years ago it may have been the case that Article 1F cases 
tended to fail more often than not before the tribunal.  
SCU 1: "Anecdotally, I would say that up until probably 08 09, we’ve been going 
since about 2004, we saw more allowed appeals, however this has changed since 
around 2010." 
However, since the Supreme Court decided the JS (Sri Lanka) case in 2010, his opinion was 
that ‘since then the law has been getting clearer … the law has just settled down a little bit 
and judges understand it a bit more’. In consequence, ‘the number of allowed appeals we’ve 
seen at the First-tier in the last couple of years has really reduced, so that suggests that we 
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aren’t losing that many … since about 2010 we’ve had less allowed appeals so we seem to be 




 The responses of judicial participants regarding the success of Article 1F cases before 
the tribunal were mixed: 
Judge A: "I certainly have never accepted one myself, and I’m not aware other 
colleges have ever actually conceded to (a) (b) or (c)." 
Judge 18: "If raised, it invariably succeeds, perhaps because it is raised so 
infrequently in this country." 
Judge D: "To my knowledge none of the cases that I’ve seen or I’ve heard or 
been involved in have [the Home Office] been successful." 
Judge 28: "Very small size therefore statistical basis is not reliable but I would 
say Home Office only raise it where it is at least arguable and therefore in public 
interest it is raised." 
A major factor highlighted by a number of participants that took part in this research is that 
problems often emerge at the appeal stage due to the unfamiliarity of both HOPOs and 
immigration judges with the legal issues raised by Article 1F cases. Again, it must be stressed 
that this is not a criticism of those involved in the appeal process, but rather a natural 
consequence of the infrequency of Article 1F cases and the complex legal issues involved. 
However, it does seem that recent clarification of the law by the appellate courts has helped 
provide further guidance on how to approach Article 1F decisions, and as a result there has 
been a greater success rate for the Home Office before the tribunal. 
3.1.2. The evidential issues 
The unfamiliarity of immigration judges with Article 1F cases also seems to have influenced 
their treatment of the evidence upon which Home Office exclusion decisions are based. In 
section 1.2 a number of these issues were considered. In particular, the SCU team member 
interviewed as part of this research noted that some of the main problems his team 
encountered when cases went to appeal were: 
- Often immigration judges have a limited conception of the country situation and the 
regime the asylum applicant is alleged to be part of, and so they find it difficult to 
contextualise the case. 
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- Many judges do not seem to understand the legal relevance of circumstantial 
evidence, and rather prefer to be presented with evidence of a specific act occurring at 
a particular place and time 
- Often judges want a ‘smoking gun’, an individual that physically perpetrated a crime 
rather than someone who assisted or furthered the commission of a criminal purpose.  
Again it must be stressed that this is not a criticism of the judges involved, but simply a 
consequence of the complex areas of law and evidence at issue, and the fact that Article 1F 
cases are allotted a similar timescale to other immigration appeals which do not raise such 
complex issues.  
Another manner in which the SCU team member considered Article 1F cases 
sometimes struggled at appeal relates to the testimony of the asylum applicant. As noted 
above, in Article 1F cases an asylum applicant’s testimony is often relied upon as evidence of 
their involvement with the commission of an excludable act. However, the interview process 
within the Border Agency often results in the applicant having a degree of flexibility to 
change their story on appeal. The SCU team member conceded that this was often related to 
the way in which interviews are conducted within the Home Office.  
SCU 1: "Basically interviewing a suspected criminal, even when applying a 
relatively low standard of proof, requires different skills from those needed to 
establish if they have a well-founded fear of persecution." 
Often on appeal asylum seekers revise or change their account of involvement in Article 1F 
acts. There are a number of reasons that asylum applicant’s might present different accounts 
of their involvement with certain regimes and organisations on appeal than during initial 
interviews by the Home Office. During the initial asylum claim applicants might think that 
saying they were a senior member of a particular organisation or military force that was, for 
example, engaged in military activity against a government, might bolster their claim to 
protection as it would more likely establish that they would be at risk on return. However, by 
the appeal stage the asylum applicant might realise the potential Article 1F repercussions of 
claiming such involvement, and change their story accordingly. 
SCU 1: "Do people think that giving information about being involved in heinous 
crimes, in torture or whatever it might be, do they think that will help them with their 
claim? I think some people do." 
The SCU team member interviewed as part of this research highlighted that many 
immigration judges are often very credulous of asylum applicants when they change their 
testimony on appeal. 
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SCU 1: "Applicants change their stories often, and I would argue that judges are 
often a little bit too credulous, a little bit too quick to accept an evidential volte 
face." 
In addition to the treatment of open-sourced evidence, examined in section 1.2.2, a key issue 
raised by participants that took part in this research regarding evidential issues on appeal 
concerned the testimony of the asylum applicant. As highlighted in section 1.2.1, one way in 
which this process could be improved is training for SCU interviewing officers specialised in 
handling potential Article 1F cases. This would help improve the quality of initial decisions 
and furthermore lessen the possibility of asylum applicants continuously changing their 
stories on appeal. In common with immigration judges’ unfamiliarity with the legal issues 
involved in Article 1F cases appears to be their unfamiliarity with how to treat the evidence 
relied upon by the Home Office in Article 1F decisions. Again it is suggested that greater 
time could be allotted to cases that raise Article 1F issues, to enable those involved to fully 
consider the complex legal and evidential issues involved. A related legal issue which 
impacts on the treatment of Article 1F cases on appeal is the standard of proof to be 
employed in such cases, as considered below. 
3.1.3. The standard of proof 
An issue related to the treatment of evidence before the tribunal is the standard of proof 
employed in Article 1F cases. Article 1F of the 1951 Convention requires that there be 
‘serious reasons for considering’ an individual has committed or been guilty of the acts 
referred to in the provision.
667
 The meaning of the phrase ‘serious reasons for considering’ 
has attracted some measure of uncertainty, as it does not easily accord with the traditional 
standards of proof employed by courts and tribunals in the UK.  
The standard of proof imposed on Article 1F cases by the phrase ‘serious reasons for 
considering’ is unique and unknown in other areas of law. There seems to be widespread 
agreement that this standard of proof does not require an individual to have been criminally 
prosecuted for the offence in question, nor that the standard of proof equate to that required to 
justify a finding of guilt at a criminal trial: in the UK, ‘proof beyond reasonable doubt’.
668
 
However below the standard of criminal guilt it is not clear what the standard of proof 
required by the phrase ‘serious reasons for considering’ entails. The UNHCR has suggested 
that the Article 1F standard of proof should be high enough to ensure that bona fide refugees 
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are not excluded erroneously, and hence ‘balance of probabilities is too low a threshold.
669
 
The Lisbon Expert Roundtable suggested that, as a minimum, ‘serious reasons’ should be 
interpreted to mean ‘clear evidence sufficient to indict’.
670
 
 Canadian jurisprudence has long held that that ‘serious reasons’ requires more than 
mere suspicion of guilt, but less than the balance of probabilities.
671
 That this standard of 
proof is lower than the balance of probabilities test has been followed in other 
Commonwealth jurisdictions, including Australia and New Zealand.
672
 However, 
jurisprudence in the UK has stressed that, rather than attempting to equate the standard of 
proof with that employed in criminal or civil cases, the better approach is to focus on the 
ordinary meaning of the words. Thus the Court of Appeal in Al-Sirri stressed that the phrase 
serious reasons for considering ‘sets a standard above mere suspicion.  Beyond this, it is a 
mistake to try to paraphrase the straightforward language of the Convention: it has to be 
treated as meaning what it says.’
673
 This approach was approved by the UK Supreme Court in 
JS (Sri Lanka), and followed by the New Zealand Supreme Court in Tamil X.
674
 
More recently, the UK Supreme Court recently considered the meaning of the phrase 
‘serious reasons for considering’ in the Al-Sirri case, and appeared to follow the approach of 
the Court of Appeal in focusing on the ordinary meaning of the words as the Court noted that 
‘it is unnecessary to import our domestic standards of proof into the question’ and ‘the task of 
the decision-maker is to apply the words of the Convention’. However, the Supreme Court 
went on to suggest that:  
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‘The reality is that there are unlikely to be sufficiently serious reasons for considering 
the applicant to be guilty unless the decision-maker can be satisfied in the balance of 
probabilities that he is.’
675
 
The Supreme Court in this case therefore appears advocate the balance of probabilities test in 
Article 1F cases. This is despite also stressing that the task of a decision maker is to ‘apply 
the words of the Convention’. As the Court’s statements on the standard of proof in the Al-
Sirri case were obiter, it is not clear whether and how it will be followed by the tribunal. 
However, the Court of Appeal recently interpreted the Supreme Court’s guidance to mean 
that ‘It is for the Secretary of State to prove on the balance of probabilities that an individual 
should be excluded’.
676
 It is therefore likely that the balance of probabilities test will be the 
standard of proof adopted by the tribunal in future Article 1F cases. Indeed, at least one 
immigration judge interviewed as part of this research appears to have been employing the 
balance of probabilities as the standard of proof in Article 1F cases, even before the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Al-Sirri. 
Judge A: "I use the balance of probabilities test: ‘is it more likely than not that 
what I’ve been told by the appellant is correct, when I weigh that against the 
Home Office assertion?’ You can skew the result by doing it the other way round. 
You can start off with view that the Home Office operates a credible set of 
assertions, and it’s for the appellant to knock these down. I don’t do it that way 
because I think the burden of proof is on the Home Office." 
The Supreme Court’s statements on the standard of proof in the Al-Sirri case weren’t well 
received by the SCU team member interviewed as part of this research. He argued that the 
Supreme Court’s judgement isn’t in line with accepted Commonwealth jurisprudence on the 
interpretation of the phrase, and furthermore is not suitable in the Article 1F context, since 
exclusion from refugee status is different in nature and consequences from a criminal trial. 
SCU 1: "For a start, and Al-Sirri hasn’t really helped this very much, they 
basically said they would expect serious reasons for considering to mean balance 
of probabilities in reality, which is quite unhelpful because linguistically the two 
phrases clearly mean something very different. I prefer to follow JS and apply the 
natural meaning of the phrase. ‘Serious reasons for considering’ is no more the 
civil standard than the civil is the criminal. Simply the three standards mean 
entirely different things." 
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Despite these reservations, it seems that the balance of probabilities is the standard of proof 
that is likely to be employed by the tribunal in future Article 1F cases.  
3.2. Appeal to the SIAC 
Exclusion decisions wholly or partly taken in reliance on information which should not be 
made public in the interests of national security are certified by the Secretary of State under 
s.97 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. In these cases appeal lies to the 
Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC) rather than the tribunal. The sources relied 
upon in this research indicate that only a small number of cases that come before the SIAC 
involve Article 1F issues. This is because the majority of cases that come before the SIAC 
concern appeals against decisions to deport or exclude individuals from the UK or revoke UK 
citizenship. Article 1F is not relevant in decisions to exclude from the UK or revoke 
citizenship, and is only of minor relevance to decisions to deport. Since appellants can resist 
deportation on human rights grounds, even when excluded from refugee status under Article 




Judge E: "Asylum as such is very rarely a determinative question in SIAC 
because it is dealing with mainly deportation cases where issues under the 
European Convention are usually more relevant, and exclusion from citizenship, 
deprivation of citizenship, where the issue doesn’t arise, and exclusion [from the 
United Kingdom] where it also doesn’t arise … it rarely has to consider it at all. 
In only two cases [in SIAC] was Article 1F of decisive importance." 
Examination of appeal to the SIAC is therefore a relatively small section of this research. 
The great majority (over 70%) of Article 1F cases analysed as part of this research in 
which appeal went to the SIAC rather than the tribunal involved revocation of refugee status 
due to suspected terrorist activities of the individuals concerned, in which the Secretary of 
State relied on Article 1F(c). In these cases, exclusion under Article 1F was a supplementary 
issue considered by the Commission in the course of the judgements, which primarily 
concerned whether or not there was risk on return for the individuals concerned. The two 
cases in which Article 1F was a decisive issue before the SIAC concerned an individual 
excluded under Article 1F(b) for allegations of fraud in Algeria, and a member of the Libyan 
Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) that the Secretary of State sought to exclude from refugee 
status under Article 1F(c). 
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3.2.1. Legal and evidential issues 
The SIAC may decide to hold closed hearings in which it considers evidence which should 
not be made public, during which the interests of the appellant are represented by a Special 
Advocate who is appointed by the Attorney-General (or in Scotland, by the Lord Advocate) 




 The closed nature of SIAC proceedings means it is not possible to fully consider the 
nature of evidence relied upon by the Secretary of State in these cases. Indeed, the use of 
closed hearings in SIAC cases has elicited a large degree of concern. 
Barrister F: "It’s totally unfair, there’s no doubt about that. There’s nothing worse 
than being involved in a one-sided trial. There’s nothing worse than having a 
client who is not given the evidence against them. You’re given very broad 
assertions of ‘this person is believed to be involved with x, y and z’ and nothing 
to back it up. And that is just fundamentally unfair, and I don’t think you can 
really deny that. … They’re extraordinary, you do your part of the case and the 
doors close and it goes on behind closed doors. … You should go and see one it’s 
very interesting. They go on in the basements of Field House. You’ll get a sense 
of what it’s like to be shut out of a case which effectively will determine your 
client’s life. It’s extraordinary." 
However, in most of the cases analysed as part of this research the only Article 1F issue that 
the Commission had to consider related to whether there are any geographical or temporal 
limitations to the scope of Article 1F(c), i.e. could the appellant be excluded under Article 
1F(c) as a result of acts committed in the UK after being granted refugee status. In the 
majority of these cases there seemed little doubt that the individual concerned had committed 
the acts in question. 
It seems that the type of evidence relied upon by the Secretary of State in SIAC cases 
differs from that relied upon when Article 1F is raised in relation to individuals suspected of 
committing war crimes or crimes against humanity, as outlined in section 1.2 above. This is 
not surprising, since evidence that gives rise to national security issues, particularly those of a 
terrorist nature, will often be supplied by the intelligence services of the UK or other 
countries, rather than the open-sourced material that is often relied upon in Article 1F(a) war 
crimes cases.  
Judge E: "Again it’s pretty unlikely that the Home Office would rely on Article 
1F because that requires the collection of a good deal of information which they 
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won’t necessarily have, as I think is demonstrated by the only two SIAC cases in 
which it has arisen." 
Barrister F: "You basically get what’s called a Security Services Assessment, 
which is a summary. So it will say something like ‘whatever the name of your 
client is, is assessed to be an associate of x, y and z’. If you’re lucky it might say 
something like ‘in July 2002 it is assessed that your client went on holiday with 
Mr X and then Mr Y was there’. That’s if you’re very lucky, normally it will just 
say ‘He is assessed to be involved in furthering the activities of some 
organisation’, and then it will tend to have loads of information about other 
individuals who your client is assessed to be associated with and about all this 
stuff, and very little actually about your own client, that’s my experience. There’s 
never actually any evidence, they don’t really give you any actual documents. 
That’s largely because their assessment is put together on the basis of 
intelligence, sources from wire taps, from tip-offs, you don’t get any of that, they 
put it all together. They paint the picture, and you just get the painted picture but 
you don’t get any of the underlying evidence which is extremely frustrating, it’s 
extremely frustrating." 
Unfortunately, as a proportion of the evidence on which the Secretary of State relies to 
exclude individuals from refugee status before the SIAC cannot be made public, further 
information on the evidence relied upon in these cases was not available.679 
 
4. Conclusions 
In this chapter, the process by which an individual is excluded from refugee status under 
Article 1F, and the consequences of such exclusion in the UK, has been examined. This 
examination reveals that, although the application of Article 1F to those who would face risk 
on return no longer means they can be removed from the UK, exclusion under Article 1F 
does indeed have serious practical consequences for those who remain in the UK. 
Furthermore, excluding an individual from refugee status under Article 1F leaves the door 
open to future removal and prevents the excluded individual from establishing firmer ties to 
the UK that may result in their permanent settlement.  
 As to the process by which an exclusion decision is made, early identification and 
investigation of potential Article 1F issues within the Home Office is essential, as this is 
likely to avoid long and protracted appeals in which Article 1F issues have to be considered 
afresh, and also lessens the possibility that those who should be excluded under the provision 
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‘slip through the net’. Within the Home Office, closer involvement of the SCU team with 
Interviewing Officers has begun and a need to provide Article 1F interviewers with further 
training has been identified. This will likely greatly improve the quality and efficiency of the 
interview process and help to reduce the need for repeated interviews.  
The main ways the procedures of Article 1F hearings before the tribunal differ from 
other asylum appeals is that the burden of proof rests on the Secretary of State to make out 
the exclusion decision, and UK legislation directs a decision maker to consider exclusion 
before inclusion and precludes a balancing test be adopted in relation to the extent of 
persecution feared by an asylum applicant on return. However, in practice it appears that 
immigration judges tend to consider Article 1F cases holistically, an approach which may 
mitigate the effect of this legislation.  
 It appears that, aside from the testimony of an asylum applicant, a large amount of 
evidence is relied upon by the SCU team to support an Article 1F decision. This includes 
international and domestic legal information and a large amount of open sourced material. 
However, concerns have been raised regarding the non-specificity of the evidence relied 
upon, in particular that the information is often too generalised and based predominantly on 
circumstantial evidence. It seems that some of this concern may arise from unfamiliarity with 
what is required to bring an individual within the scope of Article 1F. Indeed, a recurring 
theme raised by participants that took part in this research relates to the unfamiliarity of 
immigration judges and HOPOs with the issues raised by Article 1F cases. It is therefore 
suggested that, at a minimum, greater time could be allotted to cases that raise Article 1F 
issues, to enable those involved to fully consider the complex legal and evidential matters 
involved. A further option which could be pursued is the establishment of a specialised 
tribunal with the expertise and resources to fully consider the complex issues raised by 
Article 1F cases. This was a suggestion put forward by the SCU team member interviewed as 
part of this research. A specialised tribunal could manage Article 1F cases centrally in 
London, employing skilled and highly trained adjudicators with expertise in international 
criminal and humanitarian law.
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 It is expected that the establishment of such a tribunal 
would greatly improve the quality of decision making and add a greater degree of fairness 
and efficiency to Article 1F proceedings. 
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This research began with the expectation that the past decade would have seen a dramatic 
increase in the number of instances in which an individual was excluded from refugee status 
for their suspected role in terrorist activities or organisations in the UK. This expectation was 
based on a number of factors, including the prominent role played by the UK in the adoption 
of UN resolutions calling on Member States to exclude terrorists from refugee status; the 
introduction of primary legislation in the UK incorporating a broad definition of terrorism in 
the interpretation of Article 1F(c), and; the concerns of a number of commentators that the 
absence of a universally accepted definition of terrorism could result in the abuse of Article 
1F to exclude genuine refugees from the protection of the 1951 Convention. This research 
therefore began with the belief that the last decade would have seen a dramatic increase in the 
number of individuals being excluded from refugee status on grounds of ‘terrorism’, 
particularly under Article 1F(c) of the 1951 Convention.  
However, all the data employed in this study supports the conclusion that Article 1F 
decisions represent an extremely small proportion of the total number of asylum decisions 
made in the UK: the use of this provision appears be very exceptional. Although there has 
been an increase in the use of Article 1F in the UK in the last two decades, including an 
increase in the number of Article 1F cases concerning suspected terrorists, the number of 
cases in which the Home Office has excluded individuals from refugee status for committing 
terrorist acts remains infrequent and seems to have decreased in the last three years. The 
increase in the application of Article 1F in the UK has predominantly been in relation to those 
suspected of committing war crimes or crimes against humanity under Article 1F(a) rather 
than involvement in terrorist activities. Exclusion from refugee status under Articles 1F(b) 
and (c), in which terrorism has featured, has remained truly exceptional.  
Indeed, courts and tribunals in the UK have repeatedly stressed that Article 1F is not 
to be equated with a simple anti-terrorist measure. Instead, the practice of courts and tribunals 
has been to examine whether a particular act meets the definition of one or more of the 
crimes or acts enumerated in Article 1F, rather than rely on the characterisation of the act or 
individual as ‘terrorist’ in nature. To this end, domestic definitions of the crimes and acts 
listed in Article 1F have been rejected and courts and tribunals have rather looked to 
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international legal sources to determine the ‘autonomous meaning’ of the provision as a 
matter of international law. 
The limb of Article 1F that has been relied on in the UK in the overwhelming 
majority of cases is Article 1F(a) – serious reasons for considering an individual has 
committed a  war crime or a crime against humanity. The practice of both courts and 
tribunals in the UK and the Home Office has been to look to sources of international criminal 
law to determine whether the act in question amounts to a war crime or crimes against 
humanity within the meaning of the provision. A result of this approach is that individuals 
who could very readily be depicted as ‘terrorists’ or members of a terrorist organisation are 
not described as such. Rather, reference is made to the statutes and jurisprudence of 
international criminal courts and tribunals to determine whether an individual is responsible 
for the commission of an international crime.  
The predominant focus on Article 1F(a) and international criminal sources within the 
Home Office appears to be largely a result of the close relationship of the Special Cases Unit 
(and its predecessor the War Crime Unit) with the governmental policy of ‘no safe haven for 
war criminals’, with the result that these units are more specialised in the definitions of war 
crimes and crimes against humanity than ‘serious non-political crime’ and  ‘acts contrary to 
the purposes and principles of the United Nations’ under Articles 1F(b) and (c). Furthermore, 
increased reliance on Article 1F(a) rather than the other limbs of Article 1F may be a 
consequence of the nature of asylum claims in the UK. A large number of asylum applicants 
in the UK emanate from conflict zones or are fleeing repressive regimes. Crimes committed 
by these individuals are therefore likely to have been committed in the context of an armed 
conflict or in support of such a regime, and therefore fall within the scope of Article 1F(a). 
In common with the approach adopted in the interpretation of the crimes enumerated 
in Article 1F(a), courts and tribunals in the UK have recently begun to look towards 
international criminal sources in order to determine the standard of responsibility necessary 
for an individual to be excluded under Article 1F. In advocating an approach more closely 
aligned with international criminal law, the Supreme Court and Court of Appeal disapproved 
the previous guidance on Article 1F responsibility which focused on the ‘terrorist’ nature of 
an organisation of which an individual is a member. The Court of Appeal and Supreme Court 
preferred to rely on the doctrine of joint criminal enterprise formulated by the ICTY. 
However, the Supreme Court’s formulation of this mode of liability appears to have confused 
and conflated it with other modes of responsibility in international criminal law. Furthermore, 
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the Supreme Court’s reliance on a number of ‘factors’ when determining Article 1F 
responsibility appears to have brought such an examination back  to the issue of the nature of 
an organisation.  
The limb of Article 1F that has traditionally been relied on in the UK to exclude 
suspected terrorists from refugee status is Article 1F(b) –  serious reasons for considering an 
individual has committed a serious non-political crime. In the early cases concerning the 
interpretation of this provision, the House of Lords established that those who commit 
terrorist crimes are capable of being excluded from refugee status for committing a serious 
non-political crime, despite such acts being committed with allegedly political motivation. 
However, the Court of Appeal recently stressed that merely labelling an offence ‘terrorist’ is 
not adequate to establish that the offence is ‘serious’ for the purpose of Article 1F(b). Rather, 
the Court was of the opinion that the individual facts of each case must be considered in order 
to determine if the crime in question is sufficiently serious to warrant exclusion from refugee 
status under the provision.  
The application of Article 1F(b) in the UK has indeed remained truly exceptional; the 
provision is raised in relation to only a handful  of individuals each year. This may be a result 
of the Home Office’s predominant focus on international crimes, as outlined above. Other 
factors which may have contributed to the low frequency with which this provision is raised 
in the UK relate to the limitations inherent in the provision. Unlike Articles 1F(a) and (c), 
Article 1F(b) is geographically and temporally limited to crimes committed outside the host 
state before an individual’s entry as a refugee. Furthermore, the application of Article 1F(b) 
requires the identification of a specific crime having been committed, whereas under Articles 
1F(a) and (b) responsibility so as to give rise to exclusion from refugee status can be in the 
form of contributing to the criminal purposes of an organisation or group more generally. 
The limb of Article 1F under which terrorism has featured most strongly in the UK’s 
interpretation and application is Article 1F(c) - serious reasons for considering an individual 
is guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations. That terrorism 
has featured largely in the UK’s interpretation of this provision is unsurprising, as UN 
resolutions, UK legislation and the EU Qualification Directives explicitly provide that acts of 
terrorism fall within its scope. The reference in UK legislation to the UK’s broad domestic 
definition of terrorism in this respect led to the present researcher’s expectation that a large 
number of individuals might potentially fall to be excluded under this provision. However, 
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much like Article 1F(b), the application of Article 1F(c) in the UK appears to have remained 
exceptional.  
When interpreting ‘terrorism’ for the purpose of Article 1F(c), courts and tribunals in 
the UK have looked to international definitions of the term rather than rely on the UK’s 
domestic legislation. These bodies have furthermore developed in their jurisprudence a 
distinction between military activity directed against governmental armed forces and violence 
directed against civilians (the former held to not fall within the meaning of terrorism for the 
purpose of the provision) and a requirement that such activity have an international 
dimension in order to constitute ‘acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United 
Nations’. Indeed, the Supreme Court recently rejected the UK’s domestic definition of 
terrorism for the purpose of Article 1F(c) entirely, and relied on guidance provided by the 
UNHCR in stressing that, in order to fall within the scope of the provision, the terrorist 
activity in question must ‘attack the very basis of the international community’s coexistence’, 
being assessed with regard to its gravity and impact on international peace and security. In 
the context of Article 1F(c), this approach may have gone some way to dispelling many of 
the differences that exist between the different definitions of terrorism that exist in 
international and domestic law, such acts being likely to fall under all these definitions.  
Furthermore, as a primary problem that states encounter when attempting to agree 
upon an international definition of terrorism concerns the question of whether an exception 
should be made for the activities of national liberation movements, the exclusion of military 
activity directed against government forces from the meaning of terrorism for the purpose of 
Article 1F(c) might go some way in dispelling concerns regarding the lack of international 
consensus on this issue. In the absence of a clear universally accepted definition of terrorism, 
however, it may be preferable to focus on what the immigration tribunal in the early cases 
termed ‘acts which are the subject of intense disapproval by the governing body of the entire 
international community’. These would appear to include acts prohibited by international 
anti-terrorism conventions such as those relating to hostage taking, hijacking, terrorist 
bombings and nuclear terrorism, which are politically motivated and committed with the 
intent of causing death or serious bodily injury, as referred to in Security Council Resolution 
1566. 
 In practice, Article 1F(c) appears to have been applied to two main types of cases. 
The provision has been relied on by the Secretary of State to revoke refugee status from a 
number of individuals who were suspected of committing terrorist acts within the UK. As 
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these terrorist acts were committed in the UK after the individuals had been granted refugee 
status, Article 1F(b) could not be relied on. In the majority of these cases, appeal against the 
Secretary of State’s decision went to the SIAC rather than the tribunal, as the decision was in 
part based on security sensitive information. The main issue the SIAC had to resolve in these 
cases concerned the issue of whether there are any temporal or geographical limitations to the 
scope of Article 1F(c), rather than an examination of the meaning of terrorism for the purpose 
of the provision. There have also been a number of cases in which Article 1F(c) was relied 
upon by the Home Office to exclude individuals who had been engaged in military activity 
against governmental forces. It appears that Article 1F(c) was relied on in these cases rather 
than Article 1F(a), as the acts in question did not constitute war crimes within the meaning of 
Article 1F(a). The Court of Appeal in a number of cases rejected the argument that violence 
directed against governmental military forces constituted terrorism for the purpose of Article 
1F(c), maintaining the above noted distinction between activity directed against civilians and 
against government forces.  
 Although courts and tribunals in the UK appear to have been increasingly restrictive 
in their interpretations of ‘terrorism’ in the context of Article 1F(c), a recent development has 
seen the provision expanded to apply to attacks directed at UN-mandated combatant forces. 
However, it appears that the Supreme Court and Court of Appeal may have been misguided 
in this respect. The principles of international law which govern the interpretation of the 1951 
Convention, and leading international guidance on the interpretation of Article 1F(c) in 
particular, indicate that international consensus is required to expand the meaning of the 
phrase ‘acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations’ in this way. In the 
case of action directed against UN-mandated combatant forces, this consensus is clearly 
lacking. It is therefore suggested that the Supreme Court’s decision was flawed in this point 
and should be revisited. 
The process by which an individual is excluded from refugee status under Article 1F 
was also examined as part of this research. The exclusion process within the Home Office 
appears to be subject to a fair amount of rigour, no doubt due to the establishment of 
exclusion units with expertise in Article 1F issues. However, some areas have been identified 
for further improvement. Closer involvement of the SCU team with Interviewing Officers has 
begun and a need to provide Article 1F interviewers with further training has been identified. 
This will likely greatly improve the quality and efficiency of the interview process and help 
to reduce the need for repeated interviews. The SCU team rely on a large amount of evidence 
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to support an Article 1F decision, including the testimony of the asylum applicant, 
international and domestic legal information and a large amount of open sourced material. 
However, concerns have been raised regarding the non-specificity of the evidence relied 
upon, in particular that the information is often too generalised and based predominantly on 
circumstantial evidence. It seems that some of this concern may arise from unfamiliarity with 
what is required to bring an individual within the scope of Article 1F.  
Indeed, a recurring theme raised by participants that took part in this research relates 
to the unfamiliarity of many immigration judges and HOPOs with the issues raised by Article 
1F cases. It is therefore suggested that, at a minimum, greater time could be allotted to Article 
1F cases. A further option which could be pursued is the establishment of a specialised 
tribunal with the expertise and resources to fully consider the complex issues raised by 
Article 1F cases. A specialised tribunal could manage Article 1F cases centrally in London, 
employing skilled and highly trained adjudicators. Although Article 1F may be said to have 
lost much of its raison d’etre, exclusion from refugee status still has serious practical and 
legal consequences for the individuals involved. It is therefore essential that Article 1F 
decisions are made with a high degree of factual and legal expertise and specialised 
knowledge, in order to give due consideration to the complexities involved in such cases and 
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